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ABSTRACT 
 
A Friendship for Others:  
Bonhoeffer and Bethge on the Theology and Practice of Friendship 
 
Preston Parsons 
 
This study considers the theology and practice of friendship in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
academic writing, his pastoral work and thought, his involvement in the Abwehr plot, and his 
prison letters, taking special interest in the influence of Eberhard Bethge on Bonhoeffer and 
the influence of Bonhoeffer on Bethge. Friendship, as a locus of interpretation, also provides 
a fresh perspective on other aspects of Bonhoeffer’s thought, including ecclesiology, divine 
and human agency, eschatology, vicarious representation, concrete ethics and the divine 
command, politics, freedom, and obedience.  
 Part I of the dissertation investigates Bonhoeffer’s theology before Bethge. In 
Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer’s doctoral dissertation and first book, friendship is 
described as a community that is oriented to God’s creation and eschatological future, and the 
friend can participate in Christ’s redeeming work through ecclesial practices of 
Stellvertretung. Bonhoeffer’s failed friendship with Helmut Rößler, and his remarks about 
friendship within the context of his ministry in London and about the relation between ethics 
and the concrete command, offer insight into his theology of friendship as a political and 
ecclesiastical phenomenon in the context of the Third Reich. 
Part II of the dissertation looks at the theological influence Bonhoeffer and Bethge 
had on one another. At Finkenwalde, we begin to see this mutual influence begin to take 
shape, where freedom and obedience become part of the foundation of Bonhoeffer’s later 
concept of the Spielraum, and where we begin to see Stellvertretung, as a practice, take place 
between them. In the prison correspondence and through the influence of Bethge, Bonhoeffer 
develops the idea of the “realm of freedom” (der Spielraum der Freiheit), an expansion of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of the mandates, where freedom and friendship become part of his 
understanding of social and political life. 
 Integrating these theological and biographical resources, the study makes the 
constructive argument that a friend can be a theological Stellvertreter, taking into special 
account the particularity of the friend and mutuality that is characteristic of friendship. 
Through this participation in Christ’s redeeming work, its ecclesial location, and its political 
significance, a friendship can be for others. 
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TRANSLATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
I have used the critical English editions of Bonhoeffer throughout. There are, however, 
occasions when it was appropriate to include the German, and I have done so by italicising 
the German and placing it in square brackets. My interpolations should not be confused with 
the critical edition’s German interpolations, which are also in square brackets, but not 
italicised. 
The German and English critical editions of Bonhoeffer’s work share a system of 
referencing that divides the Bonhoeffer material into volumes, numbered sections, and 
numbered subsections. This dissertation refers to the section and subsections of the critical 
editions in the following form:  
 
DBW/E Volume:Section/Subsection, Page(s) in German Edition/Page(s) in English Edition. 
 
For example, DBW/E 10:1/40, 90-91/127 refers the reader to volume 10 of both the DBW 
German edition and the DBWE English edition, and to Section 1, subsection 40, of that same 
volume in both the German and English editions. Because the German and English critical 
editions do not share page numbers, and readers may want to check the English alongside the 
German, the page numbers of both the German and English critical editions are included. In 
this example, 90-91 refers to the page numbers in the German DBW, and 127 to the English 
DBWE. 
If there are no sections or subsections, the reference takes the following form: 
 
DBW/E Volume, Page(s) in German Edition/Page(s) in English Edition. 
 
Some materials became available after the German editions were published, and are 
only found in the critical English editions in translation; alternately, the material is in 
English, in which case I only refer to the English critical edition. The reference, in these two 
cases, would simply read: 
 
DBWE Volume:Section/Subsection, Page Number(s). 
or 
DBWE Volume, Page Number(s). 
 
  x 
Similarly, some material appeared in English after the first German editions were 
published, so appear in the appropriate English volume but appear in volume 17 of the 
German critical edition. This reference would read: 
 
DBWE Volume:Section/Subsection, Page Number(s) and DBW 17, Page Number. 
or 
DBWE Volume, Page Number(s) and DBW 17, Page Number.
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In a photograph taken at the celebration of the baptism of Eberhard Bethge’s son, the 
silhouette of a man sits slightly outside the circle of the Bonhoeffer, Bethge, and Schleicher 
families. His back is to the camera, and he looks toward Bethge, who holds his newly 
baptised son.1 The man in silhouette is Helmut Linke, a prison guard at Tegel, who had 
recently arrived with a smuggled letter and a sermon from Dietrich Bonhoeffer.2  
Linke began this illicit activity after observing one of the visits between Bonhoeffer 
and Bethge; Linke supervised prisoner visits in order that no illicit communication could take 
place, and in supervising Bonhoeffer and Bethge on 19 May 1944, he encountered a 
friendship unlike any other he had seen.3 Linke would later tell Bonhoeffer how impressed he 
was by the conversation; writing to Bethge, Bonhoeffer relayed what Linke had said:  
 
[What Linke] especially admired was that you “didn’t tell me what I wanted to hear”, 
which is what he says everyone else does in such a situation. I said that was just what 
was good, that we didn’t need it. He was obviously very impressed in other ways as 
well. This kind of conversation is a whole new world to him, and I myself think that–
very objectively–it’s rather rare.4 
 
Becoming part of this ‘whole new world’ meant that Linke became more than an observer. In 
addition to receiving a gold watch,5 that conversation led Linke to become one of two primary 
smugglers of the uncensored correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Bethge.  
This was not Bonhoeffer’s first observation about friendship. As early as his first 
doctoral dissertation, he opened the possibility that a friend can be Stellvertreter for another 
friend. In his correspondence with Helmut Rößler, we see both Bonhoeffer and Rößler 
negotiating a friendship under strain on account of their differing convictions. Near the end of 
his life, Bonhoeffer wrote of friendship and der Spielraum der Freiheit, a final addition to his 
social and political theology, where friendship takes up a particular place and role in the 
political and social world in which friendship is found. Finally, in taking Linke’s place, and 
observing the friendship between Bonhoeffer and Bethge, we see more than Linke did: that 
Stellvertretung—as an ecclesial practice through ‘acts of love’—took place between 
                                                            
1 Eberhard Bethge, Renate Bethge, and Christian Gremmels, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A 
Life in Pictures (London: SCM, 1986), p. 208. 
2 The sermon was delivered on 21 May, the day of Dietrich Bethge’s baptism; DBW/E 
8:3/143, 426/382 n3. 
3 DBW/E 8:3/154, 459/410 n4. 
4 DBW/E 8:3/154, 459/410. 
5 Charles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York: Alfred K. 
Knopf, 2014), p. 460. 
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Bonhoeffer and Bethge, where the friend acts as Christ for a friend in a way that has political 
and social implications beyond the immediacy of the friendship itself. In this friendship 
between Bonhoeffer and Bethge, the contention of the thesis comes into clear view: that 
Stellvertretung is appropriate to a friendship, and that a friendship can be for others. 
Before we get to the contention of the thesis, however, some measure of contemporary 
Bonhoeffer literature needs to be taken in order to locate my work within it, followed by the 
related subject of Bonhoeffer and Bethge within the field of friendship literature more 
generally. 
 
1.1  TRENDS IN BONHOEFFER INTERPRETATION: CONSTRUCTIVE AND 
HISTORICAL IMPULSES 
 
Bonhoeffer, and his theology, have spoken to contexts at great variance from their 
own. Bonhoeffer, for example, was deployed in theological movements like the death-of-God 
theology, Marxist East German theology, and English liberal Christianity; they were early, if 
not sophisticated, constructive recontextualisations of Bonhoeffer, taking place in a post-war 
context that Bonhoeffer himself could not have imagined.6 
With the work of Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer’s friend and theological conversation 
partner, a major corrective took place. With his biography, published in 1967, Bethge aimed 
to redirect the course of these constructive readings. For Bethge, Bonhoeffer was a theologian 
whose core concerns were consistent from his earliest work as a doctoral student to his last 
letters from prison; this was a critical move in response to Bethge’s opponents, who were 
taking Bonhoeffer’s work out of its textual and historical context. This trend of understanding 
Bonhoeffer as a theologian with consistent theological concerns, and whose historical context 
are essential to properly understanding his theological contribution, is, as we will see, still an 
active mode of Bonhoeffer scholarship. 
Bethge, however, did more than make sure that Bonhoeffer was well-understood on 
historical-critical terms. Along with the death-of-God theologians, the Marxist theologians, 
and the English liberal theologians, Bethge did his own recontextualising work on 
Bonhoeffer.7 As early as 1967, in his biography of Bonhoeffer, Bethge was re-reading 
                                                            
6 Haynes’s is the most comprehensive overview of different approaches to Bonhoeffer, 
though his work is oriented around content. His categories are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’, 
‘liberal’, among others. In comparison, my schema in this section is oriented around 
methodological use of Bonhoeffer. For Haynes’ approach, see Stephen R. Haynes, The 
Bonhoeffer Phenomenon: Portraits of a Protestant Saint (London: SCM, 2004). 
7 On Bethge’s ‘dual role’, see John W. de Gruchy, ‘Eberhard Bethge: Interpreter 
Extraordinaire of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, Modern Theology, 23 (2007), pp. 349-368 (p. 355). 
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Bonhoeffer’s legacy on the ‘Jewish Question’.8 Later, in the 1980s, he began refining earlier 
assumptions about Bonhoeffer’s record on the topic.9 Bethge’s work is better than many of 
the Bonhoeffer popularisers because of his historical sensibility and his comprehensive 
knowledge of Bonhoeffer’s theology.10 What he does, in recontextualising Bonhoeffer, is 
different in quality from the other contextualisers, but not different in kind; along with the 
others, Bethge read Bonhoeffer in order to navigate a post-war theological context that 
Bonhoeffer did not share.11 
What Bethge offers is two ways of approaching Bonhoeffer. The first is historical, and 
centres around the question of what Bonhoeffer said and/or did. This is seen especially in 
Bethge putting the prison correspondence in the context of Bonhoeffer’s theology as a whole 
in order to understand Bonhoeffer and his theological intentions accurately. The second is 
constructive, and centres around reading Bonhoeffer according to new contexts and engaging 
questions that Bonhoeffer could not have foreseen. This is seen in Bethge’s re-reading of 
Bonhoeffer for the sake of post-war Jewish-Christian relations.  
 The secondary literature on Bonhoeffer is too wide and unwieldy to survey 
completely; but with regard to recent representative publications, trends, and interpretations 
of Bonhoeffer, the twin categories of historical and constructive offer a good critical 
framework because recent volumes are a continuation of this trend. Some are historical 
investigations, like DeJonge’s. Others are historical, though speak to constructive contextual 
issues, like Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, as they read Bonhoeffer as an Anabaptist; or Marsh 
as he engages questions of sexuality and desire. A third way to engage with Bonhoeffer is to 
employ Bonhoeffer’s life and work as a resource in a constructive project, like de Graaff, 
Williams, and McBride. Each of the following representative volumes touch on this 
negotiation in these different ways, and will act as touch-points in the representative survey. 
 
                                                            
8 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 
pp. 271-6. 
9 Eberhard Bethge, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews’, in Ethical Responsibility: 
Bonhoeffer’s Legacy to the Churches, ed. by John D. Godsey and Geffrey B. Kelly (New 
York: Edwin Mellen, 1981), pp. 43-96. See also Stephen R. Haynes, The Bonhoeffer Legacy: 
Post-Holocaust Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), p. 7. This led to Bethge becoming 
a primary contributor to the statement of the Synod of the Evangelical Church of the 
Rhineland, Germany, in 1980, titled Towards a Renewal of the Relationship between 
Christians and Jews; on Bethge’s involvement in the production of this document, see John 
W. de Gruchy, Daring, Trusting Spirit (London: SCM, 2005), p. 189. 
10 Primarily seen throughout the biography, which works through Bonhoeffer’s 
theology beginning with his essays from university, and ending with Bonhoeffer’s prison 
letters; see Bethge, Bonhoeffer: A Biography, pp. 85-91, 853-91. 
11 De Gruchy, ‘Interpreter Extraordinaire’, pp. 361-65. 
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1.1.1 Historical readings of Bonhoeffer 
 
Michael P. DeJonge’s Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, & 
Protestant Theology is the most recent and comprehensive examination of Bonhoeffer’s 
habilitation thesis, Act and Being. DeJonge has two core theses, both concerning Bonhoeffer’s 
place in his historical-intellectual context. First, Bonhoeffer was not simply a Barthian, but 
rather brought the liberal and historical tradition of Berlin—exemplified in Harnack, for 
example—into a critical conversation with Barth. Second, in DeJonge’s reading, Bonhoeffer’s 
concern for the historical, as well as the influence of Barth, are both controlled by 
Bonhoeffer’s commitment to a Lutheran Christology.12 
Considering our terms, however, one irony needs to be pointed out, although it is an 
irony with which DeJonge is perfectly comfortable. Arguing for more use of the tools of 
intellectual history in studies of Bonhoeffer,13 DeJonge has himself written a book of 
intellectual historiography, showing that Bonhoeffer was a theologian who married historical 
concerns with constructive ones. But DeJonge’s form of inquiry is at odds with the content of 
Bonhoeffer’s own approach; in order to get Bonhoeffer historically and intellectually situated, 
DeJonge eschews any attempt at constructive application or use of Bonhoeffer. But situating 
Bonhoeffer in this way leads DeJonge to point out that Bonhoeffer himself did theology 
through interrogating a tradition, with the resources of that tradition, in order to develop new 
constructive insights. Bonhoeffer is, for DeJonge, ‘no slavish adherent of the Lutheran 
Christological tradition’ while remaining consistent with Lutheran theology’s ‘best 
impulse’.14 Bonhoeffer, in this way, was not himself strictly an intellectual historian like 
DeJonge. This insight about how Bonhoeffer approached the theological task helps to 
understand the ways in which other theologians, through an improvisation on Bonhoeffer’s 
own methodological impulses, approach and use Bonhoeffer. Most uses of Bonhoeffer are 
constructive, and the constructive theologians who use Bonhoeffer tend to read Bonhoeffer 
much like Bonhoeffer read his tradition: not slavishly, but according to a ‘best impulse’, with 
present-day concerns in mind.15  
 
  
                                                            
12 Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and 
Protestant Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 11-12. 
13 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, pp. 142-43. 
14 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 91. 
15 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 143. 
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1.1.2 Historical-Constructive readings of Bonhoeffer 
 
Bonhoeffer the Assassin?, written by Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and 
Daniel P. Umbel, argues that Bonhoeffer’s theology can find a much more comfortable place 
in the peace tradition than has been allowed. As a topic within Bonhoeffer studies, peace and 
the peace tradition has a place. Bonhoeffer thought he belonged, as the book reminds us, 
somewhere within the peace tradition. 
But in order to make the claim that Bonhoeffer’s life and work are reconcilable to 
Anabaptist traditions, the authors make the critical mistake of confusing constructive and 
historical categories. The first issue is how the authors treat Bonhoeffer’s objections to war as 
though it were a principle in Bonhoeffer’s thought.16 But this is to misunderstand how 
concrete commands work in Bonhoeffer’s ethics; the concrete ethical command, for 
Bonhoeffer, could never function as a principle, because an ethic based on principle would 
serve the principle rather than the God who commands. The argument, then, that Bonhoeffer 
spoke about a concrete command of peace does not mean he would have applied such a 
command, during his involvement in the conspiracy to kill Hitler, as though it were an ethical 
principle to be applied in a new situation. Further, the claim disregards Bethge’s biography. 
Bethge was present for many of the conspiratorial conversations, and was involved in the 
conspiracy himself, making Bethge a reliable witness to Bonhoeffer’s involvement. In their 
attempt to disclose an Anabaptist-friendly Bonhoeffer, the constructive impulse to appropriate 
threads and patterns of Bonhoeffer’s thought led to a bad reading of history.  
My point here, however, is not to vindicate Bethge over and against Nation, Siegrist, 
and Umbel; my point is that the authors of Bonhoeffer the Assassin? did not need to claim the 
historical Bonhoeffer for their project. The perceived need to articulate Bonhoeffer’s own 
thoughts on this matter led the authors into bad history, despite the fact that a constructive 
conversation about peace in Bonhoeffer’s work does not need to rely on a revisionist 
argument about what Bonhoeffer really thought or did during the conspiracy. When this takes 
place, in the way it does here, we end up with a constructive theological conversation with 
Bonhoeffer, but badly disguised as history.17 The constructive insights made by the authors 
                                                            
16 Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel, Bonhoeffer the 
Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2013), p. 119. 
17 In fairness to Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, they recognise that interpretation is self-
involving. See Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, Bonhoeffer the Assassin, pp. 101-2. But the 
presentation of their work, in the end, is not so easily recognised as interpretation when the 
claims are consistently about what Bonhoeffer really thought and did. 
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into the peace tradition are valuable, though not for their historical and close reading of 
Bonhoeffer. 
Charles Marsh’s Bonhoeffer biography, Strange Glory, makes a similar mistake to 
Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel. We could dwell on factual errors in Marsh’s account of 
Bonhoeffer’s life,18 but to do so would be a distraction from Marsh’s contribution. In Marsh, 
we have someone who is in the upper echelon of Bonhoeffer scholars, as well as a theologian 
in his own right. Where these qualifications do us great service is in his chapters on 
Bonhoeffer’s first sojourn in New York, and the continuing influence of that period on 
Bonhoeffer’s life and work. It takes a scholar like Marsh to point out that Bonhoeffer’s 
largely negative comments about American social theology stand in contrast to the traceable 
influence of that theology on Bonhoeffer over the long run.19 
It is not Marsh’s work on Bonhoeffer’s American influences, however, that raises the 
most questions. That distinction is reserved for Marsh’s theory about Bonhoeffer’s sexual 
orientation;20 I will cover this claim in more detail in Chapter 5. Again, like the Nation, 
Siegrist, and Umbel volume, Marsh’s assertions are best seen from a constructive angle. To 
frame the Bethge-Bonhoeffer relationship as an example (in part) of unrequited sexual 
attraction, as Marsh does, is to infer more than the sources can bear. Constructively, however, 
to read Bonhoeffer in order to find resources for a church working on ways to express and 
articulate the theological contours of intimacy, would be a fair use of Bonhoeffer; though 
Marsh should make a more careful distinction between an historical claim about the nature of 
Bonhoeffer’s desire, and the way the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship could be a resource for 
navigating contemporary construals of affection. 
 
1.1.3 Constructive uses of Bonhoeffer  
 
A third way of engaging with Bonhoeffer is to employ his life and work as a resource 
for a constructive project. This is different from a retrieval of a historical Bonhoeffer who can 
then speak with contemporary significance; instead, a reading of Bonhoeffer’s life and work 
together can reveal certain patterns than can be deployed in constructive argument. Guido de 
Graaff’s Politics in Friendship: A Theological Account,21 for example, puts Bonhoeffer’s 
                                                            
18 Schlingensieppen has been harshest in this regard; see Ferdinand Schlingensiepen, 
‘Making Assumptions About Dietrich: How Bonhoeffer Was Made Fit for America’, 
International Bonhoeffer Society Newsletter, 110 (Spring 2015), pp. 23-27. 
19 Marsh, Strange Glory, pp. 134-5. 
20 Marsh, Strange Glory, pp. 236, 253, 308. 
21 Guido de Graaff, Politics in Friendship: A Theological Account (London: 
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friendship with Bishop George Bell to good use as a case study in political friendship. 
Bonhoeffer serves de Graaff’s larger argument, which is controlled by the political and ethical 
categories of Oliver O’Donovan, and can be best understood as an extension of O’Donovan’s 
categories rather than a work whose theology is primarily controlled by Bonhoeffer’s habits 
of thought. As such, it makes a valuable contribution to political theology and a theology of 
friendship. I will say more about de Graaff’s work below, but, for my purposes here, de 
Graaff’s use of Bonhoeffer as a biographical exemplar of a particular way of thinking about a 
topic does offer one possibility for the use of Bonhoeffer in a constructive work of theology. 
Reggie L. Williams’s Bonhoeffer’s Black Jesus: Harlem Renaissance Theology and 
an Ethic of Resistance offers a good example of how a contextual reading can lead to some 
interesting insights into the possibilities present in Bonhoeffer’s thought. In this case, 
Williams’s location within the Black Baptist church, and his interest in the racialisation of 
Jesus and how that affects race relations, led him to work on the influence of the Harlem 
Renaissance on Bonhoeffer’s theological development.22 For Williams, Bonhoeffer 
encountered systemic injustices and violence in Harlem, which led to an identification with 
Jews suffering similar kinds of injustice.23 In this way, Williams leverages Bonhoeffer’s own 
patterns of thought to analyse the connection between theology and race for an America that 
continues to confront racially motivated violence and injustice. 
Jennifer McBride’s The Church for the World: A Theology of Public Witness is a self-
consciously constructive reading of Bonhoeffer’s theology of repentance. McBride finds 
herself in a particular tradition of ‘thinking alongside Dietrich Bonhoeffer’24 and in the 
methodological company of Bonhoeffer scholars like Rasmussen, whose work intentionally 
interpreted Bonhoeffer in and for an American context; and de Gruchy, whose work 
interpreted Bonhoeffer in and for South Africa.25 At its heart, this work is exemplary of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014). 
22 Reggie L. Williams, Bonhoeffer’s Black Jesus: Harlem Renaissance Theology and 
an Ethic of Resistance (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2014), pp. x-xi. 
23 Williams, Black Jesus, p. 4. 
24 Jennifer M. McBride, The Church for the World: A Theology of Public Witness 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 6. 
25 McBride, Church for the World, p. 11. De Gruchy describes his work as doing 
theology ‘With Bonhoeffer, Beyond Bonhoeffer’: going beyond Bonhoeffer means 
‘discerning and examining those trajectories in [Bonhoeffer’s] legacy that relate to our own 
concerns, and take us in new and fresh directions as we grapple with the issues that face us 
concretely, here and now’. John W. de Gruchy, ‘With Bonhoeffer, Beyond Bonhoeffer: 
Transmitting Bonhoeffer’s Legacy’, in Dietrich Bonhoeffers Theologie Heute: Ein Weg 
Zwischen Fundamentalismus Und Säkularismus? Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A 
Way between Fundamentalism and Secularism?, ed. by John W. de Gruchy, Stephen Plant, 
and Christiane Tietz (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2009), pp. 402-16 (p. 404). We could also add 
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reading Bonhoeffer according to his own best impulses. In this case, McBride’s Bonhoeffer is 
disruptive; as McBride puts it, when ‘taken as a whole […] Bonhoeffer’s work challenges 
commonly held theological assumptions’.26 This challenge plays out in her Christological 
understanding of repentance as a public act of witness that does not easily find a home in 
either American political camp, which, through the categories of sociologist Robert 
Wuthnow, McBride sees as either ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ Christians.27 She sees the good 
and the not-so-good in both camps, arriving at a synthetic, critical, and constructive proposal, 
without slavishly building on Bonhoeffer’s own ecclesiological, Christological, and political 
work. For McBride, as the church takes the form of Christ, it witnesses to the work of Christ 
through solidarity with humanity. It accepts God’s judgment, and demonstrates God’s 
reconciliation of the world, through acts of redemption and repentance.28  
The Church for the World is a work that demonstrates how the constructive use of 
Bonhoeffer can rely on Bonhoeffer’s work without making unnecessary or dubious historical 
proposals. Its methodology is synthetic; there is no need to simply tell us ‘what Bonhoeffer 
thinks’, though a close reading does form the foundation of the argument; it is also a 
deployment of Bonhoeffer recontextualised to a particular time and place. In this sense, it is 
very much in the spirit of Bonhoeffer’s reading of his sources. McBride re-reads Bonhoeffer 
not in order to be slavish to Bonhoeffer, but to discover and construct an argument with what 
she judges to be Bonhoeffer’s best theological self, for the sake of an American church that is 
politically divided and, as a result, largely ineffective in its public witness. 
Each of these three constructive uses of Bonhoeffer do something similar: each of 
them makes certain claims about Bonhoeffer’s life and thought, and then has those claims 
speak to the present in constructive ways. They are not, in this way, like DeJonge’s 
intellectual history. There is a significant difference, however, between Williams’s and 
McBride’s work, and the work of Marsh, Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel. While Williams and 
McBride look to Bonhoeffer’s life and work to speak to a contemporary issue, they do not 
make the mistake of confusing the historical with the constructive; whereas Marsh, along with 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Moltmann, who describes his work on Bonhoeffer as ‘Theologie mit Bonhoeffer’ rather than 
‘after’ or ‘beyond’ Bonhoeffer, though this means, for Moltmann, reading Bonhoeffer 
critically through his own experience of life as he read Bonhoeffer’s work. See Jürgen 
Moltmann, ‘Theologie mit Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Die Gefängnisbriefe’, in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffers Theologie Heute: Ein Weg zwischen Fundamentalismus und Säkularismus? 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way between Fundamentalism and Secularism?, 
ed. by John W. de Gruchy, Stephen Plant, and Christiane Tietz (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 
2009), pp. 17-31 (pp. 17, 19-31). 
26 McBride, Church for the World, p. 6. 
27 McBride, Church for the World, p. 11. 
28 McBride, Church for the World, p. 11. 
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Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel, do make dubious historical claims as though they were necessary 
for Bonhoeffer to speak to the present. That is, to explore Bonhoeffer’s insights into the peace 
tradition could speak to the contemporary peace tradition without Bonhoeffer himself needing 
to be a pacifist; similarly, to explore Bonhoeffer’s life could speak to contemporary questions 
of same-sex intimacy without the need for him to experience same-sex attraction.  
 
*** 
 
My point, here, is that one need not recreate a ‘historical Bonhoeffer’—as do Marsh, 
and Nation, Siegrist, and Umbel—in order for Bonhoeffer to take part in a constructive 
argument informed by current context. Instead, Bonhoeffer’s theology and life reveal certain 
patterns that have their source in their historic context, but are not reducible to that context. 
Bonhoeffer, in this way, can be foundational, as is the case for de Graaff, Williams, and 
McBride, without recourse to unnecessary (and sometimes dubious) historical claims. 
My work, however, does not fall neatly into the three categories listed above, though it 
takes elements from each. This is not a piece of intellectual history, or a constructive theology 
that engages directly with contemporary sources. It is closest to Marsh and Nation, Siegrist, 
and Umbel in that it indirectly has contemporary significance, though I do not rely on any 
claim about a historical Bonhoeffer. My work is a close reading of Bonhoeffer (and later, 
Bethge), with reference to historical context, but without making strong claims about my 
work as historical reconstruction. It is constructive, though it only engages with current 
contexts or other theologians in a limited way. I negotiate this way of thinking of my work as 
historical and constructive, yet without being easily recognisable as either, by way of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding interpretation as the articulation the ‘unthought-of’ in a 
person’s work, because Bonhoeffer, on account of his diverse modes of theological 
production, is well-suited to this approach.  
 
1.2 THE ‘UNTHOUGHT-OF’ AND THE RELATION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND 
PRACTICE 
 
A great deal of Bonhoeffer’s work is found in exploratory letters and unfinished 
manuscripts; his work on Christian life and community tapped a deep root of Christian 
experience; he wrote for audiences both popular and academic; and the form of his work was 
myriad, including doctoral theses, sermons, addresses, and letters never intended for public 
consumption. This diversity of form, audience, context, and content leads Bonhoeffer’s work 
to be a theological conversation within itself. In this way, a careful textual reading leads to a 
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Bonhoeffer that already lends himself to constructive possibilities, and where new theological 
possibilities can emerge from within his own patterns of thought; constructive theology with 
Bonhoeffer, in this way, emerges from what lies between the things that Bonhoeffer has 
already said. As de Gruchy explains, Bonhoeffer’s legacy is ‘open-ended’, and this makes for 
an invitation ‘to become participants in a continuing quest which borders on our own 
horizons’.29 My work, here, takes it for granted that a close reading of Bonhoeffer, and later 
Bethge, will be constructive not because it directly engages with contemporary sources but 
because the work as a whole already lends itself to constructive possibilities.  
This way of integrating the textual with the constructive is articulated in ‘The 
Philosopher and his Shadow’,30 an essay by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He is best known for his 
work on intersubjectivity, and this is at play in the essay; but the concept of intersubjectivity 
leads him to develop the idea of the ‘unthought-of’ as a way of describing the task of 
interpretation. For Merleau-Ponty, ‘the perceived world endures’ in the ‘reflections, shadows, 
levels, and horizons between things’, which ‘are not things and not nothing, but on the 
contrary mark out by themselves the fields of possible variation in the same thing and the 
same world’.31 But just as we perceive the world, Merleau-Ponty suggests, so in the thought 
of a philosopher we can perceive ‘articulations between things said’.32 Discovery of what lies 
‘between things said’ is what Merleau-Ponty claims he is doing in interpreting Husserl: the 
‘unthought-of’ in Husserl, that which is ‘wholly his and yet opens out on something else’ is 
‘not to possess the objects of his thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm to think about 
which we therefore are not yet thinking about’.33 For Merleau-Ponty, ‘[t]here is no dilemma 
of objective interpretation or arbitrariness with respect to these articulations […] since we can 
be faithful to and find them only by thinking again’.34 
As I proceed to think with Bonhoeffer, and then to think with Bethge, I am doing what 
Merleau-Ponty describes as the articulation of the ‘unthought-of’; to articulate what Kelly, 
describing Merleau-Ponty’s work on interpretation, describes as the ‘aspects [that] belong to 
[the work] essentially’:  
 
                                                            
29 John W. de Gruchy, ‘The Reception of Bonhoeffer’s Theology’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. by John W. de Gruchy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 93-110 (p. 94). 
30 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, in Signs, trans. by 
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159-181. 
31 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p. 160. 
32 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p. 160. 
33 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p. 160. 
34 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p. 160. 
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The main feature of this principle is that the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so 
close to him that he is incapable of articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these 
aspects pervade the work; give it its style, its sense, and its direction; and therefore 
belong to it essentially.35  
 
So to inhabit the middle ground between what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘literal reproduction’ and 
‘inevitable distortion’36 is neither to repeat—even in a more sophisticated way—what has 
already been said by the philosopher, nor is it to depart inappropriately from the structure of 
the work in question. To inhabit this middle ground is to express something that belongs 
essentially to the work of the person under investigation, while saying something new. 
The subject of friendship is particularly appropriate for this kind of investigation 
because a surface reading of Bonhoeffer or Bethge—however close that reading would be—
could not reveal a complete, systematic, and whole theology of friendship in Bonhoeffer. 
Bethge put it this way: ‘there is not a single passage in any of his own books in which he 
wrote a specific analysis of the place and dignity of friendship, whether sociologically, 
psychologically, philosophically or theologically’.37 This sentiment is an overstatement, as I 
will argue through the thesis.38 But it is right to say that there is no extended and systematic 
treatment of friendship as a distinct theological topic. Despite this lack of extended and 
systematic reflection on friendship, Bonhoeffer does have a lot to say on friendship; and 
friendship can be, without great difficulty, understood within Bonhoeffer’s own thinking on 
both Stellvertretung and his political and social theology, making for a faithful interpretation 
that is not limited by Bonhoeffer or Bethge’s lack of systematic reflections on the subject.  
This emphasis on Bonhoeffer’s and Bethge’s own work also differentiates my work 
from Guido de Graaff’s work in particular, the most significant recent monograph on 
Bonhoeffer and friendship. For de Graaff, the practice of friendship between George Bell and 
Bonhoeffer serves as a case study in service of developing and critiquing certain trends in 
moral and political theology, which de Graaff does adeptly.39 But this thesis is more in line 
with Bethge’s own work on friendship in Bonhoeffer, articulating the concept of friendship 
using Bonhoeffer’s own conceptual resources. What Bonhoeffer does, and says, drives 
                                                            
35 Sean Dorrance Kelly, ‘Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. by Taylor Carman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 74-110 (p. 74). 
36 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p. 159. 
37 Eberhard Bethge, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Theology of Friendship’, in Friendship and 
Resistance: Essays on Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. by Eberhard Bethge (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 80-104 (p. 81). 
38 And as Bethge’s own essay shows; Bethge looks to the 23 January 1944 letter in 
particular; see Bethge, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Theology of Friendship’, pp. 91-99. 
39 I will say more on de Graaff below. 
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Bethge’s work on friendship; the major difference between my work and Bethge’s is that I 
can look at the friendship from the outside, and speak to Bethge’s own part in it. My intention 
is to write a theology of friendship faithful to the resources offered by Bonhoeffer and Bethge 
by relying most heavily—though not exclusively—on modes of thought that lie within the 
structure of Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s own thinking. In this way, throughout the thesis, I will 
speak of the ‘unthought-of’ in terms of what Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s theology makes 
possible. This is not a way to say that Bonhoeffer, or Bethge, held precisely the positions that 
I mark out—that would be the mistake of confusing the historical with the constructive—but 
it is a way to say that taken as a whole, a person’s theology can accomplish things they may 
not have intended, and remained ‘unthought-of’, but things that are made possible by the 
theologian nonetheless. In this way, my work here is constructive through the interrogation of 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge according to that which they make possible. 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of how one would articulate the ‘unthought-of’ in a 
person’s work helps to describe how a close textual reading and interpretation can be a 
constructive one, but this is not the only methodological issue that needs to be covered. The 
evidence that I use to articulate Bonhoeffer’s, and later Bethge’s, theology of friendship takes 
both a textual form, and a practical one. Structurally, the thesis begins with a theology of 
friendship that emerges out of Sanctorum Communio, followed by a chapter on Bonhoeffer’s 
practice of friendship with Helmut Rößler; it continues with a chapter on Bonhoeffer’s 
theology of friendship as it is expressed it in the prison literature, followed by a chapter that 
focusses on Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship with Bethge, a chapter that ends with the way 
Bethge re-articulates the significance of friendship for the task of interpretation.  
The use of what Bonhoeffer and Bethge say about friendship, alongside the use of the 
evidence of the way each of them practiced friendship, is not meant to treat the practice of 
friendship as an example of what they said about friendship. The intention here is neither to 
vindicate Bonhoeffer or Bethge as faithful practitioners of their theology, nor to accuse them 
of being unfaithful practitioners. As such, Bonhoeffer’s and Bethge’s theological reflections 
are not treated as something that takes priority over practice; nor is practice considered 
something that lies apart from theology. Thus both what they said, and what they did, 
constitute evidence for a theology of friendship in this thesis.  
So, my approach to this thesis is constructive, in that my investigation proceeds 
according to what Bonhoeffer’s and Bethge’s theology makes possible; and both theological 
reflection and practice are treated together, as evidence. But there is one more source of 
reflection that informs my approach to the material: topics in friendship literature more 
generally. 
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1.3 TOPICS IN FRIENDSHIP LITERATURE 
 
Neither Bonhoeffer nor Bethge consciously engaged with classical Christian or 
philosophical texts on friendship, and do not appear to know the friendship literature of Plato, 
Aristotle, and Cicero, or their theological descendants such as Augustine, Aquinas, or the 
monastic literature of John Cassian or Aelred of Rievaulx. In other words, Bonhoeffer and 
Bethge did not themselves look to the literature from which many of the themes listed below 
find their source and expression. Bonhoeffer did find himself reflecting on the German 
middle-class and aristocratic tradition of friendship as it was presented in Stifter’s fiction,40 
and this influenced the fiction he was writing in Tegel;41 there are also traces of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard in the prison friendship letters.42 Though the study of the relation of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship to Stifter, Hegel, and Kierkegaard would be worthwhile, 
it will not be the focus of this study, which is centred on friendship within the structures of 
Bonhoeffer’s life and theology rather than any of these philosophical and theological 
genealogies.  
Nevertheless, in my argument concerning Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s theology and 
practice of friendship as a whole, what is disclosed is that Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s theology 
of friendship does offer points of contact with the literature on friendship more generally. I 
have divided these points of contact under four headings: 1. particularity and partiality; 2. 
mutuality and reciprocity; 3. politics; and 4. friendship as a way of knowing. In the case of 1., 
2., and 3., the thesis will include some critical re-evaluation of the friendship literature. 
 
                                                            
40 Bethge, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Theology of Friendship’, pp. 89-91. 
41 DBW/E 7, 66/65 n48; Clifford J. Green, ‘Editor’s Introduction to the English 
Edition’, in Fiction from Tegel Prison, ed. by Clifford Green (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 
pp. 1-23 (p. 18); Renate Bethge, ‘Editor’s Afterword to the German Edition’, trans. by Nancy 
Lukens, in Fiction from Tegel Prison, ed. by Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 
pp. 195-233 (p. 200 n1). 
42 The idea that friendship is the ‘concrete concept of freedom’ has Hegelian pedigree; 
see Elements of the Philosophy of Right itself, in §7 of the Gans edition of the 
Rechtsphilosophie; for the English translation I consulted, see G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, ed. by Allen W. Wood, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 42. See also Jürgen Moltmann, The Living God and the Fullness of 
Life, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox, 2015), p. 119. 
Bonhoeffer refers directly to Kierkegaard’s aesthetics in the same letter, and is similarly 
exploratory; see DBW/E 8:2/102, 291/268. 
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1.3.1 Particularity and Partiality 
  
Liz Carmichael sees particularity and partiality as part of the earliest Greek and 
Roman notions of friendship, finding its final classical form in Cicero, where friendship-love 
is ‘partial, exclusive, and contingent on worthiness’ and one that finds an uneasy place in 
Christian reflections on friendship on account of this, because it is ‘unlike the universal love 
commanded by Christ’.43 The language of friendship as particular and partial, however, does 
find a place in the Christian tradition, though very carefully on account of a fear that a 
particular friendship could lead to ‘cliques and sedition, distraction from inner calm, and other 
possible sins’.44  
The problem of the tension between the universal love of neighbour and the partiality 
expressed in the love of a particular friend is solved in a number of ways by Christian 
thinkers. Meilaender, for example, calls this the ‘preferential bond’ of friendship,45 and sees 
this ‘particularity of preference’ as a kind of exclusion,46 one difficult to reconcile with the 
Christian love that ought to be universal. Meilaender suggests, by way of Augustine, that 
though friendship must necessarily be particular and preferential, it should be ‘placed in a 
larger context, seen as a call toward and preparation for a love more universal in scope’, and 
is part of the ‘constraints of finitude’ but would nevertheless ‘lead us toward the love of 
God’.47 White points out a similar strategy in Newman and argues that Kierkegaard’s own 
negative assessment of partiality is but one strategy in Christian solutions to the perceived 
conflict between a universal and a particular love.48 Summers devotes a chapter to 
particularity in his monograph,49 claiming that particularity gives friendship ‘meaning and 
potency, allowing it to form a framework within which an ecclesial community can 
flourish’.50 Soskice is less conditional about the good of particularity in friendship, because 
‘[y]ou are friends with particular people and not with everyone, and this gives friendship a 
different scope from love even within the Christian lexicon. You should, according to the 
                                                            
43 Liz Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love (London: T&T Clark, 
2004), p. 3. 
44 Carmichael, Interpreting Christian Love, p. 3. 
45 Gilbert C. Meilaender, Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 3. 
46 Meilaender, Friendship, p. 6. 
47 Meilaender, Friendship, pp. 21, 32, 34-5. 
48 Carolinne White, Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 45-6. 
49 Steve Summers, Friendship: Exploring Its Implications for the Church in 
Postmodernity (London: T&T Clark, 2009), pp. 125-55. 
50 Summers, Friendship, p. 125. 
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Scriptures, love your neighbour and even your enemy. You cannot be friends with everybody 
without evacuating ‘friendship’ of all meaning’.51 Soskice, like Meilaender, identifies 
friendship’s particularity as a creaturely good.52 
Bonhoeffer’s theology, and the practice of friendship with Bethge, can make a critical 
contribution to the model proposed by Augustine and seen in Meilaender and others. For 
them, particular love (understood as eros, of which philia—friendship—is a subtype) is a 
school of love that leads toward a self-sacrificial and general love for others (agape) or a love 
that is integrated into agape.53 Bonhoeffer, however, creates an interesting possibility through 
the concept of Stellvertretung. Both particularity and creatureliness are present in Bonhoeffer 
on Stellvertretung, where Stellvertretung offers a limited solution to the problem of general 
and particular love.  
In Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer speaks of Stellvertretung in two ways. Firstly, 
Christ’s Stellvertretung is an atoning work that is universal, for the sake of all people. But the 
practices of the church—her acts of love and repentance—are also a form of Stellvertretung, 
related very closely to Christ’s Stellvertretung. I will say more about this in Chapters 2 and 5, 
but for introductory purposes, the acts of love and repentance that the church carries out for 
others are different from Christ’s Stellvertretung in that the church’s Stellvertretung cannot be 
universal in the way Christ’s atoning work is universal. Instead, the acts of love are particular, 
especially in the case of the forgiveness of sins, an act of love for the sake of others in their 
own historical and personal concreteness. A love for a particular other, rather than being a 
‘school of love’ that leads to a more general creaturely love, or integrated into that general 
love, God’s universal love in Christ—accomplished in his Stellvertretung—is the founding 
condition of a creaturely particular love; and because God’s universal atoning work in Christ 
for all is not perceived by Bonhoeffer to be in competition with the atoning work of the 
church, the apparent conflict between universal and particular loves is not as large a factor for 
Bonhoeffer as it is for those committed to Augustine’s legacy on this point.  
 
                                                            
51 Janet Martin Soskice, The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender, and Religious 
Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 160. 
52 Soskice, The Kindness of God, pp. 161-2. 
53 As it is in Jüngel; see Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the 
Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, 
trans. by Darrel L. Guder (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 1983), p. 338. 
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1.3.2  Mutuality and Reciprocity 
 
The related concepts of mutuality and reciprocity are also well-represented in 
friendship literature. Hutter finds the earliest notions of friendship’s mutuality in classical 
Greek notions of friendship;54 Carmichael identifies it as a feature of friendship in Aquinas, 
through his use of Aristotle;55 and Backström includes a section on reciprocity in his 
monograph on friendship.56 Soskice, too, identifies reciprocity as a second distinctive in 
friendship, writing that love can be unrequited, but friendship requires at least two: ‘[t]o be a 
friend is to have a friend’.57 Carmichael, similarly, calls this ‘giving and receiving’ an integral 
part of friendship-love.58 A more critical reading of friendship’s mutuality and reciprocity is 
made by Kierkegaard, who calls reciprocity in love a ‘contamination’, preferring the duty of 
love because it does not expect a return.59 Meilaender devotes a chapter to this concept of 
mutuality and reciprocity;60 it necessarily implies a demand of return, for Meilaender, which 
is at odds with the love of another for their own sake.61  
The related concepts of mutuality and reciprocity are another topic in friendship 
literature with which Bonhoeffer and Bethge come in critical contact. In Bonhoeffer’s 
theology of Stellvertretung, as it relates to friendship, we will see that mutuality and 
reciprocity in friendship is not part of a contractual exchange, but a relationship in which 
something is offered to another—and something is offered in return—but without the 
necessity of return. The significance of this will be investigated in Chapter 5, where the 
                                                            
54 Horst Hutter, Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in 
the Theory and Practice of Friendship (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
1978), pp. 3-4, 18-21, 107. 
55 Carmichael, Interpreting Christian Love, p. 106. 
56 Joel Backström, The Fear of Openness: An Essay on Friendship and the Roots of 
Morality (Åbo: Åbo Akademis Förlag, 2007), pp. 154-162. 
57 Soskice, The Kindness of God, pp. 160-1. 
58 Carmichael provides a distinction between ‘friendship as a reciprocal relationship, 
and the kind of love one associates with the friend. Friendship as relationship models such 
love and enables us to observe its nature’. But this appears to make a false distinction between 
the form of the relationship (reciprocal) and the love within the relationship. For my work, 
here, reciprocity is one of the forms that friendship-love takes. For Carmichael’s take, see 
Carmichael, Interpreting Christian Love, p. 4. 
59 Meilaender, Friendship, p. 42. 
60 Meilaender, Friendship, pp. 36-52. 
61 Meilaender, Friendship, p. 48. This critique of the necessity of exchange is part of a 
larger problem; for Meilaender, both benevolence toward, and the desire to enjoy another, 
must each be present in love, though unreconciled, because these two loves lie ‘within the 
brokenness of human history’ and only in hope will there be a day when ‘good will is 
regularly crowned with mutual love’; Friendship, pp. 49-50. My concern here, however, is 
with the claim the mutuality necessarily implies the necessity of exchange. 
  17 
Stellvertretung practiced reciprocally does not imply the necessity of exchange, or that 
something is given for the sake of something being returned. Instead, in acts of love and 
repentance—the practice of Stellvertretung—love can be freely given and freely returned. 
 
1.3.3 Friendship and Politics 
 
Friendship’s relation to political thought has its roots in classical philosophical 
traditions. For Aristotle, friendship is both a personal good and a good for the whole city.62 In 
Cicero’s ‘law of friendship’, friends do not do dishonourable things for one another, 
especially ones against the republic,63 and friendship could not lead to political instability; 
instead, it is a bond of peace.64 As McGuire puts it, ‘Cicero insists on what for us might seem 
unlikely, that political activities and private bonds come together for the public good in the 
lives of virtuous men’.65 Interest in classical philosophical appraisals of friendship and 
politics has led to secondary work by political scientists like Horst Hutter.66 
A relation between friendship and politics has found contemporary expression as well, 
many of them relying on classical ideas and texts, though not entirely. There are recent 
philosophical monographs by Jacques Derrida,67 Mark Vernon,68 Ray Pahl;69 there are two 
collections of essays on friendship and politics, one edited by Preston King and Graham M. 
Smith,70 another edited by John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko.71 There are also 
historical monographs, such as the one by Graham M. Smith on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and 
                                                            
62 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b, 1168b, 1171b-1172a, following Immanuel 
Bekker’s standard line references. See also Brian Patrick McGuire, Friendship and 
Community: The Monastic Experience, 350-1250 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian 
Publications, 1988), p. xxxi. 
63 Cicero, On Friendship, XII:40. I follow J.G.F. Powell’s chapter and subdivisions, 
here and below, from Cicero, ‘Laelius De Amicitia’, in Laelius, on Friendship & the Dream 
of Scipio, ed. and trans. by J.G.F. Powell (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1990). 
64 Cicero, On Friendship, XI:36-38. 
65 Constance J. Mews, ‘Cicero on Friendship’, in Friendship: A History, ed. by 
Barbara Caine (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 65-72 (p. 71); McGuire, Friendship and 
Community, p. xxxvi. 
66 Hutter, Politics as Friendship. 
67 Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997). 
68 Mark Vernon, The Philosophy of Friendship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp. 93-144; Mark Vernon, The Meaning of Friendship (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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Schmitt.72 Theologians are doing similar work as well, and much of the literature is positive 
in its evaluation of the link between friendship and politics. Young lists John Milbank, Paul 
Waddell, and Stanley Hauerwas as examples of theologians whose ‘conceptions of friendship 
enable constructive, innovative practices of community that respond to the deficits of 
modernity’.73  
Meilaender, however, is critical of the association between friendship and politics, and 
offers an entry into how to read Bonhoeffer on the subject. Meilaender calls the association 
between friendship and politics ‘incoherent’74 because it confuses private goods with common 
goods. In the pursuit of justice, the particular goods of friendship must be put aside.75 De 
Graaff is critical of Meilaender on this point, and rightly so: 
 
[Meilaender’s] criticism has been that the ideal of civic friendship amounts to a 
category mistake, involving the projection of a private relationship onto a public one: 
political community, an instrumental bond for the sake of justice, is expected to 
deliver the goods that only friendship can offer.76 
 
But what de Graaff goes on to point out is that the distinction between public/private does not 
map cleanly onto politics/friendship, and looks to O’Donovan’s tripartite distinction as a more 
nuanced and appropriate way to think of these spheres.77 DeGraaff writes: 
  
[C]lose social units (e.g. family) become part of society, their interests and pursuits not 
left behind but rather drawn into a nexus of goods enjoyed in a wider and more public 
context, such as art and education.78  
 
These goods do not necessarily involve government, and are thus part of the common good 
without being part of a system of instrumental justice. Rather than a public sphere and a 
private sphere only, there are private, public, and political spheres.79 This framing of the issue 
does greater justice to friendship, in de Graaff’s mind, because while ‘friendship has no direct 
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business in the area of politics, or at least in political office […] we might imagine friendship 
to have a share in this sphere without “politicizing” it’.80 In this way, friendship is private and 
political, but not directly political. 
I will follow de Graaff in using O’Donovan on this point for a different reason than 
that given by de Graaff himself does so. De Graaff’s work, as I mention above, is one that 
uses the Bonhoeffer-Bell friendship in order to speak of the relation of friendship and politics. 
It is an extension and exploration of the limits of O’Donovan’s own categories and 
distinctions, and an attempt to fit friendship within O’Donovan’s ethical project. De Graaff 
does not look to Bonhoeffer’s own theology of friendship, or ethics, in order to make the case 
for politics in friendship, despite the fact that he could have done so.  
My reason for following de Graaff’s use of O’Donovan is not because I have any 
interest in extending or modifying O’Donovan’s ethical project, but to articulate Bonhoeffer’s 
own theology of friendship, and to think through friendship with Bonhoeffer and Bethge. 
O’Donovan’s categories are operational in the background of this investigation because they 
offer the flexibility that the Bonhoeffer and Bethge material demands. O’Donovan’s tripartite 
model makes the best sense of Bonhoeffer’s own ‘political and social theology’, the term I 
will employ throughout this work, because when Bonhoeffer does ‘political theology’ he does 
not speak simply of the authority of the government in distinction from other social goods. 
Bonhoeffer’s political theology is one that grows out of a heavily modified Lutheran doctrine 
of two kingdoms. For example, early in Bonhoeffer, we have a political theology that depends 
on the distinction between the church and the state, but the state itself is concerned with goods 
that Meilaender would think of as private, including communities like marriage. In this way, 
Bonhoeffer’s political theology is part of a theology of sociality, where his concerns are not 
the difference between public and political good, and a private sphere of limited and 
particular goods, but how different kinds of social communities—including the church—
interact with one another, and are in a variety of ways obedient to the command of God. 
O’Donovan’s distinction between public, private, and political allows a space for things—
including friendship—that might be considered ‘private’ in the sense that they are more 
immediately concerned with a particular good, but ‘private’ communities that are in some 
kind of relation to the sphere of the ‘political’ and the ‘public’ without direct contributions to 
statecraft. As we will see, this articulation of the issue will be a helpful way in which to 
understand Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship, offering a critical response to Meilaender, 
and a way to think of friendship as something that can reach beyond itself, and as something 
that can be for others. 
                                                            
80 De Graaff, Politics in Friendship, p. 29. 
  20 
1.3.4 Friendship as a Way of Knowing 
 
To call friendship a form of epistemology would be heavy-handed; nevertheless, there 
has been some recent theological interest in friendship as a way of coming to know the truth. 
David B. Burrell’s Friendship and Ways to Truth sees the way of truth as ‘constituted by 
personal encounters’ and these encounters happening ‘within a community, in the company of 
friends’.81 Soskice, too, sees friendship as a way of ‘dialogical thinking’: 
 
In contrast to the Hegelian pattern, where thesis and antithesis sublate one another to 
be mutually annihilated in synthesis, in dialogical thinking the one and the other one 
are not destroyed by their encounter, but become more truly themselves.82 
 
Young points out that this aspect of friendship reaches back to Aristotle, for whom friendship 
enables knowledge;83 his monograph, Uncommon Friendships: An Amicable History of 
Modern Religious Thought, is a study of historical friendships that were ‘built around the 
pursuit of wisdom or understanding’ and ‘exchanges’ that ‘engaged in some form of criticism, 
in attempts to repair deficient conceptual or interpretive approaches’.84 Most recently, Samuel 
Kimbriel’s book, Friendship as Sacred Knowing,85 examines late-antique and early medieval 
examples of ‘intimacy and understanding [that] go hand in hand friendship’ in order to 
retrieve a tradition that, for Kimbriel, repairs a current ‘habit of isolation buried, often 
imperceptibly, within our practices of understanding and relating to the world’.86 
As an investigation into friendship in the thought and practice of Bonhoeffer and 
Bethge, this project is much more modest than Burrell’s, Young’s, Soskice’s, or Kimbriel’s. 
Unlike Burrell, Young, and Kimbriel in particular, I am not making the claim that friendship 
is going to solve the problems within a major intellectual project or heal a malaise of 
modernity. This would be to make too large a claim, considering the sources I am 
investigating here. 
Yet their work does provide another point of contact with the Bonhoeffer-Rößler and 
Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship. What we see, in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship in a limited 
way, and the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship in a fuller way, is that friendship can be a way of 
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reaching toward theological truth. This will be most clear in Chapter 5, where we will see that 
Bonhoeffer speaks of Bethge as the one who helped him clarify his own thoughts, and was a 
part of Bonhoeffer’s own process of truth-finding. This was a task that did not end for Bethge 
at Bonhoeffer’s death. Instead, Bethge turned to friendship as a way to establish his 
hermeneutical priority over other interpreters of Bonhoeffer: Bethge was Bonhoeffer’s friend, 
therefore he knew what Bonhoeffer meant, and could speak most truly about what Bonhoeffer 
intended to say within the ongoing reception and interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s work in the 
post-war context. It would be a mistake to lend too much theoretical and philosophical weight 
to this process. Nevertheless, the friendship between Bethge and Bonhoeffer was integral to 
Bonhoeffer’s own process of theological reflection, and Bonhoeffer said as much; and, 
according to Bethge, the friendship was integral to Bethge’s own interpretation of Bonhoeffer. 
The four categories above—alongside the thesis as an investigation into what 
Bonhoeffer makes possible and the way the thesis draws together both theology and 
practice—are part of the way I approach my evidence and material. The final task, to 
conclude this introduction, is to describe how each of these three approaches relate to one 
another in the thesis as a whole. 
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, my approach to the Bonhoeffer and Bethge material on friendship will 
bring together the following three elements: 1. The structure of Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s 
thought on friendship makes certain unthought-of conclusions possible, and these possibilities 
are faithful to the person being interpreted without resorting to the necessity of historical 
verifiability. 2. This look at Bonhoeffer and Bethge on friendship is not at the exclusion of 
their practice of friendship, and where practice is taken into account as evidence, leading to a 
method where theology and practice build upon one another. 3. The investigation takes into 
account the four relevant categories found in the friendship literature and listed above.  
It would be helpful here, before I come to the summary, to state one of the limitations 
on assessing the degree of influence Bethge had on Bonhoeffer, and Bonhoeffer on Bethge: it 
is difficult to assess Bethge as a thinker, independent from Bonhoeffer, until well after 
Bonhoeffer’s death. Bethge’s literary estate, where we would find Bethge’s own theological 
work at the time of his friendship with Bonhoeffer, and correspondence with people other 
than Bonhoeffer, is difficult to access. It is archived where Bonhoeffer’s literary estate is 
archived—at the Staatsbibliothek on Potsdamer Straße in Berlin—and consists of numbered, 
but unsorted and uncatalogued, boxes of untranscribed letters and other documents from 
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Bethge’s life. Future Bonhoeffer and Bethge research will certainly benefit from this 
archive—especially the hundreds of pages of letters shared between Bethge and his fiancée 
and wife, Renate, while Bethge was on the Italian front and while Bonhoeffer was in prison 
and Bonhoeffer and Bethge were sharing their own correspondence. For the time being, 
however, access to these letters, and the Bethge archive as a whole, is overseen by Bethge’s 
surviving family and is limited.  
This limitation, and the three elements above, leads to the following structure: 
Part I: Bonhoeffer on Friendship, 1927-1935. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate Bonhoeffer 
on friendship before meeting Eberhard Bethge. 
Chapter 2: Friendship in Sanctorum Communio. Chapter 2 is primarily a description of 
Bonhoeffer’s own habits of thought in Sanctorum Communio; what emerges is the possibility 
of friendship as a kind of community in which Stellvertretung can be practiced, and where we 
find the first conceptual resources for the possibility that friendship could be for others. A 
discussion of mutuality and reciprocity, and particularity and preference, begins here, though 
both will be more fully investigated in the conclusion to Chapter 5.  
Chapter 3: The Rößler Correspondence. What Bonhoeffer makes possible in 
Sanctorum Communio is then followed by Chapter 3, on Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship 
with Helmut Rößler. Structurally, Sanctorum Communio provides certain insights about 
friendship to which insights from the Bonhoeffer-Rößler chapter are added. The practice of 
friendship with Rößler does not provide an example of friendship in Sanctorum Communio; it 
provides additional data, and contributes on its own to a theology of friendship that builds on 
what Bonhoeffer had to say in Sanctorum Communio. Though there is very little research into 
Rößler’s impact on Bonhoeffer, this chapter shows the value of this friendship in 
understanding certain aspects of Bonhoeffer’s theological development. This chapter also 
investigates friendship’s political aspects, and serves as a way to begin to understand the way 
friendship could be for others; it also describes friendship in terms of a mutual way of 
knowing. 
Part II: Bonhoeffer and Bethge on Friendship, 1935-1973. Part II investigates 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s theology and practice of friendship after they meet in 1935. 
Chapter 4: Orders, Mandates, Friendship, and Freedom. The political aspects of 
friendship continues to be investigated in Chapter 4, beginning with Bonhoeffer’s prison 
correspondence with Bethge on the mandates and in relation to friendship. And as the Rößler-
Bonhoeffer friendship builds upon what Bonhoeffer makes possible in Sanctorum Communio, 
the prison letters build upon the chapters that preceded it. While the secondary literature on 
der Spielraum der Freiheit—a concept related to friendship and the mandates, and introduced 
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into the conversation with Bethge by Bonhoeffer—is spare, this chapter shows that these 
remarks by Bonhoeffer illuminate other aspects of Bonhoeffer’s political theology, and are 
best understood with reference to longstanding concerns in Bonhoeffer’s thought. As such, 
the political aspects of friendship become more conceptually grounded in Bonhoeffer’s 
thought as a whole, and add to what was first revealed in the Rößler friendship: that 
friendship, as political, is a way of understanding it as for others.  
Chapter 5: Interpreting the Bonhoeffer-Bethge Friendship. The final chapter on 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s practice of friendship—even though it does provide the clearest 
example of what was disclosed in the three previous chapters—is not meant to act simply as 
an example of what has already been disclosed. It, too, provides another unique insight into 
friendship that builds upon what we know of Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship and what 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge have said about friendship. In this chapter, the practice of 
Stellvertretung becomes clear in the context of a mutual and particular friendship. Further, 
friendship—as a way of reaching toward theological truth—is seen clearly in the Bonhoeffer-
Bethge friendship in terms of mutuality; friendship, as a way of knowing, becomes another 
way to speak of friendship for others, and as it is seen in Bethge’s interpretation of 
Bonhoeffer after his death. The conclusion to this chapter critically engages some friendship 
literature’s approach to the mutuality and particularity of friendship. Finally, the Bonhoeffer-
Bethge friendship serves as a way to see friendship as an appropriate way for Stellvertretung 
to take place, and as both a good shared between friends and a good for the political and 
social world the friends inhabit.  
All of these factors come into play, finally, in the conclusion where I will make some 
final summative remarks, and suggest possible next steps and implications regarding what 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge, together, make it possible to say about friendship: that Stellvertretung 
is appropriate to friendship, and that friendship can be for others. It is to this central task that 
we now turn, beginning with Bonhoeffer’s theology of Stellvertretung as its found in 
Sanctorum Communio. 
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2 FRIENDSHIP IN SANCTORUM COMMUNIO 
 
Who in our time could, for example, lightheartedly make music, nurture friendship, 
play, and be happy? Certainly not the ‘ethical’ person, but only the Christian.87 
 
Bonhoeffer wrote these words to Eberhard Bethge from Tegel prison in 1944, though the 
claim that the Christian has a peculiar ability to nurture friendship finds a place in his thought 
as early as 1927. In Sanctorum Communio, friendship—and the way it takes shape among 
Christians in the church—finds a place within his ecclesiology as an enduring social relation 
which is grounded eschatologically in God, subject to judgment, and open to eternal life. 
Within the context of the thesis as a whole, the chapter offers conceptual foundations for 
understanding the relation of friendship to Stellvertretung, and the way friendship can be for 
others; it does so by developing what Bonhoeffer makes possible in Sanctorum Communio as 
a whole. In its most basic form, the conclusion of this chapter is that friendship, under certain 
conditions, is a lasting, redemptive social relation that reaches beyond itself in its significance 
for others. 
Before we get to the textual exposition itself, a few things need to be said about the 
text, and interpretation, of Sanctorum Communio. As for the text, Bonhoeffer’s original 
dissertation was completed in July 1927. The editors of the critical DBW and DBWE editions 
call the dissertation text SC-A, and the published text SC-B. The SC-A text was heavily 
worked over by Bonhoeffer, and 20 to 25 percent of it was cut or relegated to footnotes for its 
publication in 1930. This was to reduce the cost of printing during the depression and to 
please Reinhold Seeberg, Bonhoeffer’s doctoral supervisor, editor of the series in which the 
book appeared, and, through his foundation, a financial contributor to the cost of publishing 
the dissertation as a book.88 Thus the removal of material, or its relegation to footnotes, is 
related more to financial exigency than it is to the quality of the material itself. The published 
version of Sanctorum Communio does make sense as a whole, and the arguments can be 
followed, though they are much more compact as a result of the paring down of the 
dissertation; but this does not mean that the material from the dissertation, relegated to 
footnotes by Bonhoeffer for publication or restored by the editors of the critical editions, 
should be considered dispensable or without value. Through the reconstruction of the 
dissertation in the DBW and DBWE volumes, we see some of the details of Bonhoeffer’s 
argument, including those pieces that were important for Bonhoeffer himself in 1927 (even if 
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they were not important to Seeberg, or the publishers, in 1930). Therefore, the material from 
SC-A should be considered of value in an investigation into Bonhoeffer’s theology. 
A primary interpretive concern has to do with the form of Sanctorum Communio, 
specifically the relationship between Sanctorum Communio and the discipline of ethics. While 
I will draw out Bonhoeffer’s ethical concerns in Sanctorum Communio, I nevertheless agree 
with Eva Harasta, who points out that Bonhoeffer’s work took place before ethics was 
considered a discrete discipline apart from dogmatics, and that for Bonhoeffer, the primary 
basis for ethical claims was through dogmatic theology;89 this way of relating ethics to 
dogmatic theology takes place, for Harasta, in Sanctorum Communio.90 What this means for 
my investigation is that Bonhoeffer’s ethics can be pursued in Sanctorum Communio. 
Bonhoeffer is concerned with encounter with others, the ethical demands of that encounter, 
and the resolution of those demands; in this way, Sanctorum Communio is a work with moral 
dimensions, and ethical themes—such as what one can, and should, do for a friend—can be 
pursued. This will be most important for Stellvertretung, including its relation to eschatology; 
more will be said about the moral import of these for friendship in Section 3 and Section 4. 
But neither is Sanctorum Communio a decision-making manual, or a guide to how to 
make decisions in the world as it is, and this leads to a second implication of Harasta’s point 
about Sanctorum Communio as a text where ethics and theology are considered together: 
theology also matters to ethics. Aside from the poverty and inadequacy of relegating doctrine 
to the theoretical realm and ethics to the practical realm, and the resulting isolation of Christ 
in a history that has little bearing on everyday decision-making—as Holmes points out—this 
kind of reading would not do justice to Bonhoeffer himself.91 The structural pattern of 
Sanctorum Communio plainly puts the work within a broader, dogmatic-ethical category 
through its structural use of creation, fall, and redemption as its defining categories.92 After 
establishing his theological method as it relates to social philosophy and sociology in chapter 
1 of Sanctorum Communio, and then establishing his basic concepts of personhood and 
sociality in chapter 2, the next three chapters consider sociality and various forms of social 
arrangement as they relate to ecclesiology in terms of creation (Bonhoeffer’s ‘Primal State’), 
fall, the redeeming work of Christ in the church, and eschatology. Moral and ethical 
deliberation is set within a created, fallen world where God has acted on our behalf in Christ, 
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and where God continues to act for others in the church, and over which God will ultimately 
pass judgment. This grand narrative is where Bonhoeffer places the encounter of persons, 
collective or otherwise.93 This way of reaching back to creation, and forward to a new 
creation—from the here and now—will be important for the following reading of Sanctorum 
Communio, but it is not something imposed upon the work from the outside; the structure is 
already there, and Bonhoeffer summarises his work this way himself.94 This ‘reaching back’ 
and ‘reaching forward’, overlooked as it is by interpreters who write of ‘community’ as a 
singular category without reference to a primal state or to eschatology, was nevertheless 
important for Bonhoeffer; and to ignore this dogmatic shape to the work risks 
misunderstanding what Bonhoeffer meant by ‘community’ specifically, a central term 
throughout this discussion.  
A second issue of interpretation is the significance of the difference between three of 
Bonhoeffer’s central terms in Sanctorum Communio: Gemeinschaft, Gemeinde, and Kirche. 
The critical translation of Sanctorum Communio in the DBWE is at pains to make the 
distinctions clear, as is Green in his study Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality.95 Quite 
rightly, Green (who was also editor of the critical English edition) differentiates between two 
of these terms by translating Gemeinschaft as ‘community’ and Gemeinde as ‘church-
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community’. This is not without its own problems, however, as Kirche, translated as ‘church’ 
and referring to what Bonhoeffer often calls the ‘empirical church’, can collapse into 
Gemeinde through the false semantic field created by the duplication of the word ‘church’ in 
the translation of Gemeinde as ‘church-community’. Overall, it does accomplish, albeit 
imperfectly, what was intended. The three terms, in translation, are differentiated from one 
another. And in fairness to Green, there are no better proposals on the table. 
After the careful translations of the English critical edition of Sanctorum Communio, it 
is unfortunate that so much of the Bonhoeffer literature in English continues to be less than 
careful with these terms, because it can result in a distortion that the translators intended to 
avoid.96 Of particular relevance to this investigation, the distinction of terms becomes 
especially important because it allows for a more complex interaction between these various 
social realities and arrangements, an interaction present in Bonhoeffer’s own text, 
investigated here in Section 2 where ‘empirical church’ and ‘Gemeinde’ are related but not 
the same; Gemeinde is possible in social relations other than the empirical church. This 
subtlety would be lost without paying close attention to Bonhoeffer’s distinctions. To 
preserve these distinctions, I often use the German term in my prose in order to retain the 
character of Bonhoeffer’s subtle differentiation.  
The final issue of interpretation is related to both the ethical dimensions and 
Bonhoeffer’s differentiation of terms as they process through his dogmatic structure. The 
meaning of Gemeinschaft and Gemeinde change and shift according to where Bonhoeffer is 
within his theological narrative. The terms have different shades of meaning when they are 
discussed within the context of the primal state before the fall, within the context of the fall, 
or as reconciled in Christ eschatologically.97 Attentiveness to the changing and shifting of 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Gemeinschaft helps illuminate the importance of its original 
and eschatological wholeness, and its current state of fracture; this attentiveness will be 
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especially important when the discussion turns to the eschatological dimension of 
Gemeinschaft and Gemeinde and its meaning for Gemeinschaft in the present. 
 
2.1 FRIENDSHIP AS GEMEINSCHAFT 
 
The first step in arguing for friendship as a lasting social relation, and one that under 
certain conditions can be redemptive, is to establish friendship as a social relation in which 
God is at work. As such, this section offers the first steps toward the meaning of a ‘lasting’ 
and ‘redemptive’ friendship through the concept of Gemeinschaft, and friendship as a form of 
Gemeinschaft. As we will see, to call friendship a form of Gemeinschaft leads to seeing 
friendship as a social phenomenon in which God is at work, and which is oriented to God’s 
ultimate ends. 
The primary evidence of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of friendship as a form of 
Gemeinschaft is found in SC-B, where Bonhoeffer describes the difference between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In a technical discussion about the mediation of will, its 
independence, and the way will takes the form of objective spirit, Bonhoeffer makes a number 
of claims about Hegel’s contribution to the concept of Gemeinschaft. For Bonhoeffer, will—
as objective spirit—is something that forms a structure that is greater than the individual wills 
of the participants in the community. In this discussion, Bonhoeffer relates this objective 
spirit to purpose, and speaks of a work of art as something that is not reducible to a purpose. 
Instead, it has ‘fulfilment and understandability in itself because the objective spirit that 
sustained it was an end in itself’, and thus it continues to ‘live’; this is unlike an artefact that 
had a purpose which is no longer understood, and is ‘dead, because the objective spirit that 
sustained it […] was always a means to an end [and] has ceased along with that purpose’.98 
This is all in Bonhoeffer’s effort to describe the difference between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft has an end in itself and, as a result, Gemeinschaft is lasting, like a 
piece of art; in contrast, Gesellschaft has purposes that do not last, because they are means to 
an end, like an artefact. I will speak to the significance of this difference below, but I begin 
with Bonhoeffer’s discussion of objective spirit and will because in it Bonhoeffer speaks of 
specific examples of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; the Gemeinschaft that best embodies 
ends that reach beyond itself is friendship, a correlation that Bonhoeffer makes three times in 
the context of his discussion of objective spirit,99 leading to a conclusion that is difficult to 
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refute: not only is friendship, for Bonhoeffer, Gemeinschaft, it is one of the most exemplary 
forms of social relation that, in not being reducible to a purpose, can endure.  
Bonhoeffer is not, however, content with a non-theological reading of the difference 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and he adds some distinctive theological qualities to 
his definitions in a longer, more detailed argument in SC-A, definitions that are then deployed 
in his argument in SC-B and seen above in a truncated form.100 If we look to the detailed 
argument of SC-A we see that Bonhoeffer begins with sociology, but then self-consciously 
differentiates his work from that of the sociologists. For Tönnies, and for Bonhoeffer 
following Tönnies, Gesellschaft exists ‘purely within history’, and is ‘constituted to realize its 
purpose’.101 This sociological definition for Bonhoeffer, however, is preliminary, and he 
quickly turns to theological terms and subjects. Society may dream to ‘establish the Realm of 
God on earth’, but even this apparent eschatological grounding of society in God does not 
make it Gemeinschaft, because Gesellschaft is, by definition, ‘constituted in history to realize 
its purpose’, and ‘in no way does the idea of a society extend beyond the idea of its 
constitutive purpose’.102 What Bonhoeffer means is that even if the purpose of a society is the 
‘Realm of God’, a society by definition will never be able to accomplish that on its own; God 
establishes the ‘Realm of God’, not creatures, however righteous their intentions. So long as 
its purpose is historically borne in a human desire to establish this ‘Realm of God’, 
Gesellschaft will find its end within history.103 In Bonhoeffer’s theological reading, 
Gesellschaft’s purpose ‘lies, speaking purely eschatologically, at the end of history’, meaning 
this purpose is ‘necessarily within history and is temporally conditioned’.104 In this way, 
society is something characterised by human purposive action, rather than God’s, and 
therefore it cannot extend beyond the limit of history; and, through the reference to 
eschatology, Bonhoeffer makes Gesellschaft a theological term rather than simply a 
sociological one. 
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Bonhoeffer’s sociological-theological definition of Gesellschaft is, again, made in 
contrast to Gemeinschaft. For Bonhoeffer, a community is ‘value-bearing’, and it therefore 
‘transcends its inner historical limitations’ through this value-bearing.105 Bonhoeffer then 
turns to theological terms in order to clarify the meaning of this sociological definition: for 
Bonhoeffer, because community holds a value that is not confined historically, this is a way 
of ‘thinking’ of community ‘eschatologically and supratemporally, that is, in God’; therefore, 
for Bonhoeffer, ‘the nature of community is grounded in and willed by God’.106 The 
Gemeinschaft that is lasting, then, is lasting for theological reasons: because it is 
eschatologically grounded in and willed by God. 
There are a number of leaps in logic here on Bonhoeffer’s part, and they demonstrate 
his intent to bridge sociological disciplines and theology. It is difficul t to deduce why, in the 
case of Gesellschaft, society cannot extend beyond its purpose historically, and therefore 
cannot extend beyond the limit of history eschatologically; or in the case of Gemeinschaft, 
why ‘value’ is irreducible to history because history is without meaning, and thus leads to 
thinking eschatologically and supratemporally about community because of its ‘value-
bearing’. But to be overly concerned with the ways that Bonhoeffer successfully, or 
unsuccessfully, wrestles sociological terms into theological submission would be to miss 
Bonhoeffer’s theological point. Bonhoeffer’s interest is in articulating ‘an inherently Christian 
social philosophy and sociology’ that arises ‘out of fundamental concepts of Christian 
theology’; and, specifically, this Christian social philosophy and sociology ‘is most fully 
articulated in the concept of the church’.107 I will return to the significance of the church 
below, but for now my point is that Bonhoeffer has no desire to be bound by the narrowness 
of sociological description because in his mind, sociology and social philosophy, by 
definition, are not sufficient. Bonhoeffer begins with sociological and social philosophical 
descriptions and definitions, but the church bears the meaning of true sociality, a sociality that 
arises out of fundamental concepts of theology. The result of holding both sociological 
disciplines and theology as starting points makes for a messy method, but one that is able to 
preserve insights from them both, in a process of mutual influence. 
Discussing Bonhoeffer in terms of ‘mutual influence’ is in contrast to Green, and more 
recently Mawson, who have argued that Bonhoeffer understands theology as instrumental in 
clarifying and correcting sociology and social philosophy. For Green, though sociology and 
social philosophy function with relative autonomy and independence from theology as 
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disciplines, neither sociology nor social philosophy operate with complete independence in 
Bonhoeffer’s text. Theology, according to Green, will ‘qualify and transform’108 the 
sociological and social-philosophical terms borrowed by Bonhoeffer because of the regulatory 
nature of revelation.109 Mawson takes Bonhoeffer’s statement about employing sociology and 
social philosophy in the ‘service’ of theology to mean that theology takes on a corrective role 
with regard to the errors of sociology and social philosophy, such as the prioritising of the 
individual apart from their standing before God, and an individual’s relationships with other 
human beings.110  
The issue with this way of understanding the relation between sociology and social 
philosophy in Bonhoeffer, in distinction from my proposal, is that though Green and Mawson 
can make their argument based on the way Bonhoeffer says he proceeds, it does not describe 
the way Bonhoeffer actually does proceed, as seen above in his description of the difference 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The primary issue with Green and Mawson is not 
that they are wrong about theology’s qualifying, transforming, or corrective role for 
Bonhoeffer; the issue is that this does not fully describe how the meeting of theology with 
sociology and social philosophy functions in the arguments Bonhoeffer makes here. Further, 
Green and Mawson both make Bonhoeffer’s method appear much tidier than it actually is in 
practice.  
First, in answer to Green, it is not simply sociology and social philosophy that are 
qualified and transformed by their meeting with theology. Theology, too, is qualified and 
transformed through its meeting with sociology and social philosophy. Theology itself is 
inflected by the definitions that Bonhoeffer takes for granted, a phenomenon seen in 
theology’s qualification by social categories like Gemeinschaft. The eschaton—God’s end—
becomes a social phenomenon, as can be seen here in the definition of Gemeinschaft as 
something that is eschatologically ‘in God’; this social inflection of theology will be even 
more clear when Bonhoeffer speaks of the way sociality endures eschatologically, something 
I will look at more closely in section 4.  
Secondly, in answer to Mawson, the social categories Bonhoeffer uses are part of his 
sociological and social-philosophical sources, not his theological ones. In saying that 
Bonhoeffer’s method, in practice, is marked by the mutual influence of theological and 
sociological sources, I am not saying that for Bonhoeffer, sociology or social philosophy are 
corrective to theology in the same way that theology is corrective to the findings of sociology 
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and social philosophy. This would be too close to calling sociology or social philosophy a 
kind of revelation. But it is to say that the meeting of disciplines results in a process of mutual 
transformation, offering an insight that is not necessarily in conflict with ‘revelation’, 
including an eschatology that is understood in terms of its social dimension, a sociality that is 
understood by Bonhoeffer according to the sociological and social-philosophical sources and 
their definitions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. 
This more subtle, and messy, meeting of social philosophy and sociology with 
theology is germane to this discussion of friendship, because what Bonhoeffer accomplishes, 
through exploiting the sociological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and its 
meeting with Christian doctrine, is to press the theological together with the sociological in 
order to yield a theological definition of a certain kind of human social phenomenon, and a 
social understanding of eschatology. For example, Bonhoeffer affirms here, in addition to the 
affirmation in SC-B, that one of the communities to which he is referring, is friendship.111 So 
what we find, in Bonhoeffer’s definition of Gemeinschaft, and friendship as Gemeinschaft, is 
friendship as a community where people will one another, and their common life, as ends in 
themselves. But because neither the persons nor their common life are means to an end in 
Gemeinschaft—as they are in Gesellschaft—friendship is open to what lies beyond itself. This 
means that friendship, for Bonhoeffer, rather than being grounded in itself as historically 
limited social relation, is eschatologically grounded ‘in God’ and open to God’s ultimate 
purposes. This makes it a lasting form of social relation in which God is active because it is 
eschatologically grounded in and willed by God; and further, eschatology is reframed as a 
way of speaking of God’s action understood according to particular social categories, such as 
friendship. In this way, friendship as a social phenomenon is one oriented to God’s end; and 
at the same time, God’s end, in friendship, is a social one. 
The discussion of Gemeinschaft is a preparatory discussion, for Bonhoeffer, about the 
nature of the church, adding one more characteristic of friendship as Gemeinschaft. 
Bonhoeffer writes that ‘only community, and never a society, can or should become 
“church”’;112 and that ‘God […] has a purpose for every community no matter how small, 
every friendship, every marriage, every family. And in this same sense God also has a 
purpose for the church’.113 Again, we again see Bonhoeffer referring to friendship as a type of 
community. But my point here is to say that for Bonhoeffer, friendship—as a type of 
Gemeinschaft—is one of the social relations that are related most closely to church because 
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Gemeinschaft is eschatologically grounded in God and thus open to God’s purpose, and more 
appropriately understood in relation to the church than society would be. 
In summary, then, friendship is a form of Gemeinschaft for Bonhoeffer. And though 
the argument is difficult to parse on account of the way Bonhoeffer proceeds both 
sociologically and theologically, his point is clear: friendship, as an exemplary form of 
Gemeinschaft, is therefore eschatologically grounded in God and open to God’s purposes, and 
a form of social relation in which Bonhoeffer thinks God is at work and active. 
But there are other things that have come to light in this investigation into friendship 
as Gemeinschaft. The first to mention here is that Bonhoeffer makes an abstract and elliptical 
distinction between Gesellschaft, defined by the utility of its historical purpose, and 
Gemeinschaft, defined by God’s enduring purpose. Whether this is an accurately rendered 
distinction within the context of Bonhoeffer’s work will be discussed further in this chapter’s 
conclusion. The second is mentioned above, in passing: Gemeinschaft is an important part of 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the church; I will return to this subject as well, as it is 
important for the way Bonhoeffer thinks of redemption as ecclesially located.  
Finally, as I point out above, social forms inflect Bonhoeffer’s theology. Similarly, 
this socially inflected theology leads to an understanding of God’s end, in friendship, as 
social. In this way, Bonhoeffer’s theology is oriented to sociality and his understanding of 
sociality is theological. 
 
2.2 FRIENDSHIP AND THE ESCHATON 
 
Bonhoeffer’s social understanding of eschatology, and the related eschatological 
understanding of friendship—as Gemeinschaft—is not the last word on eschatology and 
friendship in Sanctorum Communio. Bonhoeffer will go on to say that a friendship is a 
collective person subject to judgment and open to eternal life, making friendship a social form 
that endures in the present, not because a friendship is inherently resilient, but because 
Christ—in an eschatological prolepsis—can repair a friendship through an encounter in which 
Christ himself is present. 
This line of inquiry into social reparation, for Bonhoeffer, is part of his developing 
investigation into eschatology in Sanctorum Communio. For Bonhoeffer, eschatology is 
concerned with ‘two groups of ideas’. The first is judgment, a judgment that is passed on both 
individuals and collective persons.114 ‘The question is’, asks Bonhoeffer, ‘how do we 
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conceive of human Gemeinschaft as undergoing judgment?’115 Bonhoeffer answers, 
‘[j]udgment applies to persons. But this obviously means that it applies not only to individual 
persons [Individualpersonen], but also to collective persons [Kollektivpersonen]’; thus 
communities—as collective persons—undergo ‘eternal judgment’ as ‘undivided entities’.116 
Despite the logical difficulty of people being judged as individuals and as members of a 
collective person—where God might condemn a collective person but not all the persons 
within it and vice-versa—Bonhoeffer insists that this is ‘an idea that is as necessary as it is 
incomprehensible’.117 Much the way Bonhoeffer is willing to speak of the necessity to think 
in terms of wholes within wholes in the universal church—I will say more on this below—he 
is willing for the logic of judgment to be subservient to what he considers necessary 
conclusions. These arguments rely on the witness of Scripture; and in Scripture, God judges 
both individual persons and collective ones. Bonhoeffer offers the examples of Chorazin, 
Bethsaida, and Capernaum in Matthew 11:21-24, and the churches that are addressed in 
Revelation 2 and 3, where villages and churches are subject to judgment as wholes, but the 
fate of individuals within those wholes might be different from the whole.118  
The second group of ideas with which eschatology is concerned, for Bonhoeffer, is 
eternal life,119 and the eternal life that extends to communities as collective persons.120 For 
Bonhoeffer, communities—as collective persons—undergo ‘eternal judgment’ as ‘undivided 
entities’, which means that ‘the community as a collective person can expect eternal life’; 
sociality, then, endures eschatologically. This is true for the relation between human persons 
and God, in that ‘eternal life’, for Bonhoeffer, ‘means perfect community with God’.121 But 
sociality endures among human persons as well. For Bonhoeffer, ‘God’s church-community 
[…] is now “entirely justified and sanctified”, one in Christ and yet all individuals. […] They 
give themselves to each other and to God, thereby establishing human community and 
community with God’.122 In this way, Bonhoeffer speaks in a more particular way about how 
Gemeinschaft is eschatologically grounded in God: its eschatological grounding means that it 
is subject to judgment and shares in eternal life. 
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These eschatological forms of community—as collective persons under judgment and 
open to eternal life—are related to the fallen forms of community through an eschatological 
foretaste or prolepsis that takes place when one meets Christ in another. Bonhoeffer covers 
this in his discussion of community in the fallen state, where community is infinitely 
fragmented because sin disrupts the sociality of its pre-lapsarian form: ‘sin […] has stepped 
between human beings and God, [and] between human beings themselves’.123 Community 
with God and other human beings remains, but is continually broken by the divisive power of 
sin;124 Bonhoeffer describes overcoming the experience of another as ‘alien, and as making 
demands’ through an ‘eschatological prolepsis’ where a person is revealed in their own right 
‘as love, as Christ’.125 In this way, unredeemed sociality in the church is continually breaking 
down and built up again into a unity.126 Broken forms of community, then, are able to find 
their reparation and wholeness when a person is proleptically encountered as Christ in the 
present. 
Bonhoeffer affirms this line of thinking when he turns to write his chapter on 
eschatology. Eschatologically speaking: 
 
[C]ommunity is real and eternal, which in history is merely realized in a rudimentary 
way and disintegrates again and again. Whereas even in the church the I and the You 
still encountered each other as strangers, that is, in a strangeness that was overcome 
only in the eschatological foretaste of sanctification, here the revelation of one heart to 
the other is fulfilled in divine love.127  
 
Thus, for Bonhoeffer, community (including church-community) is subject to disintegration 
in the present through the encounter of others as strangers or alien. But there is a lasting, 
eschatological form of community, and through the reception of another person as Christ—in 
the kinds of practices Bonhoeffer will describe as theological Stellvertretung—a person is 
revealed in divine love, community is restored in the present, and a person’s strangeness is 
overcome; this is described by Bonhoeffer here as an ‘eschatological foretaste of 
sanctification’. As I argued in Section 1, the insights of sociological disciplines inform 
Bonhoeffer’s eschatology: community in the present is realised according to a foretaste of its 
eschatological end, an eschatological end that for Bonhoeffer, is understood according to 
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social categories like Gemeinschaft as a sanctified collective person subject to judgment and 
open eternal life. 
For Bonhoeffer, one of the communities that undergoes judgement, and which can 
share in eternal life and can therefore be understood in the present according to its social end, 
is friendship:  
 
God’s judgment and grace applies to persons. This means that judgment and grace 
apply to all individual persons [Einzelpersonen] within the church-community[,] […] 
to marriages and friendships that have become part of the sanctorum communio, and 
finally to the unity of these, the collective person of the church-community.128  
 
The community that undergoes judgment as a collective person, and is open to eternal life, is 
not simply the community of the church as a whole. Individual persons, collective persons 
like marriages and friendships, and the unity of these in the eternal Gemeinde, are taken all 
together and ‘constitute the powerful unity of God’s church-community’; ‘[t]hey are now 
“entirely justified and sanctified”, one in Christ and yet all individuals’.129 The intermediary 
bodies that make up the universal church, then, endure within the eternal Gemeinde as persons 
‘in community with each other’.130 As ‘persons only in community with each other’, persons 
neither dissolve in a collective ‘assimilation into God’s all-encompassing person’, nor are 
they left alone with God, or with one another apart from God.131 How Bonhoeffer reconciles 
this with Jesus’s words on levirate marriage in Matthew 22:25-30, Mark 12:20-25, Luke 
20:27-36, is unclear. Jesus says there that in the resurrection of the dead, there is no marriage; 
this makes an argument for the eschatological persistence of social forms like marriage, or 
friendship, difficult to make from the Synoptics. Bonhoeffer, however, does think that as one 
of these intermediate collective persons, friendship endures in some kind of eschatological 
form that, through eschatological prolepsis, is experienced in the present. 
This reading is a departure from both Leahy and Marsh. In order to understand 
Bonhoeffer on community one cannot, like Leahy, simply say that persons are ‘created in 
relation to one another’132 and that Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology has God’s 
originally intended sociality as a centre.133 Creation is one of Bonhoeffer’s referents, but so is 
the eschaton. In order to understand Bonhoeffer on community, one looks toward the 
originary and unmediated sociality of God’s creation and to a community’s eschatological 
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end, ultimate judgment, and openness to eternal life and perfect community with God. In the 
present, community is subject to sin, and therefore persons are experienced in alienation from 
one another; in the church, this originary unity is experienced again according to its 
eschatological end in God through the eschatological prolepsis of encountering Christ in 
another. Marsh, critical of Bonhoeffer’s use of a philosophy of encounter, claims that 
Bonhoeffer is not able to provide an understanding of community that has continuity.134 But 
this would be to fault Bonhoeffer for not solving a problem he does not intend to solve under 
the heading of sin and sociality. Indeed, community does have continuity, but one needs to 
look to its unbroken created or its eschatological state. For Bonhoeffer, ‘unbroken social 
community belongs to primal being […] in parallel to the eschatological hope we have for it 
in the church’;135 so whether it be understood through Griesbach’s philosophy of encounter or 
Hegel’s collective spirit, community is unbroken, but only in primal being and in 
eschatological hope. Marsh’s criticism of Bonhoeffer for the lack of enduring relationality 
and encounter is only plausible if one looks to community in the fallen state, because there 
one will not find enduring, perfect encounter; but if one looks to the community as created, 
and then restored eschatologically, encounter does endure; this enduring encounter is 
experienced in the present through eschatological prolepsis, where another is encountered as 
Christ in the sort of practices that, as we will see, Bonhoeffer describes in the ecclesial form 
of Stellvertretung. 
Friendship, then, is a lasting social relation for Bonhoeffer. This is not to say that a 
friendship necessarily endures in the present; friendship, like Gemeinschaft in general, is 
subject to the disruption of sin that alienates people from one another. This is where 
Bonhoeffer’s dogmatic structure aids in more subtle interpretation of Gemeinschaft: in its 
present form, Gemeinschaft is subject to the disruption of sin. The disruption of sin in the 
present is overcome through an eschatological foretaste of sociality in its sanctified form, a 
proleptic encounter of another as Christ; through this prolepsis, community is restored. Thus, 
a friendship’s ability to last is dependent on both its orientation to what lies beyond the 
immediate, and the presence of Christ to it in the present. 
There is an implication to be drawn out here as well. We already know, from Section 
1, that friendship is a social relation in which God is active; and now we can see that for 
Bonhoeffer, there are social forms—such as friendship—that are part of the church in the 
present. These conclusions, alongside the idea that a proleptic and restorative encounter can 
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take place with Christ, are each key to what I will argue next: that friendship is a redemptive 
social relation. 
 
2.3 FRIENDSHIP IN THE EMPIRICAL CHURCH 
 
To say what I have said so far is not yet to say that friendship is redemptive. To argue 
that friendship, for Bonhoeffer, is a social form which is redemptive in the present, one must 
be able to locate it in the church—as the body of Christ and what Bonhoeffer calls ‘the 
empirical church’—because it is in this church that Bonhoeffer is confident that Christ is 
active in a redemptive way. 
Bonhoeffer describes the empirical form of the church in a number of different ways. 
In its empirical form, the church ‘is the organized “institution” of salvation’; ‘its centre is the 
cult, consisting of preaching and sacrament or […] the “assembly” […] of its members’.136 It 
is a ‘legal body’, operates according to ‘rules’ rather than the ‘inner disposition of its 
members’, may be a ‘political force within the state’, and, quoting Seeberg, is the ‘historical 
work of Jesus Christ’.137 It has an ‘objective spirit’, which means that it has ‘an active will of 
its own that orders and guides the wills of the members who constitute it and participate in it’; 
it is defined by ‘space and time’ and has ‘historical and social effects’.138  
The question of form, however, is secondary to the church’s primary identity in Christ. 
In a question about the relation between Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the empirical form of the 
church—one inflected by Bonhoeffer’s reading of Hegel—Bonhoeffer wonders, ‘how is the 
spirit of Christ and the Holy Spirit of the sanctorum communio related to the objective spirit 
of the empirical church-community?’139 For Bonhoeffer, ‘Kirche ist Christus als Gemeinde 
existierend’, the church is Christ existing as Gemeinde, ‘[h]owever questionable its empirical 
form may be’.140 Aside from his particular language, and his Hegelian interpolations (and an 
accompanying argument with Kant),141 this is not an unusual reading of the church: the 
appearance of the church according to form is secondary to its primary identity in Christ. 
Alongside form, number is also secondary to the church’s primary Christological 
identity. This is taken up by Bonhoeffer in his discussion of intermediary forms of the church 
that are smaller than the universal body of Christ, and as small as ‘two or three gathered’, 
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what Bonhoeffer calls Einzelgemeinden. The significance of these intermediary forms is 
overlooked by others; Greggs, for example, making an argument for the priestliness of the 
church through Christological mediation and Christ’s Stellvertretung—and against a priestly 
caste within the church—does not imagine an intermediary sociality in the church, only one 
form of sociality among persons in the church, and another between the church and the 
world.142 But the Gemeinde, for Bonhoeffer, is made up of smaller church-communities. 
There are ‘Einzelgemeinden’ and ‘an organization that encompasses them’.143 These 
Einzelgemeinden, for Bonhoeffer, include the smallest sociological units: 
 
For even a community of two people […] which has been placed under the word of 
God and is sustained by God, would doubtless fit this description of the smallest 
sociological unit […] and this would mean that wherever even “two or three are 
gathered” there would also be the body of Christ.144  
 
For Bonhoeffer, then, this means that even ‘two or three gathered’ can be the church as the 
body of Christ, as Einzelgemeinden in Gemeinde. 
For Bonhoeffer, to call the ‘two or three gathered’ the body of Christ does not erode 
the unity of the universal church. The ‘universal church’, for Bonhoeffer, is not a body unto 
itself with individual congregations as ‘members only of this body’.145 Instead, there are 
bodies in bodies. Bonhoeffer relies on the analogy of the individual Christian in order to make 
sense of this problem. ‘Christ’, for Bonhoeffer, ‘is fully present in each individual, and yet he 
is one; and again he is not fully present in any one person, but only all human beings together 
possess the whole of Christ’.146 Similarly, ‘each individual congregation is the body of Christ, 
and yet there is only one body; and again it is only the church-community as a whole that can 
actualise all the relationships within the body of Christ’.147 So for Bonhoeffer, the fact that 
there are any number of ‘bodies of Christ’ in any number of different local congregations 
does not impair the fact that the church-community, taken all together, is the body of Christ as 
well.  
Plant calls Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the self-sufficiency of each congregation an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the New Testament,148 but Bonhoeffer’s logic is not 
idiosyncratic to his own understanding of Christ’s presence in the church, and the insistence 
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in Matthew 18:20 that Christ is present in gatherings of two or three. Bonhoeffer, retaining 
the necessary unity of Christ in the universal church, and his presence in the two or three, 
ends up saying that Einzelgemeinden can be wholes, but only when they are part of the larger 
whole universal body of Christ. This presents another logical difficulty, similar to the problem 
of God’s judgment of individual and collective persons; again, like Bonhoeffer’s solution to 
the problem of judgment, his logic proceeds according to necessary conclusions. Bonhoeffer 
is willing to see wholes within wholes because it allows him to speak of social relations in 
which Christ is active in unique ways, but without reducing what is unique about 
Einzelgemeinden to the way Christ is active throughout the universal church, in such things as 
word and sacrament. This retains the possibility of a diversity of modes of Christ’s activity, 
while keeping them within their necessarily larger ecclesial context, and makes most sense of 
Bonhoeffer’s claim that though the smallest sociological unit ‘necessarily extends beyond 
itself and has its place within the “whole” body of Christ; it is in fact merely an individual 
actualization of that body’.149  
This is why, in this discussion of the unity of the body, Bonhoeffer returns to the 
question of form in order to reveal the conditions needed to qualify the ‘two or three gathered’ 
as the body of Christ. In addition to being ‘placed under the word of God and sustained by 
God’,150 the individual congregation can be considered the body of Christ if Christ is at work, 
because to speak of the ‘body of Christ’, is not, for Bonhoeffer, a reference ‘to form, but to 
function, namely the work of Christ’.151 This means that neither the outward marks of the 
empirical church, nor its number, are what qualify them as the body of Christ; it is, for 
Bonhoeffer, Christ being at work that qualifies a social unit as the body of Christ. This also 
means that Soosten, by speaking only of limbs of the body of Christ,152 rather than bodies in 
bodies, misses the significance of Einzelgemeinden as the body of Christ according to Christ’s 
work in them. What Bonhoeffer is saying that the Einzelgemeinden are both part of the body, 
and whole bodies in their own right, because Christ is at work in them. 
As a matter of function rather than number and form, we can extend the category of 
Einzelgemeinde, as the body of Christ, to other social units that fulfil the function Bonhoeffer 
describes. Bonhoeffer gives the example of marriage as the smallest of sociological units that 
can be considered an ‘individual congregation’ and ‘the body of Christ’.153 What Bonhoeffer 
makes possible, here, is that a friendship—if Christ is at work in this ‘two or three 
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gathered’—can be considered alongside marriage as a body of Christ that is part of the body 
of the universal church, not on account of it carrying any of the institutional marks of the 
empirical church, but on account of Christ acting in it. A friendship can be a unity of its own, 
within the unity of the church as a whole. This is not to say that a friendship, any more than a 
marriage, is the empirical church. The empirical church has its own markers. It is to say that 
on Bonhoeffer’s terms, a friendship can be considered the body of Christ and part of the 
church, if Christ is at work within it. And if a friendship is ecclesially located—as a body of 
Christ within the body of Christ—then we can also begin discuss friendship in terms of what 
Bonhoeffer has to say about Christ’s work in the church more generally. As we do so, what 
we find is that friendship begins to emerge as a social relation that can be redemptive, because 
it is a social relation in which Stellvertretung can take place. 
 
2.4 FRIENDSHIP, STELLVERTRETUNG, AND ACTS OF LOVE AND REPENTANCE 
 
For Bonhoeffer, there are two kinds of Stellvertretung. The first is called theological 
by Bonhoeffer, and is a Stellvertretung that, because ‘we are not able to carry [our sin] by 
ourselves’, is ‘possible only so long as it is based on an offer by God’.154 It is God’s work, 
accomplished for a humanity unable redeem itself under its own power. It is not, for 
Bonhoeffer, an ‘ethical, but a theological concept’.155 The second is called ethical 
Stellvertretung. This difference is overlooked by Green, for example, who only writes about 
theological Stellvertretung, and while Bonhoeffer does not take the time to develop ethical 
Stellvertretung in detail, it is misleading to refer, as Green does, to ‘Stellvertretung’ as a 
single undifferentiated category.156 Bonhoeffer’s ‘ethischen Begriff der Stellvertretung’157 is 
the one that he associates with friendship, calling it ‘an act of human heroic love (for one’s 
country, friend, etc.) even within the bounds of the highest ethical obligation’.158 
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There are significant differences, for Bonhoeffer, between theological and ethical 
Stellvertretung. The first difference concerns what is borne. In theological Stellvertretung, 
Jesus ‘takes the sin of others upon himself, bearing ‘sin and punishment’ for others.159 In 
ethical Stellvertretung, a person can assume ‘evil in another person’s stead’,160 but this can 
only mean bearing the ‘consequences of sin’ but not the sin itself.161 A second difference has 
to do with degree. In theological Stellvertretung, Christ is ‘vicarious representative of our 
person as a whole, and thus we owe everything to him’.162 This is not true in ethical 
Stellvertretung; when someone represents us ethically, ‘we do not put our ethical person as a 
whole at stake, but only as much as we owe’.163 Both of these, however, point to their 
foundational difference: theological Stellvertretung is ‘an offer by God’,164 while ethical 
Stellvertretung ‘remains an act of human heroic love’.165 For Bonhoeffer, God bears our sin 
and punishment, representing our person as a whole; but a person can only bear the 
consequences of our sin, and can only represent us in a partial way. Put simply, God is at 
work redemptively as Christ in theological Stellvertretung, redeeming the whole person; 
while ethical Stellvertretung is partial, human work for another. It would seem, then, that 
Bonhoeffer thinks of friendship as a social relation characterised by human, rather than divine 
action for another.  
There are good reasons, however, to think of friendship as social relation that is 
redemptive in the theological sense, and not limited to ethical Stellvertretung. To make such 
an argument, two things would have to be in place: firstly, theological Stellvertretung would 
need to be understood as something that can take place within a human social relation; 
secondly, theological Stellvertretung would not be concerned with the form of the social 
relation, but with the manner of Christ’s work. As to God’s work within a human relation, in 
Section 1 it was clear that Bonhoeffer does think that God can be active in friendship as 
Gemeinschaft; in Section 3, we saw that Bonhoeffer thinks that Christ can be active in a social 
relation, an activity that qualifies the social relation as Einzelgemeinde and therefore as part of 
the universal church. So we know Bonhoeffer thinks that God’s presence in a human relation 
is possible; to speak of friendship as a redemptive social relation would be a matter of 
defining this action on the more specific terms of Stellvertretung. As to form and function, 
simply to say that Bonhoeffer speaks of friendship in terms of ethical Stellvertretung is not 
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enough to disqualify friendship as a redemptive social relation. This would be to reduce 
Stellvertretung to relational form. But Stellvertretung is not a social form, it is a ‘function’ in 
Bonhoeffer’s terms, a way that God acts for others. And as we will see below, Bonhoeffer 
speaks of theological Stellvertretung in terms of social relation, and in terms of God’s work, 
in Christ, within that ecclesially located social relation. This makes Stellvertretung not a 
matter of relational form, but a mode of God’s action in Christ, for others, in the church. 
This argument for Stellvertretung as a social mode of God’s redemptive work begins 
with the way Bonhoeffer describes theological Stellvertretung as something that, even though 
it is God’s work for others, takes place in the church. In his passage on the difference between 
ethical and theological Stellvertretung, Bonhoeffer writes: ‘vicarious representative action is 
[…] possible only so long as it is offered by God; this means it is in force only in Christ and 
Christ’s church-community’.166 Theological Stellvertretung is, therefore, not simply offered 
by God and in force in Christ, it is also in force in Christ’s Gemeinde.  
This ecclesial Stellvertretung is understood in terms of God’s love that is shared in the 
church-community as a love taking place among and between human agents. As Bonhoeffer 
puts it, ‘since the love of God, in Christ’s vicarious representative action, restores the 
community between God and human beings, so the community of human beings with each 
other has also become a reality in love once again’.167 Green, Soosten, and Greggs see this as 
a love that has divine origin, but also as a love that is shared among the people of the church. 
For Green, with Christ as Stellvertreter, all of humanity has been brought into community 
with God;168 Soosten calls it a reconciling love between human beings that is not our own in 
the first place, but a manifestation of Christ’s own reconciling love;169 Greggs speaks in terms 
of mediation, but similarly says that for Bonhoeffer, Christ not only mediates between 
humans and God, but between human beings as well.170 As such, the reconciling love of 
Stellvertretung comes from without, and through this, loving community between God and 
human beings is restored, and through the restoration of community between God and human 
beings, community between human beings is restored as well.  
This point about a divine love that takes place between human beings—yet a love not 
our own in the first place but a manifestation of God’s own reconciling love—illustrates more 
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clearly two aspects of theological Stellvertretung. God’s love reconciles human beings to 
God, and human beings with one another; thus, God’s redeeming work of Stellvertretung is 
accomplished on our behalf, and yet takes place in Christ existing as Gemeinde; yet this does 
not make it, on account of it manifesting among human beings, a kind of ethical 
Stellvertretung. Bonhoeffer is willing to pursue the logic of God’s saving work in Christ 
existing as Gemeinde as God’s work because it is taking place in Christ’s body. For Soosten, 
the external context of this justification is, in this way, simultaneously the enabling 
foundation of the social act of church-community, in that the constitution of the church-
community—God’s love in Stellvertretung—also aims for human participation in the 
Stellvertretung of Christ. There is a ‘double-relationship’. Thus, he identifies two Scriptural 
tropes in Bonhoeffer’s christological ecclesiology.171  
1. Stellvertretung extra nos. The first is the exclusive Stellvertretung that describes 
Christ and his work accomplished for us and on our behalf. This is a theological 
Stellvertretung that is conceptually governed by Colossians 1:18 and Ephesians 4:15-16, 
where Christ is described as the head of a body. This is the work accomplished by Christ for 
the sake of others and whole communities. The primary example of this, following Israel’s 
remnant, is Christ’s own laying down of himself for the sake of all humanity as 
Stellvertreter.172 As Green points out, with Christ as Stellvertreter, all of humanity has been 
brought into community with God in a new humanity,173 a Christ whose “saving work is to 
transform the community of sin into the community of the Spirit of love.”174  
2. Stellvertretung in Christo. This type of theological Stellvertretung is conceptually 
governed by Romans 12:4-8 and 1 Corinthians 12:12-27, where the body of Christ is 
described in its integrated wholeness. As Soosten puts it, interpreting Sanctorum Communio, 
the members of the body can, through this corporately oriented Stellvertretung, stand in for 
one another, and not as an ethical Stellvertreter, but with full soteriological significance of 
theological Stellvertretung.175  
Soosten’s point, as he explains Bonhoeffer’s distinction between the headship 
language and the body language of Paul, is that yes, Christ’s redeeming work is extra nos, 
accomplished by Christ and for all of humanity; but because in the church, human persons are 
in Christo, they can indeed bear one another’s sins and suffering not simply ethically, but 
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theologically and redemptively for one another.176 This makes Stellvertretung something that 
takes place within social relations between human agents. 
This Stellvertretung in Christo—as a reconciling love that restores the community of 
the church, and is a love that is a manifestation of Christ’s own reconciling love, takes place 
in concrete practices of Stellvertretung. Bonhoeffer describes them as acts for-one-another, 
Füreinander, practices that are, for Bonhoeffer, the result of being with-one-another, 
Miteinander, in Christo.177 Bonhoeffer speaks not of the form of social relation (apart from 
the fact that it takes place in the Gemeinde) but of the way persons act for one another within 
the sociality of the Gemeinde; and the way human agents act for one another, in theological 
Stellvertretung, are as follows: 
1. Self-renouncing love for the neighbour. The first act of love is self-renouncing work 
for the neighbour, where a person is called to advocate for another in particular ways in 
everyday matters, giving up possessions, honour, and under some circumstances, whole lives. 
For Bonhoeffer, this may mean giving up community with God, taking on God’s wrath in 
order that others may have community with God; this is theological, not ethical 
Stellvertretung, because a person takes the place of another as their substitute, as Christ 
does.178 This act of love is, through Bonhoeffer’s underdetermination of ‘neighbour’, an act 
that can be for another who is not necessarily ecclesially situated.  
2. Intercessory prayer. The second act of love is intercessory prayer. Intercessory 
prayer, for Bonhoeffer, is an ecclesially situated kind of Stellvertretung, and another that 
reaches beyond the Gemeinde itself; it is transgressive of this boundary between Gemeinde 
and the world outside Gemeinde because it ‘potentially draws the one for whom it is offered 
into the church-community’.179 (I will return to Stellvertretung as both ecclesially located, and 
reaching beyond the Gemeinde, in the conclusion to the chapter.) It is also theological 
Stellvertretung because when a person prays for another, they enter into their particular sin 
and affliction, and as such, bear those afflictions as Christ: ‘[i]n our intercession we can 
become a Christ to our neighbor’.180 (Bonhoeffer even makes here a nominal connection to 
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friendship, saying that the sins of the unknown person, when we pray for them, ‘afflict me no 
less than those of a closest friend’.)181 Bonhoeffer is clear that what he is speaking of is not 
ethical Stellvertretung, but theological Stellvertretung, because in intercession, we become 
Christ for a neighbour as Gemeinde, and as a member of the Gemeinde; this ‘does not compel 
God, but, if God does the final work, then one member of the community can redeem another, 
in the power of the church’.182  
3. Mutual forgiveness of sin in God’s name. The third act of love is the mutual 
forgiveness of sins in God’s name.183 Again, Bonhoeffer describes this in the terms of 
theological, not ethical Stellvertretung. We forgive one another’s particular sins, as ‘the 
person who takes them upon himself, bears them, and wipes them out’.184 But in this ecclesial 
forgiving of sins, as the person bears them, they do so as the Christ takes them upon himself 
and ‘bears them’.185 Thus, even as we forgive one another, it is ‘only Christ [who] can do it, 
which for us means his church as the sanctorum communio’.186  
4. Repentance. Bonhoeffer does not refer to repentance where he writes about 
Stellvertretung as ‘acts of love’. But in his section on the empirical church, he speaks of 
repentance in terms that make it appropriate to include here. Repentance, for Bonhoeffer, is 
something that, like the three ‘acts of love’ listed above, can be done for others, including a 
whole community of people: ‘[i]n the church, as in any other community, people repent both 
for their own sin and that of the collective person of the community’.187 And revisiting his 
distinction between ethical and theological Stellvertretung, and the distinction about form and 
function in the empirical church, Bonhoeffer asks, ‘is this collective person perhaps “Christ 
existing as church-community”, the body of Christ?’ The answer, for Bonhoeffer, is yes, but 
‘[o]nly insofar as God’s own self is at work in the act of repentance’.188  
These acts of love and repentance are each a way of acting as Christ, and as a person 
‘standing in as a substitute for [one’s] neighbor’.189 This is another double Stellvertretung, in 
addition to the double Stellvertretung of Christ that is accomplished by him extra nos and 
with him in Christo. In the acts of reconciling love, a person stands in for the neighbour as a 
substitute through self-renouncing love, intercession, in bearing sins, and in repentance. But it 
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is also Christ’s Stellvertretung: we renounce ourselves for our neighbour as Christ, bearing 
their afflictions in prayer as Christ, forgiving and bearing their sins as Christ. These acts are 
necessarily located in the church-community, and as such, Bonhoeffer consistently refers to 
the Gemeinde as necessary for Stellvertretung. But as a practice, Stellvertretung is 
nevertheless taken up within the body by the actions of specific persons who act, pray, 
forgive, and repent for others. Bonhoeffer does not imagine, here, any competition between 
divine soteriological agency and human action. For Bonhoeffer, if we are in Christ, we act for 
others in the church as Christ, and in four easily identifiable concrete acts. 
For Bonhoeffer, then, friendship as a redemptive social practice is a possibility, under 
certain conditions. Ethical Stellvertretung, taking place under the power of the person, is 
clearly described in terms of friendship, but this is not an exclusive claim. Though 
Bonhoeffer’s preferred designation of the person for whom one acts in theological 
Stellvertretung is neighbour, not friend, the identification of the friend as ethical Stellvertreter 
is only necessary insofar as it is unclear whether the friend is acting in the church for the 
friend as Christ. But I have already argued that friendship should be considered alongside 
marriage as a form of the body of Christ if God’s work is taking place in it, and even more 
clearly that Bonhoeffer thinks of friendship as Gemeinschaft and therefore as where God is at 
work in its eschatological grounding in God. Here, again, it is not a question of form. As I 
have already shown, there are distinct kinds of social relation that subsist in the church as 
intermediate forms of the body of Christ and where God is at work. Similarly, what makes 
ecclesial Stellvertretung theological is much the same as that which makes a social relation 
the body of Christ: it is where Christ is at work. Thus the form of relation—friendship—is not 
what determines the relation as ethical or theological. What determines Stellvertretung as 
theological is God’s work in Christ, as Stellvertreter, taking place in the context of human 
action for others in the church, and seen in acts of love and repentance. Therefore, friendship 
is not categorically excluded from theological Stellvertretung, opening the possibility of 
friendship as a redemptive social practice, if one were to find evidence of Bonhoeffer’s acts of 
love and repentance taking place within it. This leads to the conclusion that Bonhoeffer’s use 
of neighbour, rather than friend, is not on account of categorical exclusion of friendship from 
theological Stellvertretung (as we might think if we allowed Bonhoeffer’s textual association 
between friendship and ethical Stellvertretung to govern the argument); and that friendship, 
on Bonhoeffer’s terms, is not necessarily only ethical. Friendship can be a redemptive social 
relation if we were to identify these practices within it. 
Further, Stellvertretung—the way Bonhoeffer describes how Christ is encountered in 
others—is one of the ways in which a community like friendship can experience, in the 
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present, proleptic restoration. Thus what Bonhoeffer says about friendship being 
eschatologically grounded in God becomes more fully explained and determined. Friendship 
is lasting, in the present, not because it is immune to sin and not subject to the effects of sin, 
but because it can be restored in the practices of Stellvertretung that make Christ present to 
another, and where its eternal, eschatological form is therefore experienced proleptically in 
self-giving acts of love, intercession, mutual forgiveness of sins and repentance. 
Finally, the ecclesial location of this Stellvertretung can, in the case of intercessory 
prayer, be one that reaches across the boundary of the Gemeinde, bringing the one for whom 
one prays more deeply into the Gemeinde. Bonhoeffer thinks that God’s work for others 
restores human relationship with God and among people within the church; but here, in his 
description of intercession, Bonhoeffer describes this form of reconciling love among human 
persons as incorporative, restoring or bringing others into the human sociality of the church. 
This will be revisited in the conclusion, as it will be significant for the question of the limits 
of friendship which will be addressed in Chapter 3, and the possibilities for friendship 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
There is, however, one more thing to be said about friendship’s relation to redemption, 
and how the friend can act as Christ for the friend: for Bonhoeffer, this Stellvertretung can be 
for the whole of a community, opening up the possibility that friendship—through this 
ecclesially located practice of Stellvertretung—has significance beyond itself. This leads, as 
we will see, to the possibility that a friendship can reach beyond itself for the sake of others. 
 
2.5 FRIENDSHIP FOR OTHERS 
 
In Section 4, I described Bonhoeffer’s practice of Stellvertretung as acting as Christ 
for others in the church; this acting for others, however, is not necessarily limited to acting for 
just one person. For Bonhoeffer, the sin that has come between persons is redressed on a 
social level through repentance, a Stellvertretung that is a way of acting for others 
corporately. As I pointed out there, repentance is a form of theological Stellvertretung for 
Bonhoeffer, in that ‘God’s own self is at work in the act of repentance’.190 For Bonhoeffer, 
when one person repents ‘[i]n the church, as in any other community, people repent both for 
their own sin and that of the collective person of the community’.191 This repentance is not for 
the sake of a single person; in repentance, the collective person as a whole ‘hears, repents, and 
believes’:  
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The community that is […] willed and created and has become culpable; it must seek 
repentance, believe in and experience justification and sanctification, and experience 
judgment and grace at the limits of time. […] [it is] the whole community that, in the 
individuals, hears, repents, and believes.192 
 
So for Bonhoeffer, repentance as theological Stellvertretung is a way that a person acts for 
others in a corporate way, where the repentance of one person is the repentance of the whole 
Gemeinschaft or Gemeinde. 
In his discussion of Stellvertretung in Sanctorum Communio, Soosten writes that the 
implication of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Stellvertretung is that members can act as 
Stellvertreter for other parts of the body;193 in this way, Soosten sees Stellvertretung as work 
undertaken for the sake of others in the church, a subject I covered above in Section 4. 
Greggs, however, pushes this in a different direction, following the logic of Bonhoeffer’s 
remarks on repentance and Stellvertretung above; for Greggs, there is an ‘internal ordering’ of 
the church that is employed by Bonhoeffer to understand the relationship between the church 
and the world in terms of the church’s corporate priestliness. Greggs, making this argument 
with the resources provided by Sanctorum Communio, sees Christ acting in the church as 
Kollektivperson for the world, saying that ‘[i]n this, a priestly relation of the church to the 
world can be identified: Christ’s priesthood extends not to individuals—not even to the sum 
of all individuals as in Luther—but to the church as a body; the church is the priest of the 
world’.194 Greggs, then, does not limit corporate action simply to repentance; Stellvertretung 
itself has this kind of character of corporate acting for others. So for Soosten, a member of the 
church can act for another; and for Greggs, the church, in its corporate form, acts for the 
world. 
What both Soosten and Greggs overlook is the significance of the intermediary nature 
of the Einzelgemeinde, which makes the way persons act for others in the church and for the 
world much more complex. For Bonhoeffer, the body of Christ can subsist in the universal 
church as a whole, as Einzelgemeinde. Following Soosten’s claim that a person can act for 
others in the church, and Gregg’s claim that the church as a collective person can act for the 
world, I would simply add that, for Bonhoeffer, communities like friendships are 
Einzelgemeinden as well, and collective persons. In this way, a friendship—as 
Einzelgemeinden and collective persons—can act for others in the church (as Soosten 
suggests, though limiting himself to the member of the church) and for the world (as Greggs 
suggests, though limiting himself to church acting as a single collective person for the world). 
                                                            
192 DBW/E 1, 75/119. 
193 Soosten, Die Sozialität der Kirche, p. 270. 
194 Greggs, ‘Ecclesial Priestly Mediation’, p. 87. 
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In this way, a friendship in which acts of love and repentance take place is a social unit that 
acts as a unity in those acts of love and repentance; this friendship, as collective person, can in 
turn act for the whole of the church and for the world. Thus not only the individual members, 
or the church as a whole, can act for others as Christ. Einzelgemeinden, as collective persons 
and the body of Christ—including the ‘two or three gathered’ of friendship—can act for 
others, for the sake of the whole of the Gemeinde, and for the sake of the world. 
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology, then, as one in which a person acts for others, and in which 
persons can be collective, leads to the possibility of a collective person—like friendship—
acting for others. A repentant friendship can repent for the church; a friendship in which 
theological Stellvertretung takes place can in turn act for the world. Friendship, in this way, is 
more than a private good whose benefits are shared only between friends. A lasting 
friendship, in which acts of love and repentance are taking place, has significance for the 
church as a whole, and for the world as well. Friendship itself, in this way, is a shared 
ecclesial and political good. 
How this might be true is underdetermined here, on account of the conceptual 
difficulty of describing how a friendship, as opposed to a friend, might act for others through 
self-renouncing love, repentance, intercession, or forgiveness. I would only point out that 
Stellvertretung in friendship—conceptually, at this point—is open to what lies beyond it, a 
possibility that will be investigated in the chapters that follow. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise the findings of this chapter, Bonhoeffer’s understanding of community, 
eschatology, the empirical church, and Stellvertretung—and friendship’s relation to each of 
these—leads to a theology of friendship as an enduring social relation, which under certain 
conditions can be understood as redemptive and for others: 
1. Friendship endures: Bonhoeffer’s thinking on eschatology, and its part in 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship, begins with friendship as Gemeinschaft. As a form of 
Gemeinschaft, for Bonhoeffer, friendship is not limited by historical purpose; the implication 
of this lack of historical limitation makes a friendship, for Bonhoeffer, open to purposes 
beyond itself, and thus eschatologically grounded in God and open to God’s purposes. To say 
that a friendship is enduring or lasting, however, is not to say that friendship necessarily 
endures uninterrupted in the present. This is because a friendship, as Gemeinschaft in its 
present form, is subject to the disruption of sin. But Bonhoeffer’s dogmatic structure leads to 
additional, eschatological dimensions to Gemeinschaft: friendship’s eschatological grounding 
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in God, as a collective person subject to judgment and open to eternal life, means that the 
disruption of sin in the present is overcome through an eschatological foretaste of sociality in 
its sanctified form. This prolepsis takes place when one encounters another as Christ in 
Gemeinde and in a friendship as a type of Einzelgemeinde; through this prolepsis, community 
is restored.  
 Bonhoeffer’s eschatology, as it takes form in a sharp distinction between Gesellschaft 
and Gemeinschaft, is not without its problems. For Bonhoeffer, Gemeinschaft is an end in 
itself and therefore open to God’s purposes, and Gesellschaft is determined by its utility in the 
present; but it’s not clear why these are mutually exclusive categories. Why can a sociological 
phenomenon not be of utility in the present, and open to God’s eschatological end? As we 
will see in the next chapter, Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of this changes in his theology 
of the ‘orders of preservation’, where certain social phenomena can be of present utility, and 
open to new creation in Christ. 
2. Friendship can be redemptive: For friendship to be a redemptive social form, it must 
be ecclesially located, because for Bonhoeffer, redemption is something that happens in 
Gemeinde, in Christ. Friendship, for Bonhoeffer, can be an ecclesial social relation within the 
church, as an Einzelgemeinde of two or three gathered together, if Christ is active in it. Its 
number—how many persons are in the social unit—does not matter, for Bonhoeffer, any 
more than its form: a marriage is an example of Einzelgemeinde, despite its number, so long 
as Christ is at work in it; so friendship, too, as the ‘two or three gathered’ in which Christ is 
present, is another candidate for Einzelgemeinde, an instantiation of the body of Christ within 
the whole body of the universal church. This is not to say that a friendship is the empirical 
church, though it is to say that on Bonhoeffer’s terms, a friendship can be considered the body 
of Christ and part of the universal church, if Christ is at work within it.  
One of the ways Bonhoeffer speaks of Christ’s work, specifically in the church, is 
Stellvertretung. Though Bonhoeffer speaks of friendship as ethical Stellvertretung, and as 
something that takes place under the power of the person, this is not an exclusive claim. The 
identification of the friend as ethical Stellvertreter is only necessary insofar as it is unclear 
whether the friend is acting in the church for the friend as Christ. But friendship, as 
Gemeinschaft, is a social relation in which God is at work through its eschatological 
grounding in God; so we know that friendship, for Bonhoeffer, can be a social relation in 
which God is at work. And friendship, alongside marriage, can be the body of Christ if 
Christ’s work is taking place in it; so friendship can be, in this way, ecclesially located as 
well. To say that friendship can be a redemptive social relation is simply a step toward 
speaking more specifically about the nature of God’s work in this ecclesially located social 
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relation; this is not a step beyond ethics, but a step into an ethics in which God is active in 
Christ as Stellvertreter, an ethics in which human and divine soteriological agency are not in 
conflict with one another. Friendship, then, is not necessarily excluded from being a 
redemptive social relation; it would qualify as a redemptive social relation if theological 
Stellvertretung were to be found taking place within it.  
That friendship is a redemptive social relation is central to the ongoing argument of 
this thesis. In the way that human persons in the church can redeem others as Christ means 
that human and divine soteriological agency are not in competition; more will be said about 
this in Chapter 5. Also in Chapter 5, the significance of acts of love and repentance for 
Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge will be looked at closely; but before that, in Chapter 3, 
the significance of their absence in the friendship between Bonhoeffer and Helmut Rößler 
will lead to some conclusions about their relation to friendship’s resilience: if Christ is not 
present through acts of love and repentance, the proleptic reparation of friendship becomes a 
limited possibility. 
3. Friendship can be for others: One of the conclusions that can be drawn from 
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology—as an ecclesiology in which a person acts for others, and in which 
persons can be collective—leads to the possibility that a collective person, like friendship, can 
act for others. A collective person such as a friendship, in this way, can repent for the church; 
and a friendship in which theological Stellvertretung takes place can, in turn, act as a 
collective person for the world. This moves in two directions. First, a friendship is for others 
in that it can take the place of others for their sake; the collective person, in this case, is 
Stellvertreter. Secondly, this makes friendship more than a private good whose benefits are 
shared only between friends; a friendship could be for others, in this way, in that it is not 
simply for itself. It is as a social relation with significance for the political and social world in 
which the friendship is found. This will be an important distinction as the thesis moves 
forward. 
How friendship might have significance beyond its internal goods will become clearer 
in the rest of the thesis. In Chapter 4, Bonhoeffer’s theology of the Spielraum will be 
described as a way that friendship has significance for the whole of social and political life; In 
Chapter 5, the significance of Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge for the political and social 
life in which the friendship finds itself will be seen in friendship’s part in the conspiracy to 
kill Hitler, and then after Bonhoeffer’s death, when the friendship between them becomes part 
of Bethge’s claim for understanding Bonhoeffer, and for articulating Bonhoeffer in new post-
war contexts. Before we turn to those subjects, however, Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Helmut 
Rößler will reveal that Bonhoeffer was already, in the early 1930s, assuming that friendship 
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had political dimensions and was a consideration for the larger ecclesial-political conflicts 
faced in the Church Struggle.  
Before I move to those chapters, there are some other theological threads and 
problems that are beginning to show themselves, and are worth mentioning here, as they will 
inform the shape of the rest of the thesis as a whole. The first has to do with the practices of 
the church as they relate to the world in which the church is situated. There will be much 
more to be said about the boundary between the church and the world in which the church is 
situated, and how this boundary ought to be understood; at this juncture, however, I would 
simply point out that already, in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer is thinking of intercessory 
prayer as a practice that can bring the one prayed for more deeply into the Gemeinde, thus 
opening up the possibility that the church can have practices that reach across the boundary 
between the church and the world; and that self-offering, too, is something that can be done 
for another, no matter the boundary of church and world. 
The second has to do with the way that theological Stellvertretung, in its ecclesial 
practice, is a practice that is mutual and reciprocal, and particular. In the Introduction, I 
suggested that there are a number of ways that friendship has been understood, and though 
Bonhoeffer himself does not appear to engage with this literature, there are features of his 
theology that offer limited engagement with it. One of them is the way universal love relates 
to particular loves, with particular love being most closely related to friendship-love; another 
was friendship-love as mutual.  
In this chapter, Christ’s accomplished work of Stellvertretung is described in general 
terms by Bonhoeffer, in the way Christ’s Stellvertretung is for the sake of the whole of 
humanity: Stellvertretung extra nos is accomplished in a general way for the sake of 
humankind. But this Stellvertretung extra nos is necessary for the possibility of ecclesial 
Stellvertretung; and Stellvertretung in Christo—leaving aside repentance—is particular, and 
even partial, in that it is an act that is not always for a corporate other, but for a neighbour or 
friend. As self-renouncing love, it is a love that takes into account the specific needs of a 
particular neighbour; as intercessory prayer, it is prayer for a particular neighbour’s 
afflictions; as forgiveness of sin, it is the forgiveness of particular person’s sins with the 
expectation, in this case, that your sins will be forgiven as well.  
But friendship-love—as a mutual and a particular love—has led theologians such as 
Meilaender (by way of Augustine) to consider it to be inferior to a love that is universal. What 
Bonhoeffer offers here, however, is twofold. First, Bonhoeffer does not place particular acts 
of love for particular others within a hierarchy of value where the love of a particular person 
is considered a lesser love, or as preparatory for the love of all others. It is possible that 
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Bonhoeffer is wrong in not identifying this as a conflict, and that a particular love is 
necessarily preferential. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer, here, does not treat this kind of particular 
love as lesser love than divine and universal love, or a kind of love that is preparatory; 
instead, he treats particular acts of love for particular persons as an appropriate creaturely 
expression of Christ’s love for all, and a love in which Christ is at work for others in 
particular ways. 
Secondly, in the case of mutual forgiveness of sins, the hope and expectation that one 
will be loved in return—through the mutuality of such acts—does not makes these acts at 
odds with loving another for their own sake, or as a way of forsaking love as duty. Instead, 
particular acts of love for a particular person are not necessarily part of an economy of debt or 
exchange, because they are acts of love in which a person acts as Christ for another; and if it 
is God who acts, as Bonhoeffer puts it, an act of love ‘does not compel God, but, if God does 
the final work, then one member of the community can redeem another, in the power of the 
church’.195 So even as it is described as a love that is mutual, it is not a love in which God can 
be compelled, in another as Christ, to reciprocate; in this sense, mutuality would be the free 
offering of oneself in Christ to another, as another does so for you. 
 Thus, through particularity and mutuality as part of the conceptual construal of 
friendship-love, and particularity and mutuality as they relate to Stellvertretung, 
Stellvertretung has a natural, though critical, place in the context of friendship. 
Stellvertretung, in friendship, would be a way for particularity to be understood as an 
appropriate creaturely instantiation of Christ’s love of all, and where mutuality would be 
hoped for; but because God is not compelled, this love would be offered freely. We will 
return to the question of whether Stellvertretung is possible in friendship when we look at 
Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge. But before we turn to that possibility, we will turn to the 
friendship that preceded Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge—Bonhoeffer’s friendship with 
Helmut Rößler—where a very different kind of relationship will reveal the dialogical and 
political possibilities of friendship. 
                                                            
195 DBW/E 1, 125/187. 
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3 THE RÖßLER CORRESPONDENCE 
 
You know, of course, that over here people are losing many of their friends, often in 
the most shocking ways, but certainly also finding new friendships. In the past year, I 
have lost many people who were important in my life, but in the struggle of the 
churches I have also found a community again, one which is unbreakable from a 
human viewpoint. Its shape is becoming ever clearer, even now. The only concern is 
to know, before night comes, who is a friend and who is not […] I can tell you one 
thing: more important than any insight, than anything to do with your fundamental 
beliefs, is to have people in your life with whom you share convictions.196 
 
Bonhoeffer wrote these words from Finkenwalde in March of 1936, a time and place where 
new friendships were beginning to take form. But the Church Struggle, by this time, had 
already taken a personal toll on Bonhoeffer; friendships may have been gained at 
Finkenwalde, but friendships had been lost as well. One of the lost friendships Bonhoeffer is 
referring to here was with Helmut Rößler, a friendship that began at least as early as 1926.197 
Before the end of the friendship, however, the Rößler correspondence captures a theological 
conversation in the form of twelve letters shared between 1928 and 1934. And while 
Bonhoeffer had other friends who acted as theological interlocutors, the Rößler 
correspondence captures something unique: a theologically substantive set of letters where the 
writers addressed one another as friends, and engaged in conversation about friendship and its 
limits.198 But it was not a friendship easily recognisable on the basis of what was said about 
friendship in Sanctorum Communio, in that the friendship neither endures nor does it have 
recourse to acts of love and repentance that would provide the friendship some resilience. But 
the intention, here, is not to provide an example of friendship as described in Sanctorum 
Communio. Instead, in describing a friendship that was both dialogical, and one in which 
convictions about a political-ecclesial environment are shared, this correspondence adds to 
what was already discovered in Sanctorum Communio.  
The most thorough treatment of Rößler’s significance to Bonhoeffer is given by 
Bethge in his biography, where he calls Rößler one of Bonhoeffer’s friends while Bonhoeffer 
was lecturing in Berlin in 1929-30,199 but Bethge does not say much about the nature of the 
friendship, Rößler’s political leanings, or much about what their conversation reveals about 
Bonhoeffer’s theological development. The limited attention given to Rößler was 
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characteristic of Bethge’s treatment of living figures; Bethge said very little, for example, 
about the unsavoury military decisions and Nationalist Socialist company kept by the 
Commandant of Berlin, Paul von Hase, Bonhoeffer’s cousin.200 Bethge is similarly discrete 
about Rößler and his political past; Rößler had survived denazification, and at the time of 
Bethge’s writing of the biography was a living figure and prominent churchman.201 So in 
Bethge’s references to the Bonhoeffer-Rößler letters, he treats the correspondence outside the 
immediate context of the arguments between Bonhoeffer and Rößler, and as part of his own 
arguments or biographical descriptions about things other than Rößler and the friendship.202 
This includes Bonhoeffer’s one-time ‘disinterestedness’ in politics;203 to give context to the 
fanaticism of the German countryside in 1931, a fanaticism that Bonhoeffer described to 
friends in New York by reading his letter from Rößler;204 or to bring some clarity to an 
argument Bonhoeffer had with Barth about concrete commandments. Marsh,205 
Schlingensiepen,206 and Moses207 follow the same pattern, using the correspondence between 
Rößler and Bonhoeffer to make a point in an argument about Bonhoeffer’s theological 
development or to add biographical details to Bonhoeffer’s life, but apart from the context of 
Rößler as interlocutor. Similarly, De Graaff does not look at the Rößler correspondence in 
order to make his argument about the connection between politics and friendship for 
Bonhoeffer.208 
But when one looks at the Bonhoeffer-Rößler correspondence as a whole—as a 
theological conversation and political argument, between friends, about the German 
nationalism and the Church Struggle—there is a great deal to be learned about Bonhoeffer’s 
life and theology as they relate to ethics, politics, ecclesiology, eschatology, concrete 
commandments, and the personal toll of the Kirchenkampf. Each of these subjects will be 
covered here through the lens of friendship, because one of the benefits of an investigation 
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into this friendship—as dialogical and embedded in the political tumult of its time—is a more 
nuanced appraisal of Bonhoeffer’s theological development, as he moves away from a naïve 
nationalism and toward a critical and Christologically-centred political ethics. Despite the fact 
that, as I will show, this movement takes place in reaction to Rößler, there is no other detailed 
investigation into the way Rößler influenced Bonhoeffer’s theology through their friendship. 
Alongside the theological material found in Bonhoeffer’s addresses in Barcelona 
(DBW/E 10:2/3, 8 February 1929) and Czechoslovakia (DBW/E 11:2/14, delivered on 26 
July 1932), the central resource for this investigation into the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship is 
their correspondence. It takes place over three distinct periods. 
Period 1. In the first period, the letters share personal and family news and pastoral 
concerns. Rößler was in Brandenburg, and Bonhoeffer wrote from Barcelona, Berlin, and 
New York. All the letters are from Bonhoeffer. Organised chronologically, we have one letter 
written by Bonhoeffer from Barcelona (DBW/E 10:1/40, 7 August 1928); five letters written 
by Bonhoeffer from Berlin (DBW/E 10:1/78, 5 April 1929; DBW/E 10:1/79, 7 April 1929; 
DBW/E 10:1/106, 23 February 1930; DBW/E 10:1/119, 24 June 1930; DBW/E 10:1/148, 24 
June 1930); and one letter written by Bonhoeffer from New York (DBW/E 10:1/148, 11 
December 1930). Topics covered in the letters include the challenges of being a pastor 
(DBW/E 10:1/40); family news about marriages, deaths and births (DBW/E 10:1/78, DBW/E 
10:1/79, DBW/E 10:1/106); and plans to see one another in person (DBW/E 10:1/106, 
DBW/E 10:1/119). The theological content of the letters centres around what Bonhoeffer was 
reading. 
Period 2. During the second period, the conversation becomes more theologically 
substantial, and the friendship is revealed to be under strain. Rößler was still in Brandenburg; 
Bonhoeffer was in New York and Berlin. Organised chronologically and topically, the 
exchange begins with a detailed theological reflection by Rößler on eschatology, nationalist 
sentiment, and parish life in Brandenburg, written to Bonhoeffer in New York (DBW/E 
10:1/164, 22 February 1931); Bonhoeffer continues a conversation about India, begun by 
Rößler in 10:1/164, in a brief response from Berlin (DBW/E 11:1/14, 18 October 1931); in a 
more substantial theological letter, responding to a letter from Rößler (not extant) about the 
published version of the lecture given by Bonhoeffer in Czechoslovakia, in which he spoke of 
the concrete commandment, Bonhoeffer picks up the topics of eschatology from DBW/E 
10:1/164 and concrete commandments from the lecture (DBW/E 12:1/22, 25 December 1932, 
also written from Berlin). 
Period 3. The third and final period of correspondence takes place while Bonhoeffer 
was a pastor in London and Rößler was a pastor in Holland; this period marks the end of the 
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friendship. The letters revolve around the relation between the German churches abroad, the 
Confessing Church, and the Reich Church. Organised chronologically and topically, it begins 
with a letter from Rößler to the German Evangelical Pastors Abroad, including Bonhoeffer, 
giving reasons why the German churches outside Germany ought not side with the 
Confessing Church (DBW/E 13:1/168, 16 November 1934); Bonhoeffer responds with a 
personal letter to Rößler saying that siding with the Reich Church was the wrong path, and 
accusing Rößler of complicity with the Reich Church (DBW/E 13:1/172, 20 November 
1934); the final letter in this period, and the last between Bonhoeffer and Rößler, was written 
by Rößler to defend his position and to make an argument for their continued friendship, 
despite their divide (DBW/E 13:1/181, 6 December 1934). 
What we will see, through these three periods of correspondence, is that for 
Bonhoeffer, there are limits to friendship: a friendship can dissolve and end. The reason for 
the dissolution of this friendship, however, was not theological disagreement. Both 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler share eschatology, for example, as an integral part of theological 
inquiry, though they do disagree about its meaning. This disagreement, on its own, did not 
lead to the dissolution of the friendship because friendship, for Bonhoeffer, can include 
theological debate and argument. (In fact, we will see that theological debate and argument 
between friends is part of the way Bonhoeffer thinks through his positions and claims.) There 
is disagreement, however, that is unbearable for Bonhoeffer, and in this instance, it centres 
around the character of God’s action in the world, and in the way God, through the church, 
speaks to the world. As we will see, digging deeply into the theological disagreement about 
eschatology yields that the failure of this friendship is related to the possibility, and the 
specific content, of the concrete commandment. For Bonhoeffer, the church can speak a 
divine command to the world, and call it to repentance; but Rößler’s theology is politically 
optimistic, and sees no room for this kind of divine command. The friendship can bear 
disagreement and discussion about the possibility of a divine command, but when it becomes 
clear to Bonhoeffer that Rößler does not hear the concrete ‘No’ to National Socialism, the 
friendship becomes impossible. In the end, what was central to the friendship between 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler was its dialogical nature, but dialogue, and even mutual theological 
influence, is not enough—from Bonhoeffer’s perspective—to sustain a friendship once 
political commitments diverge, and once a friend is no longer sharing the same ecclesiastical 
space. 
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3.1 THE SHAPE OF THE FRIENDSHIP 
 
As I argued in the first chapter, Sanctorum Communio describes friendship as lasting; 
this friendship, however, does not last. If it did not last, can we call it a friendship, in 
Bonhoeffer’s terms? If so, what kind of a friendship was it? What we will see is that both 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler described the relationship as a friendship, and as such, the relationship 
provides a concrete example of a friendship in practice. The correspondence also shows 
intimacy and affection, and that theological argument and conversation were important to 
them, though intimacy, affection, argument and conversation were unable, on their own, to 
sustain the friendship itself.  
The friendship began early in Bonhoeffer and Rößler’s time as theological students at 
the University of Berlin.209 The two were close enough that Rößler took a vacation with 
Bonhoeffer and Walter Dreß, staying together with the Bonhoeffers at Friedrichsbrunn in the 
spring of 1927,210 a visit that Rößler would remember fondly.211 In December of that same 
year, Rößler was one of Bonhoeffer’s opponents at the public defence of his first doctoral 
thesis.212 
The letters are marked by a warmth and affection that is not found in all of 
Bonhoeffer’s correspondence. Bonhoeffer writes about his concern for the wellbeing of 
Rößler213 and his family,214 and his gladness and pleasure in their correspondence.215 The 
letters contain personal reflections on the joys and struggles of ministry.216 Bonhoeffer is even 
unusually candid with Rößler about his struggle with a depressive episode in New York.217 
Bonhoeffer consistently expresses regret over missed opportunities for them to see one 
another218 and the hope that they see one another soon.219  
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This was more than epistolary pleasantry. While the letters are marked by the formal 
use of Sie rather than du, Bonhoeffer nevertheless calls Rößler’s correspondence 
‘freundschaftliche’,220 and sends his regards ‘in alter Freundschaft’221 and ‘In herzlicher 
Freundschaft’,222 addresses Rößler as ‘Freund’,223 and writes that he is often with Rößler in 
his ‘thoughts, as is a friend with a friend’ (‘wie ein Freund beim Freund’).224 Rößler calls 
Bonhoeffer ‘Freund’225 as well. And, when we look to Bonhoeffer’s correspondence more 
generally, we see that ‘friend’ is a descriptor that Bonhoeffer reserves for a limited number of 
people, such as Bethge. Bonhoeffer is judicious in his use of titles and relational terms, and is 
aware of fine degrees of relational differentiation.226 As I argue elsewhere in this thesis, for 
example, his use of ‘brother’ is reserved for people with whom he has a particular, 
disciplined, and ecclesiastically ordered relationship. Bonhoeffer is equally judicious with the 
terms ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’. It is a term Bonhoeffer uses sparingly and intentionally; he 
uses it for Rößler. 
In addition to the affection they felt toward one another, it was also a friendship that 
included theological dialogue and conversation. Rößler, writing about this combination of 
theological dialogue and personal affection, says: 
 
[The] infrequency of our correspondence is remarkable compared to the intensity of 
our mutual intellectual engagement. In any case, I often think intensely of you—quite 
involuntarily, wondering what your opinion might be on this or that topic of event. 
And sometimes Friedrichsbrunn hovers over me like a smiling, melancholy reflection 
with those few precious days in 1927. Your Sanctorum Communio doubtless 
contributes to that feeling, a book I have read halfway through with great engagement 
and joy in your accomplishment, even though the unfinished character of your 
thoughts does sometimes seem quite tangible. […] I am glad to be reading it for the 
sake of our own dialogue.227 
 
And just as Bonhoeffer’s work was read closely by Rößler, Bonhoeffer took Rößler’s 
theological work seriously as well. Rößler’s theological letters were evocative enough that 
Bonhoeffer read one of them to his American friends in New York, a letter that, as 
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Bonhoeffer puts it, ‘riveted my attention and occupied me like nothing else. When you wrote 
me then, what you said about your work stayed with me for a long time’.228  
Bonhoeffer’s dialogue with Rößler included not just conversation, but disagreement. 
In his last letter to Rößler, Bonhoeffer begins by saying that they are both ‘once again, on 
opposite sides of an issue’.229 Even though Bonhoeffer’s arguments with Rößler tended 
toward attempts to find common ground rather than the cultivation of opposition, it could, 
nevertheless, include unresolved theological arguments. This was not unusual for Bonhoeffer. 
Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Franz Hildebrandt, for example, included two longstanding 
disputes, each of them criticising the other over the use of sources.230 And, as we will see later 
in the thesis, Bonhoeffer had disagreements with Bethge as well, many of which influenced 
Bonhoeffer’s own theological development, and which Bonhoeffer held as essential to the 
character of their friendship.  
In 1932, however, both Bonhoeffer and Rößler were beginning to wonder if the 
friendship was sustainable. Cracks in the friendship’s foundation begin to appear in a 
Christmas letter that year; again, lamenting the fact that they had been apart for so long, 
Bonhoeffer writes to Rößler, describing his joy at receiving Rößler’s letter: 
  
All the years we have been apart seemed to vanish in an instant, and it was as if we 
stood face to face or side by side, as we did in our student years and occasionally on 
the tennis court. It’s quite remarkable how a few words have the power to make the 
years disappear. […] I would like so much to talk through the whole complex of 
questions [about concrete commandments] with you[.] […] In our discussions, I have 
always felt that we lost no time on arriving at something that was a burning issue for 
one of us. This has made our conversations especially worthwhile.231 
 
But in the letter, Bonhoeffer was beginning to recognise that he and Rößler were ‘differently 
constituted spiritually’ and suggested that Rößler may be right to say, as he had in a previous 
letter, that they were ‘bound to go separate ways’.232 Theological conversation and personal 
affection are still in play, but an end to the friendship was looking increasingly possible. 
The parting of the ways came in 1934. There was, in the end, a disagreement that 
broke this friendship. This break is clear at the end of Bonhoeffer’s final letter to Rößler; 
Bonhoeffer was afraid that his friendship with Rößler was at risk, comparing it to the bad 
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state of his relationship with Bishop Heckel, the head of the Church Foreign Office; 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler were, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, also ‘threatened by such a parting of the 
ways. So I am asking you,’ wrote Bonhoeffer, ‘could we not get together some time? We 
could clear up so many things! I look forward to your reply soon’.233 The letter ends with 
Bonhoeffer’s hope for reconciliation, but we can also see clearly that the friendship is under 
stress. For Bonhoeffer, if Rößler was in agreement with and working for Heckel, the 
friendship may be over. And it was.234 Rößler writes one more letter to Bonhoeffer saying that 
he was in league with the head of the foreign office, saying ‘[of] course I wrote my circular 
letter by agreement with Heckel’;235 it is the last piece of correspondence we have between 
them. 
So this friendship takes on a different shape from what was described in Sanctorum 
Communio. It was not lasting; nor do we see evidence of acts of love and repentance. The 
friendship was, instead, an affectionate and dialogical one; despite this affection, and the 
theological dialogue they both appreciated, the friendship ended when their convictions 
diverged.  
But what were the issues at stake? Where does the unbreachable fissure between them 
lie? It begins with their differing assessments of the situation in Germany and what that meant 
for the church. The following investigation into these differing assessments will reveal 
Rößler’s sympathy with the popular nationalism of his congregants, which put Rößler at odds 
with Bonhoeffer over the manner and the way the church can speak into a concrete political 
situation. Before I turn to that, and in order to set the stage for a more detailed analysis of the 
Rößler’s influence on Bonhoeffer and their eventual disagreement, I will turn to Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of the concrete commandment before his conversation with Rößler.  
 
3.2 THE CONCRETE COMMANDMENT AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE BARCELONA 
LECTURE 
 
The most comprehensive early example of Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on concrete 
commandments is found in an address on ethics and moral theology delivered by Bonhoeffer 
to his expatriate German congregation in Barcelona on 8 February 1929.236 Themes that will 
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become familiar in Bonhoeffer’s later work are already present here, including Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of principled ethics, and his understanding of God’s will and command as concrete. 
He will later develop these ideas more thoroughly, and critically, but the foundations of his 
approach are already clear here. How he applies his critique of principled ethics, however, is 
inconsistent; one of the principles that Bonhoeffer employs is Volk as an ethical determinant. 
And, as we will see, the Volk as ethical determinant is one that is related, in Bonhoeffer’s 
mind, to friendship. 
In the Barcelona lecture, Bonhoeffer asserts that there are no ‘universally valid 
Christian norms and commandments’.237 The reasons for this are theological, and have to do 
with God’s freedom. God does not operate according to human categories, but according to 
the path he chooses (seen, according to Bonhoeffer, in the ‘path of the cross’);238 therefore 
there is no ‘Christian ethic’, at least in the sense that humanity is at odds with God if it derives 
ways of acting according to its own ‘innumerable human paths’.239 Further, because God is 
free, ‘I will do something again today not because it seemed the right thing to do yesterday, 
but because today, too, God’s will has pointed me in that direction’:240 God may command 
differently today than he did yesterday; but to act again, according to what appeared to be 
right action in the past, is to operate upon a principle, and ‘would be surrendering the most 
precious human possession, my freedom’, an ‘immense gift’ given to humanity by Jesus.241 
So for Bonhoeffer, there is no Christian ethic, only God acting the way God acts, with 
freedom, and freely commanding. What this means for human decision-making is that there 
‘is absolutely no possibility for establishing universally valid principles, since each individual 
moment lived before God can confront us with completely unexpected decisions’.242 For 
Bonhoeffer, at least at this juncture, there is only the ‘decisive moment at hand’, a moment 
‘that is of potential ethical value’, and moments where one’s ‘immediate relationship with 
God’s will’ is ‘continually establish[ed] anew’.243 This results in ethical decisions as solitary 
acts, as Bonhoeffer puts it, in a ‘solitude in which a person stands before the living God. […] 
And precisely because I am face to face with God in this solitude, I alone can know what is 
right and wrong for me personally’.244  
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This freedom from principles, and the opportunity to follow God’s will, means that 
‘Christians must enter the complicated reality of the world’.245 Not making decisions ahead of 
time means a twofold reliance on God and the concrete situation; indeed, in this lecture, just 
as human beings encounter one another, God encounters human beings.246 A decision-maker 
‘cannot decide a priori what to do but rather will know only when they have actually entered 
into the situation of crisis itself and are conscious of being addressed by God’.247 It is, then, 
the concrete situation that leads a person into a circumstance where one is addressed by God; 
as Bonhoeffer puts it, ‘we must place ourselves in a concrete situation and from there direct 
our gaze toward eternity’.248 
But Bonhoeffer is inconsistent on this concrete, solitudinous decision-making before 
God. If one is presented with an ethical decision, and one stands before God in order to 
discern God’s will, would God not speak clearly and decisively? No, according to 
Bonhoeffer. As much as Bonhoeffer is concerned to speak of ethical decision-making as a 
lonely discernment of God’s will in the moment, he also speaks of the church and the Volk,249 
‘two of God’s orders’, that ‘seem to be in conflict’.250 Here Bonhoeffer undermines his own 
argument.251 In this case, the solitudinous decision-making is, on the one hand, concrete and 
free before God; on the other hand, it is the Volk who demand allegiance and determine the 
ethical course of action, rather than God in his freedom in the moment of decision. 
Thus the decision against the neighbour as enemy, and for the neighbour as Volk, is 
predetermined:  
 
If I ever find myself in the distressing situation of having to decide whether to expose 
my biological brother, my biological mother, to the hand of the attacker, or to raise my 
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own hand against the enemy, then the moment itself will doubtless tell me which of 
these two is and must be my neighbour, including before the eyes of God. 
 
But for Bonhoeffer, as he continues, it is the Volk, to whom he belongs according to ‘the 
divine order [Ordnungen] of things’, which he would defend, because for him, if he does ‘not 
act, I am doing nothing other than surrendering my neighbors’.252 Despite his own 
protestations that this is according to the ‘concrete situation’ with which he is confronted,253 
Bonhoeffer is caught in a contradiction, siding with the defence of the neighbour (through the 
demand of the Volk for war) over the love of an enemy (through the demand of the church for 
peace), on principle. The two orders, one preaching peace and love of enemy, and another 
championing war, lead to a decision between the destruction of an enemy or the surrender of a 
neighbour to destruction, where the love of neighbour is to be chosen over love of the enemy 
in advance. 
This move from the individual making an ethical decision before God, to a 
determination of war made by a people, is explained by Bonhoeffer in reference to a class of 
people who can discern God’s will.254 Bonhoeffer imagines a kind of Christian moral 
aristocracy at work: 
 
[The] determination as to when this moment has arrived for a people can and may 
only be made by human beings who are conscious of the grave responsibility for what 
they do, surrendering their own selfish will to the divine will that guides world 
history.255  
 
There is a class of people, according to Bonhoeffer, who are able to set aside their own selfish 
wills, and when they are able to do so, can make decisions according to the divine will; the 
‘moment’ of decision can and may only be taken up by those who can set aside their selfish 
wills and surrender the course of history to God’s will. The implication here is that large-scale 
decisions about foreign and domestic policy should exclude those who are only able to act 
according to their own desires, and that others—by virtue of their inability to set aside their 
own wills for God’s—are not to take part in such moments of decision. 
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This Protestant aristocratic sensibility bears on friendship for Bonhoeffer. For 
Bonhoeffer, this moral aristocracy comprises individuals whose ‘intellectual growth, youth, or 
power’ can lead a person ‘beyond others’,256 and this can mean separation from a friend: 
 
If our own intellectual growth, our own intellectual youth, our own power leads us 
beyond others, that is, if through God’s actions with us we find ourselves inwardly 
prompted to separate from a friend, there is no room for sentimentality. God wants us 
courageously to resolve to go beyond the other even if by moving beyond the other 
person we hurt that person. For God wills strength of life, not anxiety. And it is God 
who will find a way of amply healing the wounds he inflicts through us, that we inflict 
for his sake.257  
 
For Bonhoeffer, here, a person’s intellect and power can lead that person beyond others; the 
intellect and power are identified with God’s actions, and those actions inwardly separate a 
friend from a friend.  
Bonhoeffer, however, is caught in a problem similar to the one of the Volk as a moral 
determinant. In this case, signs of moral superiority determine the moral course of action. 
Rather than God prompting the dissolution of the friendship, intellect and power are evidence 
of God’s action that leads to the necessity of separation. God’s actions, here, are found in the 
pre-existing condition of intellect and power rather than in commanding, and intellect and 
strength determine a moral course rather than the command of God.  
There are two things to point out here. The first is that Bonhoeffer’s nationalism, at 
this point, partly determines the outcomes of moral decision-making. Bonhoeffer will soon 
show evidence of moving away from this; but here, his nationalism determines ethical 
decisions about war and peace. In this way, Bonhoeffer does speak of the importance of the 
concrete in ethical decision-making, though as he refers to the Volk as part of ethical decision-
making, the ‘concrete’ is still conceptual and abstract. The ‘concrete’ situation that 
Bonhoeffer is imagining here is not one that connects immediately to the decisions facing his 
expatriate congregation, but to future and possible ethical decisions; Bonhoeffer himself is not 
yet speaking of the concrete situation in Germany with specificity.  
The second thing to point out is that Bonhoeffer is beginning to associate friendship 
with moral and political decision-making in a way he did not in Sanctorum Communio. There 
are people who surrender their own will to the will of God that guides world history, 
including decisions about war and peace; these individuals, through God’s gift, have the 
intellect and power to make such moral determinations. If it becomes clear that between 
friends, one friend is able to make proper moral determinations, and another is not, God 
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prompts the separation of friend from friend, though not without the hope of some kind of 
resolution through God’s future healing. In this way, a friendship depends on a shared ability 
to hear God’s will concerning the shape of history, either through the surrender of the will to 
God or through God’s provision of intellect and power; and a breach in friendship is God’s to 
heal. 
As we now turn to Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Helmut Rößler, this is precisely what 
we see: that Bonhoeffer considers Rößler’s moral determinations—with regard to nationalist 
movements and Reich interference with the church—to be deficient, and for this reason 
Bonhoeffer ends the friendship. This does not happen, however, before Rößler’s presses 
Bonhoeffer’s ethics in a direction where the ‘concrete’ is not simply conceptual, it is specific 
to the political and social movements of the Germany they inhabited. 
 
3.3 ESCHATOLOGY, CONCRETE COMMANDMENTS, AND A FRIENDSHIP 
UNDER STRAIN 
 
Two developments in Bonhoeffer’s approach to ethics take place after the Barcelona 
lectures: one is that Bonhoeffer’s ethics become more christologically focussed; another is 
that they begin to take into account, with more specificity, the concrete situation of Germany. 
More successfully than in his Barcelona address, Bonhoeffer is able to abandon the Volk as a 
moral determinant for ethical decision-making, and to carefully integrate an ethic of God’s 
command with a concern for the concrete situation in Germany.  
This development takes place partly through Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Rößler, 
seen primarily in the second period of correspondence between them. In this period their 
friendship was under stress, caused by diverging political convictions and their differing 
political eschatologies. But as we will see, the friendship remains one of theological 
conversation, despite their divergences and differences; evidence of the dialogical nature of 
the friendship is seen most clearly in Rößler’s influence on Bonhoeffer, particularly through 
Bonhoeffer’s response to Rößler’s critical assessment of his friend’s inability to take into 
account the concrete situation in Germany. 
Barnett points out that the uneasy alliance between Bonhoeffer’s nationalist 
sympathies and his critique of principled ethics does not last long, and is not a factor by the 
time Bonhoeffer leaves New York in 1931;258 Tödt points out that Bonhoeffer re-evaluates 
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the antagonism between ‘orders’ and nationalist sentiment as a determining factor in his 
ethics in his turn to a ‘christological concentration’259 in his 1933 Christology lectures.260  
These developments, however, do not happen in isolation from the friendship 
Bonhoeffer shared with Rößler. Before Bonhoeffer left New York, and before the Christology 
lectures, Bonhoeffer and Rößler began their discussion about Germany’s situation with what 
they saw happening in the church. As an exchange student at Union Seminary in New York, 
Bonhoeffer described ‘the situation of the church [in the United States] which, without 
suspecting it, is now smiling in desperation’.261 German theology, particularly Luther, seemed 
provincial to American students, and according to Bonhoeffer they ‘just don’t understand’ the 
theological stakes of the German church.262 This assessment of the American reception of 
Luther, and German theology more generally, is picked up by Rößler in a response to 
Bonhoeffer. Rößler agrees with Bonhoeffer about the state of the American church, calling it 
‘theologically grotesque’. ‘But’, writes Rößler, ‘are things much different in our own 
church?’263 For Rößler, things are not that different. 
While Rößler was not wholeheartedly sympathetic to National Socialism, particularly 
when it is syncretistically combined with the gospel and ‘in the service of one or the other 
quite respectable human concern’,264 Rößler was willing to share the concerns of the people 
he was serving on account of being ‘called to a deed of ongoing love’ toward them.265 For 
Rößler, the struggle was for an appropriate German nationalism that does not ‘betray the 
gospel’; he writes: 
 
My own heart is hotly engaged in the mighty struggle for national self-assertion and 
the will for the future, a struggle that, especially in the rural flat country, has grown 
tremendously[,] […] and precisely because I am so engaged in that struggle, I often 
feel sorely challenged lest I betray the gospel to the “most sacred possession of the 
nation”, especially since by doing so the way of the cross […] can be made 
considerably easier by external success.266 
 
Rößler continues to say that he is, on account of love, nevertheless called to the ‘questions 
and distress of today’s rural inhabitant’, a distress that is ‘of an exclusively nationalistic 
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[vaterländisch] disposition’.267 In this sense, Rößler sees his task as ‘preaching the cross’ in 
the midst of the ideas that are moving the rural population of Germany, such as the renewal of 
the ‘Prussian idea of the state’, ‘racial purity, war on the Jews’, renegotiation of reparation 
payments, anti-Marxist sentiments, and the ‘“third Reich” of German freedom and 
righteousness’.268 Rößler’s struggle is to remain both faithful to the gospel and to take 
seriously the real concerns of the people he is serving. The problem in Germany is not, for 
him, the ‘mighty struggle for national self-assertion’;269 it is its syncretism of the combination 
of the völkisch movement of national fervour with a ‘new paganism’, which he calls a 
‘tragedy’.270 Nationalism ought to be Christian for Rößler, who reports that it is difficult for 
him ‘not to betray the theologia crucis and instead value the kingdom of God higher than the 
tormented fatherland’.271 So for Rößler, there is a hierarchy of commitments, rather than a 
conflict between his Christian calling to love his people and the nationalist movements in 
which his people were participating.  
This sympathy with a growing popular nationalism has to do with Rößler’s political 
eschatology. Rößler pointed out that for him, all the spheres of human life—including what he 
calls the ‘profane’ and ‘autonomous’—were coming more and more ‘under the purview of the 
eschatological’,272 something Rößler sees happening among his congregants: ‘the experiences 
I’ve had during the past year and a half in the rural Mark Brandenburg have certainly 
contributed to that feeling’.273 While Rößler describes the church as the place where ‘God 
personally gather’s together God’s people […] who have been brought and are brought ever 
anew out of their own self-glorification and self-determination’,274 this is all written within 
the context of Rößler’s optimistic view of the nationalistic turn within Germany and the 
German church. Rößler is critical of the ‘pagan’ aspects of the growing popular movements 
taking hold in rural Brandenburg, but was not dismissive of their nationalist concerns, 
because for him, the ‘purview of the eschatological’ was encroaching over all spheres of life, 
including such movements.275 
Part of Rößler’s eschatological confidence has to do with Buß, repentance. For Rößler, 
the time of asking for penance was over. He asks Bonhoeffer: ‘Can we still be prophets who 
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have time to bring about hardness of heart through the call to penance? Must we not bring the 
realism of love to those who are lost?’276 Rößler is explicitly arguing against ‘Barth’s call to 
penance’ (Bußruf),277 as it is found in one of Barth’s collected essays in Die Wort Gottes und 
die Theologie, where Barth argues not for sacrificial penance but for a ‘radically new way of 
thinking’ that begins with Christ calling his disciples to follow him.278 Rößler disagrees with 
Barth, and thinks this theology of penance should be replaced with a theology focussed more 
immediately on Christ preached as ‘the great hope […] proclaimed to this hopeless, suffering 
humanity’.279  
Taken as a whole, Rößler’s optimistic eschatology is one where all spheres of life 
were coming under the purview of a Christ who offers hope rather than a call to repentance. 
So it is no wonder that Rößler would have sympathy for the nationalist movements taking 
root among his congregants. His eschatology is primarily one of hope, and this leads him to 
love his congregants where they are. But without the possibility of a complementary call for 
repentance, the changing of one’s mind—and the political consequences of changing one’s 
mind about certain aspects of the nationalism that was gripping Brandenburg—a critical 
faculty that could begin to formulate a ‘No’ to these social movements is eroded to the point 
of being ineffectual, or even, as it seems in Rößler’s mind, unnecessary. 
One thing that can be said for Rößler is that he was in touch with what mattered to his 
congregation: he was not above the fray. And in the midst of Rößler’s description of the 
difficulties of ministry in rural Brandenburg, he accuses Bonhoeffer of being ‘unpolitical’. 
This is part of Rößler’s argument for his conclusions about the political situation he was in. 
For him, even though Bonhoeffer might have a ‘high vantage point’ in New York, he was 
unable to understand the concrete struggles of pastors like Rößler, who were on the ‘frontline 
soldiers in the filthy trenches’,280 and therefore better able to formulate a theological response 
to the nationalism that was taking root in his parish. 
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Bonhoeffer’s initial response to Rößler’s accusation, on 18 October 1931, is 
unfortunately short.281 Bonhoeffer thinks that there is such a thing as a ‘local’ German 
theology, and that the Germans have ‘understood what the gospel is’;282 Bonhoeffer, however, 
remains unconcerned with the national fervour that gripped Rößler, and does not engage 
Rößler on the theological and eschatological significance of the German Christian movement. 
But the accusation has been made, even though Bonhoeffer does not immediately respond: for 
Rößler, Bonhoeffer is not close enough to what is going on ‘in the trenches’, and 
Bonhoeffer’s ethical determinations are not sufficiently grounded in the concrete. 
Bonhoeffer does soon ground his ethics in Germany’s concrete situation. Rößler 
introduced into that conversation a political eschatology that was uninterested in repentance; 
then, Bonhoeffer revisits these same topics in a lecture at an ecumenical peace conference in 
Ciernohorské Kúpele, Czechoslovakia, delivered on 26 July 1932 and published in Die Eiche 
later on the same year.283 It is no wonder that the address became an important subject 
between the two of them: Rößler insisted that Bonhoeffer take into account the concrete 
situation of Germany; but once Bonhoeffer begins to get more specific about the nationalist 
movements to which Rößler was sympathetic, he does so through a political eschatology that, 
as we will see, is critical of the nationalist movements to which Rößler was sympathetic.  
In the lecture, Bonhoeffer speaks clearly about the concrete situation in Germany, 
framed by a concern that the ecumenical movement did not think its task was a theological 
one. For Bonhoeffer, the lack of theological vigour in the ecumenical movement meant that it 
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was not robust enough to withstand the political fluctuations that the church, and the 
ecumenical movement, should resist: the ‘political wave of nationalism among the youth’.284  
Bonhoeffer connects this theological resistance to the church’s ability to speak a 
concrete command. For Bonhoeffer, because the church is ‘Christus Praesens’, Christ in the 
flesh and as a human organization, it therefore has the ‘authority of the Christ who is present 
and living in it’, and is thus able to proclaim both ‘gospel and commandment’.285 The 
ecumenical movement, then, if it were to think of itself as ‘one church’ that had ‘joined 
together in order to express their claim, or rather the claim of our Lord, on the entire 
world’,286 it could take a stand and speak with the authority of the Christ who is present and 
living in the church; this would lead to the possibility that the ecumenical movement, as a 
church, could ‘proclaim not principles that are always true but rather only commandments 
that are true today’:287 that is, commandments concerning the rise of nationalism which 
Bonhoeffer is addressing.  
In the lecture, Bonhoeffer says that the church can err or sin, but that this should not 
prevent it from speaking concretely; even if ‘the church is in error and sinful […] it may 
speak [the commandment] in faith in the word of the forgiveness of sins that holds true for the 
church as well’.288 To be at risk of erring or sinning simply means that the church must not 
lose sight of the centrality of its proclamation of the forgiveness of sins:  
 
Thus […] the proclamation of the commandment is founded in the proclamation of the 
forgiveness of sins. The church cannot command unless it itself stands in the belief in 
the forgiveness of sins and without directing all those whom it commands to 
emphasize this proclamation of the forgiveness of sins.289  
 
The commandment that speaks into the present, for Bonhoeffer, also has 
eschatological dimensions that result in the possibility of the destruction of that which is not 
oriented to Christ. As Bonhoeffer puts it, the ‘commandment cannot come from anywhere 
except that place where the promise and fulfillment come from, namely, from Christ […] as 
the one who brings and promises the new world’.290 The commandment reorients those who 
hear it, and ‘we are directed toward Christ. Through this, however, we understand the entire 
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world order of the fallen creation as directed only toward Christ through the new creation’.291 
For Bonhoeffer, ‘all worldly orders exist only because they are directed toward Christ’292 and 
they ‘receive their value completely from the outside, from Christ, from the new creation’.293 
Orders are to remain only if they are open to Christ; ‘[every] order—be it the oldest and 
holiest—can be broken—and must be, when it is locked within itself, hardened, and when it 
no longer permits the proclamation of revelation’.294 In this way, through the demand that 
orders be broken, Christ stands over the world in judgment. 
More will be said about Bonhoeffer’s early theology of orders, as it is expressed here, 
in Chapter 4. For now, however, I would point out that Bonhoeffer, at this juncture, is not 
unpolitical. Christ’s call is a word for all spheres of life, and all spheres of life can change 
their orientation and ends. In this way, Bonhoeffer’s ethics is one of repentance in Barth’s 
sense: it is a new way of thinking and a new orientation of the world that comes through its 
orientation to Christ. In this we see Bonhoeffer moving away from his principled ethics 
toward one that is Christologically concentrated, and one where the situation of the German 
church is not determinative of ethical decision-making; rather, the situation on Germany is 
now the concrete context into which Christ speaks through the church. 
As I pointed out above, the situation in Germany was already part of the conversation 
between Bonhoeffer and Rößler; Rößler had introduced into that conversation a political 
eschatology that had no need of repentance. But once Bonhoeffer begins to get more specific 
about the nationalist movements to which Rößler was sympathetic, he does so in a political 
eschatology that is focussed on Christ’s judgment over political orders, and firmly underlines 
the necessity of both forgiveness and repentance, in a way that allowed him to gain more 
critical traction over nationalist movements and to undermine volkisch sentiment as a 
determining ethical factor.  
This way of turning attention to the specifics of the political situation in Germany 
would not have found much purchase with Rößler, considering his optimism about the social 
developments that were happening in Brandenburg, and his insistence that any understanding 
of the spheres of human life should be characterized primarily by hope and love rather than 
penance or the possibility of their destruction. Further, one can imagine that Rößler would 
feel the need to respond to these claims, because though Bonhoeffer had taken his advice, 
becoming more attentive to what is happening ‘in the trenches’, it leads Bonhoeffer away 
from Rößler’s own sympathies.  
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Rößler’s response to the address came in a letter that is not extant, though we do have 
Bonhoeffer’s reply to Rößler’s response, which came on Christmas Day, 1932.295 We do 
know that Rößler pointed out in his letter that for him, the church cannot utter a concrete 
commandment, because Bonhoeffer wrote in his reply a summary of the conversation so far, 
saying that they both agree that the church of their day could not ‘utter a concrete 
commandment’.296 Bonhoeffer is even more resolute on the question of eschatology, another 
ongoing topic of debate between them. But Bonhoeffer, responding to Rößler’s claim in the 
missing letter, thinks the question was about why the church cannot utter a concrete 
commandment, writing that ‘the question is whether this lies in its nature—that is, within the 
inherent limitations of the eschata—or represents apostasy [Abfall] and loss of substance’.297 
It is a rhetorical question that Bonhoeffer had already answered in the ecumenical address, 
and against Rößler’s idea that the encroachment of eschatological love should lead to the end 
of any need for repentance. For Bonhoeffer, it is not about an encroachment of eschata upon 
spheres of life that limit the church’s inability to utter a commandment; the church can utter 
the commandment because it is Christ in the flesh, and has the authority of Christ whose 
commandment, through repentance, reorients the world to him and his new creation. Thus, for 
Bonhoeffer, the inability of the church to utter a commandment is certainly a question of 
apostasy and loss of substance. 
This response, for Bonhoeffer, is connected to Rößler’s initial accusation that 
Bonhoeffer held himself above the fray. Bonhoeffer replies directly to Rößler, saying that his 
‘disinterestedness’ in politics was one that he had once claimed for himself; Bonhoeffer 
writes, however, that in retrospect ‘[it] was only meant to indicate the parameter within which 
I see the problems through the objective reality of the church’.298 But the lecture, and 
Bonhoeffer’s reply to Rößler, are not only clarifications of what appeared to be 
‘disinterestedness’; they were a development of Bonhoeffer’s ethics in a concrete way, a point 
which he underlines in this same letter to Rößler, writing that ‘just as the individual is 
supposed to hear the concrete commandment […], so should a congregation or a nation 
[Volk] also be the subject, the hearer of God’s commandment’.299 As we have seen, the 
commandment has become, for Bonhoeffer, not one of the abstracted political possibilities he 
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outlined in Barcelona, but a commandment against the nationalist movements that were 
changing the face of German politics at that moment in history.  
Bethge thinks that the reference, in this letter, to the church’s ability to utter a concrete 
commandment is a criticism directed at Barth;300 but to see this as a response to Barth is only 
partly true. It makes more sense to place this within the conversation Bonhoeffer is having 
with Rößler, seeing it as a response to the earlier claims made by Rößler, in the letter that is 
not extant, but whose content is verified in Bonhoeffer’s following letter and his summary of 
their conversation, which included the subject of concrete commandments paired with a 
continuing conversation about political eschatology and repentance. The argument makes 
most sense if we see the reference to Barth as part of their disagreement, with Bonhoeffer 
seeing Barth’s call to repentance in terms of a reorientation of social orders to Christ and his 
new creation, and Rößler disputing Barth’s account as unnecessary because Christ is to be 
preached as hope and love, rather than in terms of repentance or the reorientation of orders. In 
this way, Barth is part of the conversation, but the disagreement itself is taking place between 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler. The dispute over the possibility of the church uttering a concrete 
commandment is simply the next part of their engagement with one another over the relation 
between social orders and eschatology, forgiveness, and repentance. 
Looking at the situation from the perspective of his arguments and disagreement with 
Barth, as Bethge does, helps make sense of one of the ways that Bonhoeffer disagreed with 
Barth. Bethge is right to say that Bonhoeffer eventually changed his position on concrete 
commandments in favour of Barth, softening his language to speak of God’s counsel rather 
than God’s command.301 But the immediate context of the letters is a conversation on the 
same themes with Rößler. Overlooking this immediate context helps with the big picture of 
Bonhoeffer’s theological development, but at the same time overlooks a significant part of 
that development, which is, in this case, being worked out with Rößler, making Rößler, 
through their disagreement, the impetus for the clarification of Bonhoeffer’s position. First, 
we can see Bonhoeffer taking into account the real situation of German nationalism, asking 
the ecumenical movement to boldly speak against it after Rößler had written a letter to 
Bonhoeffer about his own sympathy to that same nationalism, and accusing Bonhoeffer of a 
‘high vantage point’ that did not take into account what was happening ‘in the trenches’. 
Second, Rößler introduced to their conversation an optimistic eschatology of hope and love, 
without need for repentance, and Bonhoeffer responds with a Christological eschatology 
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where political orders are to be orientated to Christ and the new creation through the enabling 
conditions of repentance and forgiveness, and a Christologically oriented ecclesiology that 
allows the church to speak as Christ to the world. In these two ways we can see this 
conversation, and theological friendship, as one of the factors at play in Bonhoeffer’s 
theological development. 
Their correspondence, and their friendship, are significant for more than an 
understanding of Rößler’s role in Bonhoeffer’s theological growth. It also speaks to the nature 
of friendship for Bonhoeffer. In addition to the possibilities of Sanctorum Communio—where 
friendship is lasting, and potentially redemptive and for others—Bonhoeffer’s practice of 
friendship was also dialogical, and one that could maintain significant theological 
disagreement. Further, the theological conversation partner was both someone to whom you 
spoke about your theological interests and positions, and a person who could further shape 
your theological positions on account of what the theological friend was saying to you in 
response. 
This period of correspondence also speaks to the state of the Bonhoeffer-Rößler 
friendship, and the reasons why it became so precarious. For Bonhoeffer, theological dialogue 
has its limits; on its own, dialogue and mutual influence might not be sufficient to save the 
friendship. Bonhoeffer’s letter on Christmas, 1932, expresses this fact, Bonhoeffer writing 
that he and Rößler might be ‘bound to go separate ways’ on account of being ‘so differently 
constituted spiritually’.302 Their differing spiritual constitutions led them to very different 
ways of thinking theologically about the church and the world: Bonhoeffer to an ethics of 
critical engagement with political and social movements, and Rößler to sympathetic 
engagements with those same political and social movements. 
In a sense, it was an unfortunate impasse. Renegotiation of reparation payments was 
one of Rößler’s concerns; the pressure to pay back war debt had led to levels of inflation that 
were having corrosive effects on the German economy as a whole. In this way, one can see 
the good in Rößler’s love and hope that does not depend on repentance, if repentance led to 
the kind of suffering that Rößler tells Bonhoeffer he is seeing. Rößler cared for his pastoral 
charge, in this sense, even theologically. But Bonhoeffer was not in this kind of theologically 
generous mood; he was more concerned to maintain his theologically critical approach to 
nationalist socialist movements as a whole, which led to a faltering friendship, though one 
that had yet to end. 
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3.4 GERMAN PASTORS ABROAD AND THE END OF A FRIENDSHIP 
 
For a time, the theological differences between Bonhoeffer and Rößler—and the 
political ramifications of those theological differences—were bearable within the context of 
their friendship. Rößler’s sympathy to the nationalistic tendencies of his Brandenburg parish, 
and Bonhoeffer’s re-oriented political ethics, had stressed their friendship but not broken it. 
But the ecclesiastical-political significance of the argument between Bonhoeffer and Rößler 
becomes clearer during an exchange that begins in November 1934 when they were both 
pastors abroad, Bonhoeffer in England, and Rößler in Holland. As we will see, their 
differences eventually become unbearable, and their theological commitments lead to 
concrete decisions about the legitimacy of the Reich church, decisions that themselves lead to 
the end of the friendship. 
Both Bonhoeffer and Rößler, as pastors abroad, were under the oversight of Theodor 
Heckel, director and bishop of the newly instituted Church Foreign Office of the German 
Evangelical Church. Heckel was a German Christian sympathizer303 who fell in with Ludwig 
Müller,304 Hitler’s personal adviser305 and then Reich Bishop.306 Bonhoeffer and the London 
congregations had a history of conflict with Heckel; and on 15 January 1934, the London 
pastors sent a telegram307 and a letter to the President of the German Reich308 asking for the 
removal of the Reich Bishop Müller, threatening secession. This prompted Heckel to visit 
London in February 1934 with the hope of returning to Berlin with a declaration of loyalty 
from the German pastors. They refused to sign, even under an accusation of treason,309 
because after Barmen and Dahlem, and largely under Bonhoeffer’s influence, the London 
churches aligned themselves with the Confessing Church, and agreed to a declaration of 
secession from the Reich Church.310  
In response to the declaration, Heckel wrote a circular letter to the German pastors 
abroad, including Bonhoeffer and Rößler.311 It was, in part, a response to the resolutions to 
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secede made by the London congregations earlier that month. For Heckel, the churches 
abroad did not need to take a side in the struggle taking place in Germany: 
 
[It] is not as though our German churches abroad had to choose between different 
groups within the home church or had to make decisions themselves with regard to 
church politics. The German Evangelical Church abroad is called upon to act in 
concert, in unity and unanimity, since it is in greater danger from the erroneous 
decisions of individuals than any one of them, looking out from his particular outpost, 
can judge. Affiliation with the Foreign Office of the home church does not indicate 
that one has taken a political stance within the church for or against a particular 
church system. The work of the churches abroad, like the Church Foreign Office, 
stands over and above these contradictions.312 
 
Heckel’s desire was for the unity of the churches abroad through not taking a side, and for 
him, affiliation with the Church Foreign Office did not mean that any of the congregations 
had necessarily sided with the Reich bishop and against the Confessing Synod. 
 Two days later, Rößler took this letter as an opportunity to write a confidential letter 
of his own to the pastors of the same congregations, including Bonhoeffer.313 Rößler tells the 
pastors that he had just been to Berlin ‘to negotiate with the Church Foreign Office’, writing: 
‘[this] gave me the opportunity to learn in detail about the state of the critical disputes in our 
church.’314 Rößler’s main concern was that the battle over governance between the 
Confessing Synod and the Reichskirche would lead the Reich to dissociate from church 
affairs entirely, leading to the establishment of free churches, like those seen in America, and 
ending ‘the tie that has existed since Luther’s day between the Evangelical Church and the 
German State’.315 According to Rößler, the question of governance ‘is of minor importance 
compared with the certain prospect that state subsidies for all church bodies and activities—
the Protestant theological faculties, confessional schools, and work among the German 
communities abroad—[which] would be in jeopardy’.316 The unification of the German 
church under the state authorities was necessary to pre-empt this, for Rößler, through ‘a legal 
reorganization of the existing church government that preserves the continuity of the unified 
constitution and administration and its tie to the state authorities’.317 Heckel, according to 
Rößler, was ‘defending the independence of the German churches abroad’ from the conflict 
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taking place in Germany, and that the churches abroad have been ‘spared the internal 
dissension within the church’.318 
So for Rößler, the association of the German churches abroad with the Reichskirche 
was practical, in that it safeguarded their subsidies; but he would also say that disassociation 
would be dangerous and treasonous. Rößler directed this fire towards London, Bonhoeffer, 
and Bonhoeffer’s fellow pastors: ‘I can well understand that many colleagues in the ministry 
might have a sense of belonging inwardly to the Confessing Church and would not 
understand why they shouldn’t simply give way to it. But as things are now, to do so would 
be ‘to stab the Church Foreign Office in the back’,319 and ‘individual demonstrative acts by 
congregations abroad could do more harm than good’.320 The Church Foreign Office, 
according to Rößler, ‘is struggling to find a real solution for the whole church that does not 
necessitate the complete disintegration of what now exists’.321 The London parishes were 
threatening disloyalty to the Foreign Office, the Reichskirche, and treason against Germany; 
echoing Heckel, Rößler says: ‘quite aside from the fact that congregations abroad that 
intervene in internal German church disputes may at any time easily incur accusations of 
treason and have a hard time refuting them’, and revealing his longstanding sympathy with 
the Deutsche Christen, also says that he wants to see and to fight for ‘a unified German 
Evangelical National Church […] within the Third Reich and for the sake of Protestant 
German culture worldwide’.322 In a final bit of solidarity with Heckel, he asks that the 
German congregations abroad ‘refrain as long as possible from making decisions, and if they 
cannot be postponed, do not in any case announce them without contacting the Church 
Foreign Office!’323 
But for Bonhoeffer, the time of reconciliation and cooperation had passed after 
Barmen and Dahlem, and so Bonhoeffer responded with a letter to Rößler that picks up an 
existing thread of conversation about the concrete commandment. Bonhoeffer, in a thinly 
veiled accusation that Rößler was in league with Heckel, and referring to the need for the 
German churches abroad to decide for the Confessing Church and against the Reichskirche, 
wrote: ‘I know these voices, and I know that objectively there is nothing behind them except 
the attempt to avoid making the decision that is demanded’.324 For Bonhoeffer, the practical 
path outlined by Rößler and Heckel was a path of good tactics, but not good faith, and if 
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anyone was being disloyal it was the Church Foreign Office and Heckel, who were ‘betraying 
our congregations abroad to a pseudochurch for the contemptible purpose of getting the 
pastors paid’.325 Bonhoeffer points out that the Church Foreign Office was implicated with, 
not distant from, the Reich Church, with Heckel giving his blessing to the Reich Bishop; this 
revealed to Bonhoeffer that Heckel was associating himself not with Christ, but with 
‘Beliar’.326 Thus, ‘[w]hat is called for here is an immediate, uncompromising No’, writes 
Bonhoeffer. ‘There is no more communion between us and this kind of a church, and since 
that is so, we should say so. We have waited long enough’.327  
As this difference over the legitimacy of Reich Church became clear, Bonhoeffer 
began to think that a parting of the ways with Rößler might be necessary, just as had 
happened with Heckel, someone Bonhoeffer ‘used to have quite good relations with […] 
almost of friendship’; but after Heckel’s unwillingness to clearly speak and work against the 
Reich, that friendship had ended.328 And the friendship with Rößler did end not long after. 
Rößler wrote a response to Bonhoeffer, a letter to which Bonhoeffer decided not to respond. 
In the letter, Rößler admitted to being in league with Heckel, and disputed the claim, made by 
Bonhoeffer and the Confessing Church, that it was the true church. Rößler wrote that the 
‘Confessing Church isn’t any more the true church than the German Christian Church. The 
true church lies hidden within each of them’, and that Heckel’s strategy ‘offers just what we 
are hoping and secretly longing for, the vision of a church that is equally distant from both the 
German Christians and the Confessing Church, the church that is to come’.329 But this was a 
weak endorsement of the Confessing Church, and a weak claim for distance from the German 
Christians. Rößler had in essence distanced himself from the Confessing Church, and allied 
himself with Müller and Heckel. 
In one final volley, Rößler revisited his accusation that Bonhoeffer was always at a 
distance, and not involved in the struggle as he would be if he were in the middle of parish 
life in Germany. As I point out above, Bonhoeffer, in response to Rößler, had already made 
his ethics more concrete, taking into account the situation of the German church and its 
nationalistic tendencies. But there was, for Bonhoeffer, one more step to take. Unknown to 
Rößler, Bonhoeffer had decided in September to return to Germany, take up a post as the 
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director of the Finkenwalde seminary, and to put himself directly into the fray of the Church 
Struggle.330  
Bonhoeffer, however, would not have an opportunity to tell Rößler. Rößler finished 
his letter, saying, ‘I will close for now, having simply marked out my position in our 
discussion. How are you personally? I hope we will soon be able to have a good talk; we 
really need it’.331 They never had that talk. Rößler wrote, at the top of his own copy of this 
letter, in his own handwriting: ‘My (painful) parting of the ways with D. Bonhoeffer in the 
Church Struggle’.332 Rößler’s letter was the last contact between them.  
The friendship between Bonhoeffer and Rößler ends within the patterns of reasoning 
Bonhoeffer used in his Barcelona lecture and his ecumenical address. Bonhoeffer had gone 
‘beyond’ Rößler, in the terms of the Barcelona lecture, a situation that meant the separation of 
friends. The potential for the destruction of a sphere of life that was not oriented the new 
creation in Christ, as described in the ecumenical address, plays out in this smallest of social 
spheres, a friendship. While Bonhoeffer and Rößler disagreed about concrete commandments, 
the friendship could continue, even though it was faltering. Disagreement did not mean the 
end of friendship. But once it came to an actual commandment spoken concerning the relative 
authority of the Reich—which happened for Bonhoeffer at Barmen and Dahlem, but not for 
Rößler—their differing convictions led to their ecclesial separation. Upon finding themselves 
in different ecclesiastical communities as a result of differing conclusions about the limit of 
state authority over the church, it meant—at least for Bonhoeffer—the end of the friendship. 
 
3.5 GANDHI, INTER-FAITH FRIENDSHIP, AND RÖßLER’S LAST WORD 
 
Rößler’s last word, in this friendship, was one of hope. We see this hope first in his 
desire that the two might ‘have a good talk’, as I point out above; but it seen in another way as 
well. Rößler himself did not agree with Bonhoeffer about the possible need for the friendship 
ending, and made his own argument for its continuation. In doing so, Rößler refers to another 
thread of their conversation: their mutual interest in India, which acts for Rößler as an entry 
into a case for friendship across difference; for my purposes here, it also acts as an entry into 
a critical assessment of Bonhoeffer’s willingness to end the friendship. 
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Plant, in his introduction to Letters to London, writes that for Bonhoeffer some 
differences of opinion—but not all—are possible between friends.333 We can see this in the 
Rößler correspondence. There is a lot of disagreement that does not break the friendship 
between Bonhoeffer and Rößler. Plant also asserts that friendship is Christocentric for 
Bonhoeffer, because it ‘has Jesus Christ at its centre: he it is who is the true basis of 
friendship because he is the Lord of truth and enemy of falsehood’.334 We can see this, too, in 
this correspondence. The dividing line between Bonhoeffer and Rößler is, as Bonhoeffer puts 
it, between Christ and Belial. As I have argued above, Rößler’s eschatology is not 
sophisticated enough to allow hope and love to be present alongside repentance, which in 
turn—for Bonhoeffer—would not provide the church with the right conditions to utter a 
concrete commandment; Rößler himself did not think it was necessary for the church to speak 
such a commandment. This led Rößler and Bonhoeffer in different political directions. So, in 
a sense, for Bonhoeffer, friendship does have Jesus Christ at its centre, if the church that 
speaks the concrete commandment in Barmen and Dahlem is Christus Praesens; this would 
mean that to ignore what this church has to say would be to take a side against Christ, and an 
unwillingness to associate oneself with the Confessing Church would be to be placed outside 
Christ. 
The Christocentricity of friendship needs some qualification, however; and we have 
evidence that Bonhoeffer did not understand this Christocentricity in terms of Christian 
exclusivity in his correspondence with Rößler. A conversation about India had begun between 
them in Rößler’s letter describing the challenges of a being a pastor in rural Germany. ‘I was 
alarmed to hear’, writes Rößler about a lecture he had heard, ‘that the process of 
nationalistically grounded syncretism presently poses the most serious temptation of the 
Christian mission in India’.335 Bonhoeffer, already interested in going to India to meet 
Gandhi, responded:  
 
One large country I would like to see, if perhaps the great solution will come from 
there—India. For otherwise it seems to be over; the great dying out of Christianity 
seems to be here. Is our time over? Has the gospel been given to another people, 
perhaps proclaimed with completely different words and actions?336 
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This remark illustrates something curious about Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on India: Bonhoeffer 
appears to be claiming that the gospel might be revealed to, and then proclaimed by the non-
Christian.  
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Gandhi and India according to his own Christian 
categories can sound exoticized and inadequate because there is little evidence of 
understanding Gandhi, or India, on Indian or Hindu terms.337 But this is not a facile 
engagement with another faith; rather, Bonhoeffer sees an analogy between his own thought 
and Gandhi’s. At the Fanø conference, for example, Bonhoeffer wondered how peace would 
come, and who might make a call to peace that the world might hear. Bonhoeffer thought the 
ecumenical movement could, and if it did, the peace of Christ would be proclaimed ‘against 
the raging world’; but for Bonhoeffer, those who were heeding the ‘radical call to peace’ were 
the ‘non-Christian peoples in the East’,338 those in Gandhi’s movement whose work was an 
‘exemplification of the Sermon on the Mount’.339 
What we can see in this ‘call to peace’ is something analogous to a concrete 
commandment. In Bonhoeffer’s manner of thinking, the way the church speaks a concrete 
command to the world, and which results in certain kinds of action—like the ‘No’ to the 
Reich church, which leads to resisting the Reich church in the Confessing Church—Gandhi 
and his movement were making a ‘call to peace’ that led to certain kinds of political action. In 
this way, a pattern that is internal to Bonhoeffer’s own faith is recognisable by him in the faith 
of another: the command is analogous to the call. Further, the content of the call was 
analogous as well: it was a call or command to peace, a call to peace that Bonhoeffer shared 
with Gandhi and his movement, and one that was leading Bonhoeffer to visit India and to 
share work toward that peace.340  
Rößler, in his final letter to Bonhoeffer, hinted at this sort of possibility, writing to 
Bonhoeffer about friendship across difference, including religious difference: 
 
[W]ould you be able to be, and remain, friends with a Communist? Yes! With a 
Frenchman? Yes! With a Mohammedan, a Hindu, or a heathen of the Batak faith? I 
would think so. With a Christian, a German, who “betrays the gospel”?? I would think 
so. But I protest with all my might against seeing the relation between the opposing 
sides in the church today as the fulfillment of Matt. 10:35. The differences lie deep as 
an abyss, but they have absolutely no effect on blood relationships and bonds of 
friendship; they are poles apart in matters of the mind, but not of faith! So even if you 
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were a fanatic of the Confessing Church, while I saw the Lord’s promise today as 
being offered by the poor, really poor Lazarus (theologically, intellectually, and in 
human terms) that the German Christians represent, I would not take this to mean any 
destruction of our relationship with each other. I could not make any sense of that at 
all. My opinion of intellectual differences and battles is much too low, compared with 
my high estimation of the true mystery of our calling and mission in history, to allow 
me to think otherwise.341 
 
We do not have a response from Bonhoeffer. Rößler wrote this in the last letter between them, 
so we do not know what Bonhoeffer might have said about Rößler’s assertion about 
friendship with the non-Christian. We do know, however, that Bonhoeffer—seen in his 
actions toward Rößler—does clearly disagree with the suggestion that he could remain friends 
with a German who, for Bonhoeffer, ‘betrayed the gospel’. This was the dividing line for 
Bonhoeffer and represented more than ‘intellectual differences’. Bonhoeffer no longer shared 
convictions with Rößler; Rößler had sided with Heckel and the Reichskirche, and did not hear 
the commandment uttered by the Confessing Church to the German Protestant Church, and 
was outside the church that spoke as Christus Praesens. Without all of these things, even if 
Rößler thought he could remain friends with Bonhoeffer, Bonhoeffer could no longer be 
friends with Rößler so long as he did not hear the ‘No’ that Christ was speaking. 
But Rößler’s invocation of the non-Christian, particularly of the Hindu, does offer 
some possibilities already present in Bonhoeffer’s life and work. One of the things that 
Rößler, Heckel, and the leaders of the Reichskirche lacked—resulting in the breaking of 
bonds of Christian friendship—was present in Gandhi’s movement. For Bonhoeffer, the 
‘peoples of the East’ had heard a concrete commandment and shared that hearing with 
Bonhoeffer, and were fulfilling one condition of friendship. Rößler claims that despite the 
great differences between the non-Christian and the Christian, friendship is possible; and on 
Bonhoeffer’s terms, the condition of hearing God’s command is not a matter of difference, 
but of shared address, an address that even Bonhoeffer’s fellow Protestants did not hear. So, 
as Plant points out, friendship is Christocentric, and friendship is concerned with falsehood 
and truth, though Christ may not be immediately apparent in the religious practice of others 
that fulfil this condition of friendship.  
So to say that Bonhoeffer’s interest in India and Gandhi is evidence of his departure 
from ‘Lutheran salvific exclusivity’,342 as Lovat puts it, is eccentric. On the one hand, 
Bonhoeffer did say that there is no salvation outside the church, not meaning the ‘Lutheran’ 
church but the Confessing Church. Bonhoeffer, in this sense, still holds to a narrow 
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exclusivity, though it is an exclusivity governed by the fact that the Confessing Church, for 
Bonhoeffer, is obedient to the revelation given in Barmen and Dahlem. But on the other, 
Christ still gives the divine address, so Christ can address others such as Gandhi and his 
movement without calling into question the exclusivity of Christ’s salvific work. Bonhoeffer 
is generous about who might hear God’s address in Christ, without necessarily calling into 
question Christ’s salvific exclusivity. 
What Rößler unintentionally does, in his letter on friendship, is to call attention to the 
conditions that made the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship fail, while also calling attention to a 
person who was fulfilling conditions that he himself was not fulfilling. Bonhoeffer and Rößler 
did not share a hearing of the same commandment concerning political and ecclesial order in 
the concrete ‘No’ to the Reich church; this led to the faltering and then the ending of the 
friendship by Bonhoeffer. But what we see, in Bonhoeffer’s assessment of Gandhi and his 
movement, is that those conditions for friendship were in place: Gandhi and his movement 
proclaimed a ‘call to peace’; Bonhoeffer shared a hearing of that call to peace with Gandhi 
and his movement, which led to Bonhoeffer’s desire to share work toward that peace. 
Friendship, on the terms that Bonhoeffer develops through his relational practice with Rößler, 
becomes a speculative possibility for Bonhoeffer with Gandhi and/or members of his 
movement. 
There is an additional thread to Bonhoeffer’s interfaith curiosity in Gandhi that is 
pertinent here. Four months before the final correspondence from Rößler, on 8 July 1934, 
Bonhoeffer gave a sermon in London on repentance. The text was Luke 13:1-5, on the 
‘Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices’,343 where Jesus tells the 
crowd to repent rather than judge these Galileans as ‘worse sinners’. Bonhoeffer sees the text 
as ‘only too much like the news of the day’,344 referring to the Röhm Putsch, where Nazis had 
murdered Hitler’s party rivals and Catholic leader Erich Klausener.345 Bonhoeffer asks his 
congregation, despite the desire ‘to accuse one person and exonerate the other’,346 that they 
repent, saying that ‘to repent and submit […] to God’s justice’ is to be ‘on dangerous ground. 
Now we are no longer bystanders, onlookers, judges of these events, but we ourselves are 
being addressed; we are affected [and] God is speaking to us’.347 
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Bonhoeffer’s exemplar of a person who reserves judgment and repents is Gandhi. 
Bonhoeffer says of Gandhi that he is ‘great man of our time—who is not a Christian, but it is 
tempting to call him a heathen Christian’:  
 
[Gandhi] tells a story, in his autobiography, that took place when he was a director of 
a school. He was doing everything in his power for these young people, and one day 
within this school community an injustice was done, which shook him to the core. 
However, he took this not as an occasion that called for him to judge or to punish 
anyone but only as a call to repentance [Ruf zur Buße]. So he went and spent long days 
in repentance [Buße], with fasting and all kinds of self-denial. What did this mean? It 
meant first of all that in the guilt of his pupils he saw his own guilt [Schuld], his lack 
of love, patience, and truthfulness. Then, it meant that he knew that there could be 
room for the Spirit of God only in the spirit of humble realization of guilt. Finally, it 
meant the recognition that faith and love and hope could be found only in repentance. 
We have not yet believed enough; we have not yet loved enough—can we be judges? 
Jesus speaks: I tell you, No.348 
 
This sermon is pertinent to a discussion of the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship in two 
ways. The first is that Bonhoeffer sees in Gandhi what he does not see in Rößler. Gandhi 
addresses injustice through an act of repentance and in the realisation of his own guilt. This is 
what Rößler is not able to do, seen in his position on the lack of the necessity for penance 
because of the primacy of God’s love and hope, or in the fact that he sees no need to change 
his mind about the Reich Church. Gandhi, on the other hand, repents. When we include 
Bonhoeffer’s conviction that Gandhi hears the commandment of peace and proclaims it, the 
same commandment Bonhoeffer hears and proclaims, the conclusion can be drawn that 
Gandhi fulfils another condition for friendship that Rößler does not: shared address, and the 
speaking of the concrete commandment spoken by the church in the case of the ‘No’ to Reich 
authority, and in the ‘completely different words and actions’ of Gandhi and members of his 
movement. 
The second thing to draw from this sermon has to do with who repents, and who does 
not, in Bonhoeffer’s illustration. In the sermon, Bonhoeffer does not see the perpetrator of the 
injustice as the one who repents. It is Gandhi, the observer of the injustice, who repents in the 
‘humble realization of guilt’.349 Rößler played down repentance; but this did not mean that 
Bonhoeffer could demand Rößler’s repentance. Repentance might be necessary, but this does 
not mean it can be demanded. Instead, even according to the Bonhoeffer who preached this 
sermon, it was for him, as the witness of injustice, to carry guilt and repent personally for 
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others, and thus taking his part in theological Stellvertretung and acting redemptively for the 
sake of his friend. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter 2, I argue friendship was, according to Bonhoeffer’s thinking in Sanctorum 
Communio, lasting and redemptive. On these terms, it would appear that the friendship 
between Rößler and Bonhoeffer does not qualify. It did not survive the Church Struggle; 
neither is there evidence, in their correspondence, of acts of love and repentance. But this 
chapter is not intended to serve as an example of Sanctorum Communio in practice; rather, it 
is intended to look at a friendship, in its practice, as a way to bring a greater fullness to bear 
on the theology of friendship that I am developing. And the Rößler-Bonhoeffer friendship 
adds a greater fullness to a theology of friendship in two ways. 
 First, this friendship was dialogical. Bonhoeffer and Rößler valued the theological 
conversations that were part of the friendship, and Bonhoeffer was pressed in new theological 
directions on account of these conversations (despite that these theological directions were not 
the ones that Rößler himself might have hoped for). The friendship was clearly a factor in 
Bonhoeffer’s theological development: Bonhoeffer responds to Rößler’s criticism of 
Bonhoeffer’s distance from the real struggle of the German people, first by taking into 
account the real situation of German nationalism as the concrete context for ethics. The 
nationalism that once functioned as an abstract ethical determinant—as it did in the Barcelona 
lecture—is adjusted Christologically, and more fully takes into account the concrete context 
for that ethical deliberation, even if Bonhoeffer departs from Rößler’s sympathy for those 
nationalist movements. Bonhoeffer also develops his eschatological vision as part of a 
conversation and in response to Rößler’s optimistic eschatology of hope and love, an 
eschatology that had no need for penance. The connection between repentance and 
eschatology was introduced by Rößler to their conversation, and Bonhoeffer responds with an 
eschatology where an orientation to new creation in Christ is built upon the enabling 
conditions of repentance and forgiveness. In these two ways, we can see Bonhoeffer 
developing—at least in part—through his conversation, and theological friendship, with 
Rößler. This is not to claim that Bonhoeffer develops these theological convictions because of 
Rößler and Rößler only. But because these developments happen in conversation with Rößler, 
with Bonhoeffer responding to Rößler’s criticisms and adjusting his theology accordingly. 
This leads to the conclusion that Rößler—through their friendship—was part of that 
  89 
theological development. Rößler, in this way, is one of Bonhoeffer’s under-appreciated 
theological interlocutors.  
This way of looking at the friendship between Rößler and Bonhoeffer—as 
dialogical—speaks to two of the topics found in the friendship literature. There is a kind of 
mutuality to dialogue, where giving and receiving takes place in a theological conversation 
that enables thinking. This line of thought about theological dialogue as both mutual and as a 
way of theological knowing will come to bear especially on the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship 
in Chapter 5; but here, in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship, we already see its presence in the 
way their conversations lead to Bonhoeffer adjusting and changing his theological course. 
Secondly, this friendship has political dimensions. Friendship, for Bonhoeffer, is an 
ecclesial mode of sociality; this is seen in the way the friendship between him and Rößler 
ends when they no longer share the same ecclesial space. But because the inability for the two 
of them to share the same ecclesial space has to do with their differing convictions about the 
way the church relates to the world, it was not simply an ecclesial breach, but an ecclesial-
political one. Bonhoeffer found himself in the Confessing Church, and Rößler remained in the 
Reich Church; but the reason that Bonhoeffer found himself in the Confessing Church had to 
do with the illegitimacy of the Reich Church on account of National Socialist interference 
within it. Bonhoeffer’s disassociation from the Reich church, and Rößler’s co-operation with 
it—the factor that meant the end of the friendship—was as much about differing political 
convictions as it was about ecclesial separation. 
In the previous chapter, I raised a question about whether Bonhoeffer’s strict 
differentiation between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft made sense as strictly differentiated 
categories. This was related specifically to the question of utility and whether a social 
phenomenon like friendship could be of utility in the present, and also open to God’s 
eschatological end. In this case, the friendship between Bonhoeffer and Rößler is concerned 
as much with the limits of Reich authority as much as it is concerned with the church, 
problematising the sharp distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, if Gemeinschaft 
is an end in itself and therefore open to God’s purposes and Gesellschaft is determined by its 
utility in the present. This friendship is characterised by Bonhoeffer’s hope for its political 
utility in the present, and his hope for its orientation to Christ’s ultimate ends. 
In another sense, we see Bonhoeffer develop, here, an understanding of orders as 
social phenomena that contribute to the political good in the present, and are nevertheless 
open to God’s eschatological end. In the friendship with Rößler, the friendship could only 
continue in the case that 1. Both of them shared convictions about the legitimacy of Reich 
interference in the church, and 2. They both a shared a hearing of the concrete command that 
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orients the church to Christ and his new creation. So, in this way as well, Bonhoeffer is 
beginning to move away from a strict differentiation between utility and eschatological 
orientation; instead, they both belong together; in this case, they belong together as part of a 
friendship. As such, friendship is a social and political good; there will be more to say about 
this, and in greater detail, in Chapter 4.  
What the dialogical and political nature of the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship reveals, 
then, is that the friendship is more than what Sanctorum Communio allows: friendship, in 
practice, is not simply an ecclesial social relation that lasts, is redemptive, and for others. It is 
also a form of sociality in which theological dialogue and influence can take place, and which 
is concerned with present political situations and outcomes.  
There are, nevertheless, two threads of theological continuity between the Bonhoeffer-
Rößler friendship Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship as it is found in Sanctorum Communio. 
First, as I argue in the previous chapter, friendship in Sanctorum Communio can be for others. 
One of the dimensions of friendship for others was that friendship is not simply for itself, but 
has significance for the political and social world in which the friendship is found. We see 
this here, in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship, at least in a nominal way. The friendship could 
not continue without shared convictions about, and responses to, the Reich’s interference in 
the church. In this way, this friendship was not isolated from the political social world in 
which we find it.  
The second has already been covered in part: in Sanctorum Communio, friendship, as 
a community oriented to God’s end, has eschatological dimensions. There, God’s 
eschatological end was present as an eschatological prolepsis in the form of an encounter with 
Christ in acts of love and repentance. Here, in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship, eschatology 
is also present as part of Bonhoeffer’s political theology, where an orientation to Christ and 
the new creation results in the reordering of social orders; or, alternately, if a social order is 
closed to Christ and his new creation it can be destroyed. So in Sanctorum Communio, 
eschatological prolepsis leads to a friendship’s resilience; in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler 
friendship, an unshared orientation to Christ and his new creation leads to the end of a social 
order; in this case, one as small as a friendship. 
This brings us to what appears to be lacking in the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship: acts 
of love and repentance, as they are described in Sanctorum Communio, as a means of 
friendship’s resilience; or, in the terms of this chapter, the friendship was not oriented to 
Christ and his new creation, and was therefore destructible. In the letters we have, we do not 
see that they offered themselves to one another sacrificially, in a partial or a complete way, 
neither is there evidence of the mutual forgiveness of sin, intercession, or repentance. This 
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lack would corroborate the idea that friendship is lasting under certain conditions. First, 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler—at least according to Bonhoeffer—no longer shared ecclesial space 
together; and not sharing that space, Stellvertretung as a redemptive practice, in Bonhoeffer’s 
mind, is not as clearly available. Thus the eschatological foretaste of redeemed and sanctified 
sociality Bonhoeffer described in Sanctorum Communio—and the overcoming of alienation 
from God and one another in the present—as avenues for reconciliation are closed off. The 
healing of the friendship, through the gift of God that Bonhoeffer describes in his Barcelona 
lecture, is thwarted and hindered; the result of this hindrance was its destruction because the 
friendship was no longer oriented eschatologically to Christ. In this way, a political friendship 
like Bonhoeffer and Rößler’s will be more fragile than a friendship that had recourse to 
practices beyond shared convictions, such as practices of Stellvertretung in which healing and 
reconciliation can take place. 
 We can place some of the responsibility for the friendship’s end with Bonhoeffer. 
Bonhoeffer speaks of Stellvertretung in two ways that could have been part of the friendship’s 
reparation. Bonhoeffer thinks of intercessory prayer as taking on the afflictions of another 
who is not necessarily within the church-community; this is precisely the situation that he 
finds himself in with Rößler. Bonhoeffer considered himself to be within the church, and 
Rößler without, and that presents an opportunity for Bonhoeffer to intercede for Rößler in 
hope of drawing him into the church. Further, Bonhoeffer points out in his sermon on Gandhi 
that repentance is not necessarily the work of the one who commits the offence. As one 
repents for others, one can take on the guilt of another. In this sense, it was for Bonhoeffer to 
repent for the sake of the friendship. This would have moved the friendship in new directions, 
to be sure; but Bonhoeffer, even if he were eventually vindicated for saying ‘No’ to the Reich 
Church, this vindication would not absolve Bonhoeffer for abandoning a friendship where 
avenues of reparation—such as intercession and repentance—were yet available.  
This is a cautious conclusion, because these acts of love and repentance may have 
taken place without having been recorded in the correspondence. But there is plenty of 
evidence of acts of love and repentance elsewhere in Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship; 
enough to say that if acts of love and repentance were taking place, it is very likely we would 
see it in the letters. This possibility, however, will have to wait until Chapter 5, where an 
investigation into the acts of love and repentance, as found in the correspondence between 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge, will take place. 
Before we turn to the Bonhoeffer-Bethge correspondence, however, there is another 
task more immediately at hand. The Bonhoeffer-Bethge correspondence will, in part, shed 
light on Bonhoeffer’s political and social theology because his political and social theology is 
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worked out, by Bonhoeffer, as he reflects on friendship with Bethge. But the concept that 
Bonhoeffer develops there, with Bethge—the concept of der Spielraum der Freiheit, and 
friendship’s relation to it—is a topic that needs to be investigated in detail. So now, before we 
turn to the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, we turn to the Spielraum and friendship’s place in 
Bonhoeffer’s social and political theology of the mandates. 
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4 ORDERS, MANDATES, FREEDOM, AND FRIENDSHIP 
 
I wonder whether–it almost seems so today–it is only from the concept of the church 
that we can regain the understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education, 
friendship, play). [...] Who in our time could, for example, lightheartedly make music, 
nurture friendship, play, and be happy? Certainly not the ‘ethical’ person, but only the 
Christian.350 
 
We began, in Chapter 2, with an abbreviated form if this epigraph, because it sums up 
Bonhoeffer’s conviction that the Christian has a particular ability to nurture friendship; we 
return to it here to consider Christian friendship’s political dimensions. Bonhoeffer’s 
friendship with Rößler offers evidence of Bonhoeffer’s conviction that friendship has political 
significance: so long as Bonhoeffer and Rößler did not hold the same convictions about the 
Reich and the Reich church, the friendship could not continue. This line of thought—that 
friendship has political and social351 significance beyond itself—is articulated conceptually, 
and in a much more sophisticated way, later in Bonhoeffer’s life in the Tegel correspondence. 
In that correspondence, and through the influence of Eberhard Bethge, a conversation about 
friendship’s place in his political and social theology ends with a dense, exploratory passage 
on what Bonhoeffer calls der Spielraum der Freiheit, ‘the sphere of freedom’, a realm closely 
associated with the church and in which friendship finds a place in the mandates.352 The first 
part of my argument in this chapter is that this concept of the Spielraum—and friendship 
within it—is not an idiosyncratic development of Bonhoeffer’s theology of the mandates. 
Rather, friendship offers a way for Bonhoeffer to further develop some of his longstanding 
political and social concerns. The second part of my argument is related to the first, and 
contributes to the larger argument of the thesis: that friendship can be for others. In the 
concept of the Spielraum, friendship finds a place in Bonhoeffer’s political and social thought 
as something more than a private good to be shared between friends; and as a result, when 
friendship has social and political significance beyond itself, friendship can be for others. 
Despite the reference to the mandates—on which there is a great deal of research—
there is not a great deal of commentary on the Spielraum’s place in Bonhoeffer’s theology of 
the mandates, nor has the Spielraum been put to much theological use as a way to speak to 
friendship in Bonhoeffer’s life and theology. Bethge writes on friendship and the Spielraum 
in his essay on Bonhoeffer and friendship, but does not make the connection between the 
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Spielraum, friendship, and Bonhoeffer’s social and political thought as a whole.353 De Gruchy 
uses the concept of the Spielraum in his work on aesthetics, but does not speak to the relation 
between friendship and Bonhoeffer’s political and social thought.354 Elsewhere, de Gruchy 
does make a connection between the Spielraum and Finkenwalde; we will look at this more 
closely below.355 Pangritz’s treatment is the most comprehensive, and includes a very helpful 
discussion of friendship, though it is a compressed discussion of a subject that deserves a 
discussion that reaches across Bonhoeffer’s thought as a whole.356 Most surprisingly, de 
Graaff—in a monograph on Bonhoeffer, politics, and friendship—makes no mention of the 
Spielraum at all. Rather than looking to Bonhoeffer’s own resources on friendship and 
politics, which are rich enough in their own right, de Graaff is guided by secondary sources 
which he then deploys in his reading of Bonhoeffer, leading to a neglect of Bonhoeffer’s own 
thoughts on the subject of politics and friendship.357  
The reason for this relative lack of attention to the concept of the Spielraum may its 
complexity. It is a difficult concept to negotiate, and it is no wonder that Bethge says, in 
reference to the Spielraum letter, that ‘Dietrich intends that his theology of the mandates […] 
should be kept open in fruitful illogic’.358 But a complexity that can verge on illogicality does 
not mean that the concept should be uninvestigated, though it does mean that its complexity 
needs to be brought under some degree of control.  
One way to bring some shape and form—and with that shape and form, to bring some 
limit to its ‘illogic’—is to look at various aspects of the concept in Bonhoeffer’s thought more 
generally. When we do this, what we find that the idea of the Spielraum—and friendship’s 
place within it—is a development that we can trace in three related and long-standing 
concerns in Bonhoeffer’s thought. For Bonhoeffer, the Spielraum was 1. Comprehensive: it is 
a ‘sphere of freedom [Spielraum], which encompasses all three spheres of the divine 
mandates’,359 the political and social spheres of life that Bonhoeffer had described in the 
Ethics manuscripts. The Spielraum also had to do with 2. Freedom, a freedom that was 3. 
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Reparative: the existence of such a sphere was important for Bonhoeffer because, for him, 
freedom had been ‘pushed into the background’360 of his social and political world; 
nevertheless, Bonhoeffer hoped that in the ‘concept of the church […] we can regain the 
understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education, friendship, play)’.361 So in the way 
that practices like friendship restore freedom to the world, those practices perform a 
reparative function in a social and political world that, for Bonhoeffer, was overly 
characterised by obedience. 
The first avenue of investigation, then, is mereological. If the Spielraum is 
comprehensive, and ‘encompasses [umgeben] all three spheres of the divine mandates’—that 
is, it brings a comprehensive wholeness to the spheres of the political and social world—what 
place does the wholeness of the political and social world have in Bonhoeffer’s thought? And 
what is the place of friendship, as it relates to wholeness of the political and social world? The 
second avenue has to do with the correlation of freedom and obedience. For Bonhoeffer, the 
‘Prussian world is so strongly defined by the four mandates that the whole sphere of freedom 
has been pushed into the background’, and wonders if ‘it is only from the concept of the 
church that we can regain the understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education, 
freedom, play)’.362 The Spielraum, then, is closely related to the church, and represents 
freedom in a social and political world marked by obedience. But what do art, education, 
friendship, and play have to do with one another? How do they bring freedom out of the 
‘background’?  
The third avenue has to do with reparation, a term that needs some conceptual 
clarification. My use of ‘reparation’ is not Peter Ochs’ use of the term; for Ochs, ‘reparative’ 
is a specific kind of reasoning.363 My use of ‘reparation’ does not refer to philosophical 
discourse or reasoning, but to political and social environments that are in need of some kind 
of social and political adjustment or repair. For Bonhoeffer, writing of the Spielraum, the 
political and social world ought to be characterised by both freedom and obedience; and if 
freedom has been ‘pushed into the background’, as Bonhoeffer thought, to restore practices of 
freedom to the world, would be to repair that world. And if, for Bonhoeffer, the Spielraum is 
reparative to the social and political world—what place does reparation hold elsewhere in 
Bonhoeffer’s political and social thought? These questions point to a strategy of Bonhoeffer’s 
political and social thought where he identifies something in need of repair in the political and 
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social world, followed by proposals that would, if carried out, perform that reparation. I am 
describing reparation here in terms of freedom and obedience, but as we will see, this strategy 
of identifying ways the political and social world is in need of repair, followed by a strategy 
for that repair, is found in other parts of Bonhoeffer’s work as well. 
What I will show is that Bonhoeffer’s Spielraum—despite the fact that it is a new 
concept introduced late in the prison letters—has precedent in three earlier periods of 
Bonhoeffer’s life and thought. The first period is when Bonhoeffer develops his theology of 
the orders of preservation; the second period is at Finkenwalde; and the third begins with 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics manuscripts and his theology of the mandates.364 And, if friendship finds 
its place in Bonhoeffer’s political and social theology through the concept of the Spielraum, 
friendship can be seen as part of the development of Bonhoeffer’s political and social thought; 
and in the way it finds its place in Bonhoeffer’s political and social thought more generally, 
friendship will be seen as a social relation that is not limited to its internal goods, and a 
relation for others. 
 
4.1 WHOLENESS AND REPARATION IN BONHOEFFER’S ORDERS OF 
PRESERVATION 
 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of the mandates—a theology that Bonhoeffer would still be 
developing when he writes to Bethge on friendship and the Spielraum—has an early iteration 
in his theology of the orders of preservation. It takes the form of a response to a particular 
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reception of Luther’s political thought, and where Bonhoeffer shows concern for the 
wholeness and reparation of the social and political world. 
In Bonhoeffer’s Germany, Luther’s differentiation between spiritual and secular 
authority had an influential sway upon and discussion of political and social theologies. The 
political inheritance left by Luther is actually complex, diverse, and is not easily reducible; 
Bradstock, for example, points out that Luther’s own political thinking was occasional rather 
than systematic, and that even though Luther—as an occasional political theologian—looked 
to state authority to help his ecclesiastical cause, Luther’s work was part of the very different 
political development of the dignity of the individual in modern democracy.365 But it was 
Luther’s division of the world into distinct spheres—a division with its theological beginnings 
in Von weltlicher Oberkeit (1523) and Luther’s understanding of the separation of spiritual 
from secular authority—that occupied German political-theological discourse.366 Though 
Luther’s spheres complement one another, Luther stressed separation of the spiritual from the 
secular in the church and the state, where different moralities are at work, and where worldly 
authority is tasked with the ordering of society.367 Jesse Couenhoven, in an essay on Luther’s 
political theology, writes: 
 
[Luther’s distinctions have] the tendency to result in a dualism between a worldly state 
and the Christ-based church, as well as a split in the lives of individual believers, who 
live in both spheres but find it hard to unite them. Since the law, as Luther usually 
understands it, contains nothing positive, it does not point the state towards the 
fullness of life found in the gospel.368  
 
I will return to the idea that this kind of thinking about spheres can result in a ‘split in the 
lives of the individual believers’; for the moment, however, what I would point out is that 
Luther’s inheritance included both the question of the possibility (or, according to 
Couenhoven, the non-possibility) of an evangelical reparation of the state through its 
orientation to the fullness of life found in the gospel, and the mereological problem of 
spheres, their differentiation, and their unity. 
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This reception of Luther on spheres took the form of a discourse, in the 1930s, around 
what came to be called the ‘orders of creation’. Brunner, for example, had begun to write on 
the idea of orders of creation from a Reformed perspective as early as 1927,369 and in his 1932 
volume, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, he systematically approached ethics from the 
concepts of the divine command and the ‘Divine orders of creation’.370 Bonhoeffer also took 
part in this conversation about the orders of creation, beginning as early as April 1932.371 In 
1934, Paul Althaus wrote his pamphlet Theologie der Ordnungen.372 And the Marburg 
Gutachten, signed by every member of the Marburg theological faculty on 20 September, 
1933, spoke of a ‘true order of creation’.373 
Althaus in particular was influential, in part because he elevated the Volk to an order 
of creation. According to Probst, Althaus offered an attractive theological cover, at that time, 
for other Protestant anti-Judaic and antisemitic thinking.374 But Althaus did not argue that the 
German Volk was an order of creation that was fixed. Althaus himself saw that an argument 
for the presence of Volk at creation was slim, and that an argument for the presence of the 
German Volk at creation non-existent, and took his cue from Luther: the creation of the 
human person meant that according to Althaus himself, as a German living in the 1930s, he 
was surely created by God too, but created within a Volk, and that this racial identity was 
inalienable from his own createdness.375 This is what elevates Volk to an order of creation, not 
a pseudo-historical past creation and a supposed concretisation in the past. Althaus may have 
been following Brunner here, who also did not see orders of creation as something static and 
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fixed;376 instead, for both Brunner and Althaus, orders are part of an ongoing historical 
process that is open to certain kinds of development such as the appearance of the German 
Volk. 
Looking at Bonhoeffer’s theological interlocutors on this point is illuminating, and 
leads to the need to readjust some of the literature on Bonhoeffer’s theological relation to 
theologians like Althaus and Brunner. According to de Gruchy, for example, Bonhoeffer 
adopts a Christological interpretation of the Bible, in Creation and Fall, in an attempt to 
undermine the use the doctrine of the orders of creation in support of the Nazi ideology of 
‘blood and soil’.377 The result of this kind of interpretation, according to de Gruchy, meant 
that for Bonhoeffer, ‘[c]reation does not provide a basis for autonomous orders—state, 
family, culture—that function independently of God’s revelation and redemption in Christ; 
instead the orders must be understood from the perspective of that very revelation and 
redemption’.378 De Gruchy is right to say that in Creation and Fall we find the first reference 
to orders of preservation,379 and where Bonhoeffer develops the idea of the orders being 
preserved by God from descending into chaos and orients them eschatologically toward 
redemption. I will say more on this in due course.  
But de Gruchy misreads Bonhoeffer’s opponents, trusting Bonhoeffer’s own 
assessment of his interlocutors.380 According to de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer chooses the term 
‘orders of preservation’ in Creation and Fall in order to argue that the orders are neither given 
in creation nor ‘cast in concrete forever afterward’.381 But neither Brunner nor Althaus 
thought of the orders of creation as ‘concretized’. Rather, for both Brunner and Althaus, the 
orders are part of a world that sees historical and cultural development, change, and 
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betterment, a world of which the orders are a part. Even for Althaus, the Volk was not 
somehow ‘concretized’ at creation; in this sense, both Brunner and Althaus were open to the 
possibility that the orders could change through cultural adaptation.  
Bonhoeffer certainly saw the theology of the orders of creation as misguided and 
dangerous when he encountered others like ‘Pastor Peter’, a German Christian and member of 
the Nazi Party, who in a meeting with Bonhoeffer had asserted an understanding of the 
connection between Volk and the orders of creation in which the orders of creation are 
inflexible.382 But Bonhoeffer, more than he himself admits, is in some agreement with 
Brunner and Althaus when it comes to the contextual flexibility of the orders, though his 
vision is much more radical. For Bonhoeffer, the orders are oriented to creation, though 
fallen; and they are oriented to an eschatological promise, calling them ‘orders of 
preservation’ [Erhaltungsordnungen]. In Bonhoeffer’s July 1932 lecture in Ciernohorské 
Kúpele, for example, he said that Christ, ‘the one who has fulfilled God’s commandments for 
us’, is ‘the one who brings and promises the new world’:383  
 
Only there where the law is fulfilled, where the new world of God’s order exists […] 
we hear the commandment. With this we are wholly directed toward Christ. Through 
this, however, we understand the entire world order of the fallen creation as directed 
only toward Christ through the new creation.384  
 
This eschatological orientation of the orders does not constitute an abandonment of creation 
as an ethical category. Rather, it is the affirmation that creation is fallen, and that it cannot be 
relied upon to clearly reveal our ethical obligations. So, even though ‘all [worldly orders] 
stand alone under God’s preservation as long as they are still open for Christ’ and ‘receive 
their value completely from the outside, from Christ’, this act of preservation is one that 
‘guarantees the possibilities of a new creation’.385 In this way, through their eschatological 
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orientation, orders have a kind of flexibility and adaptability. God’s revelation cannot be 
taken as concretised or absolute, but rather as something that ‘must always be given anew’.386  
The radicality of Bonhoeffer’s eschatological understanding of orders leads him to say 
that they are also open to a ‘radical destruction’ that can be demanded in the interest of the of 
the new creation.387 We encountered this radicality already, in Bonhoeffer’s friendship with 
Rößler. Part of the reason for the discontinuation of the friendship was on account of unshared 
convictions about the Reich. But those political convictions—the ‘No’ to the Reich church—
arose from the ‘commandment […] from Christ […] who brings and promises the new 
world’.388 Their unshared convictions were a result of an unshared orientation to Christ and 
his new creation, and as such, the friendship was destructible. Similarly, orders must remain 
‘forms of purposeful formation against sin in the direction of the gospel’, to ‘stop the radical 
decline of the world in death and sin’ and to ‘be in a position to hold open the way of the 
gospel’.389 If they cannot fulfil this purpose, for Bonhoeffer, understood from the perspective 
of their eschatological end, the orders are also open to destruction.  
For Bonhoeffer, it is the church that ‘must judge the orders of the world’,390 and this 
judgment is part of the church’s reparative role within social and political life. This judgment 
is not reparative in the sense that it might be understood in the context of creation, as if there 
were an original wholeness that is somehow degraded and which would be restored if the 
world were to adjust its political practices through the church’s judgment for or against 
certain political practices or institutions. Rather, through what Bonhoeffer calls the church’s 
‘venture and decision [Wagen und Entscheiden] for or against an order of preservation’,391 a 
kind of reparation becomes possible through judgment, but one that takes into account the fact 
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that in history certain developments can take place which prevent the proclamation of the 
gospel of Christ and as such are no longer open to Christ and the new creation. In this sense, 
the church, as it hears the divine commandment, does not attempt to restore what once was. 
Instead, through its ‘venture and decision’—its judgment about what political practices or 
institutions contributes to God’s eschatological end—the church takes part in constructively 
repairing social and political orders for the sake of human life and the stemming of death and 
sin, and thus countermanding death and sin. Similar to the way the church’s Stellvertretung 
assumes a kind of human agency that is not in competition with the Stellvertretung of Christ 
in his saving work, Christ sustains and preserves the orders while human agents, in their 
‘venture and decision’, respond to the commandment and take action in the effort to preserve, 
construct, and even to destroy according to an order’s ability to preserve for the sake of Christ 
and the new creation, and through that preservation, construction, or destruction take part in 
the reparation of the social and political world. 
Bonhoeffer, enigmatically in the Ciernohorské Kúpele lecture, says that the 
commandment ‘can demand the most radical destruction for the purpose of the one 
construction [Aufbauenden]’.392 But if we look more broadly in Bonhoeffer’s work, or to the 
Marburg faculty statement on the orders of creation, we find signs of what he might mean by 
this. The Marburg faculty, unlike Luther who emphasised differentiation, saw a single ‘true 
order of creation’ which was comprehensive and whole, proclaiming ‘God’s own reign over 
all whom He has created, and His redeeming judgment of sins, to which all are subject’.393 
And as Zerner and Plant suggest, Bonhoeffer’s own concern for political, social, and 
ecclesiastical unity and wholeness—the ‘one construction’ of the Ciernohorské Kúpele 
lecture—reaches at least as far back as his visit to North Africa in 1924.394 In Tripoli, 
Bonhoeffer came into contact with Islam, and was impressed by the integration of ‘life and 
religion’,395 and there Bonhoeffer appears to be aware of what Couenhoven calls a ‘split in the 
lives of individual believers’, a ‘split’ he did not see in Tripoli’s Muslims.  
Lovin, then, can only be partly right to say that Bonhoeffer’s orders are ‘a politics of 
boundaries’.396 They are a politics of boundaries in that Bonhoeffer does differentiate between 
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the powers of the state and the powers of the church; but Bonhoeffer shows a concern for 
their unity as well. For Plant, the Islam Bonhoeffer witnessed offered a critical foil to both 
Catholicism and Protestantism, where religious devotion can become a stumbling block to 
responsible living in the world. But, according to Plant, this ‘dishonesty, this dualism, was 
something that did not seem to pervade the lives of the Muslims he met briefly in North 
Africa’.397 Plant goes on to name India, despite the fact that Bonhoeffer did not have a good 
sense of the religious diversity there, as another symbol of the unity between the religious and 
the secular that Bonhoeffer did not see in the Christianity he knew,398 the social and political 
world that the Marburg faculty also sought to describe as a unity under the reign of God.  
The unity and wholeness of political, ecclesiastical, and social life does not mean that 
spheres operate without a certain degree of independence and integrity, and Strohm is right to 
place Bonhoeffer’s theology of the orders of preservation within the larger context of 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of relationship between the state and the church.399 Both Strohm 
and Green400 suggest looking to Bonhoeffer’s essay ‘Thy Kingdom Come! The Prayer of the 
Church-Community for God’s Kingdom on Earth’, based on a lecture given on 19 November 
1932—approximately five months after the ecumenical address and while he was giving the 
Creation and Fall Lectures—as the place to find Bonhoeffer in a more conventional mode of 
reflection on the relation between church and state, but nevertheless a reflection linked to his 
orders of preservation. Bonhoeffer, unsurprisingly, assesses the questions of divine command, 
and of the appropriate context for understanding Volk and Staat, through the Lutheran 
division between the regiments, calling the state an ‘order’ and the church a ‘miracle’.401  
But the language is not simply Lutheran; it also is familiar from the Ciernohorské 
Kúpele lecture. Strohm correctly points out that Bonhoeffer is concerned, in ‘Thy Kindgom 
Come!’, with Staat as an order of preservation.402 In language that clearly echoes his 
ecumenical address, Bonhoeffer writes:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
emphasis on differentiation without reference to unity and wholeness, though his remark that 
for Bonhoeffer, the question was ‘how the church might remain independent without 
becoming autonomous’, and comes much closer to the mark. See Ernst Feil, The Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), pp. 120-3. 
397 Plant, Taking Stock, p. 116. 
398 Plant, Taking Stock, p. 116. 
399 Christoph Strohm, Theologische Ethik im Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus: 
Der Weg Dietrich Bonhoeffers mit den Juristen Hans Von Dohnanyi und Gerhard Leibholz in 
den Widerstand (Munich: Kaiser, 1989), pp. 48-50. 
400 Green, Sociality, p. 203. 
401 DBW/E 12:2/11, 273/292-93. 
402 Strohm, Theologische Ethik, p. 51. 
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The kingdom of God takes form in the state insofar as the state recognises and maintains 
the order of preservation of life [die Ordnung der Erhaltung des Lebens] and insofar as it 
accepts responsibility for preserving this world from collapse and for exercising its 
authority here against the destruction of life.403  
 
Strohm goes on to say that such things as Volk and marriages are subsidiary to the state, and 
as a result not orders of preservation in and of themselves.404 In Strohm’s reading of 
Bonhoeffer, the state is a singular order; within that order, other things such as marriage are 
derivative. Charles West similarly sees ‘one order of preservation’ at work in Bonhoeffer’s 
mind in this essay.405  
This is where Strohm, and West, go awry; Bonhoeffer’s mereology is far more 
sophisticated than they allow. The state is a unity, and the hope for unity that Plant sees in 
Bonhoeffer’s assessment of North Africa and India carries on in similar fashion here, as 
Bonhoeffer looks to Staat. But the unity of the state does not necessarily mean that it is one 
colossal order; rather, it is comprised of wholes within a whole. In this lecture Bonhoeffer 
refers to a number of things, including communities, as Ordnungen, in the plural. For 
Bonhoeffer, God ‘preserves [erhaltende] the Earth with its laws, communities 
[Gemeinschaften], and its history’,406 calling ‘order’ (along with miracle) as the form of 
God’s kingdom; within the state ‘the orders [Ordnungen] of existing communities 
[Gemeinschaften] are maintained [erhalten werden] with authority and responsibility’.407 In 
the state, then, there are a variety of orders, within another order. The fact that Bonhoeffer can 
imagine orders within an order should not come as a surprise, however. Structurally, this is 
similar to the way Bonhoeffer understood the relation between Einzelgemeinden and the 
Gemeinde of the universal church: as wholes within a larger whole. We also know that 
Bonhoeffer treated his friendship with Rößler as a community, one that, without appropriate 
orientation to Christ, was destructible; so even a social phenomenon as small as a friendship is 
treated as a kind of ‘order’. Here, too, social structures within larger social structures can 
share the same features as the larger social structure in which they are embedded, without 
calling into question the overarching authority and unity of the sphere to which they belong.  
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So Bonhoeffer has something more nuanced in mind than a monolithic state order. 
Rather than seeing the state as a monolithic order of preservation—and other social practices 
and institutions as subsidiary to a single order—Bonhoeffer is thinking here of social 
practices, communities, and institutions as distinct orders of preservation, without threatening 
the governing role of the state.408 In this sense, the conversation reaches back to the argument 
of Chapter 2: communities, insofar as they are oriented to creation and the eschaton, remain 
open to God’s purposes. But here, once they are no longer open to Christ’s new creation, as 
‘orders’, they need not be preserved. They need not necessarily be destroyed, either, because 
that would mean Gesellschaft, as a social phenomenon that is not eschatologically oriented, 
would necessarily be destroyed. 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of the orders of preservation offers a number of ways to 
understand his later concept of the Spielraum, and friendship’s place within the Spielraum. 
Already here, in 1932-33, Bonhoeffer is thinking of a political and social theology that 
involves some kind of reparation. Bonhoeffer sees the church, in its ‘venture and decision’, as 
taking part in that reparation, where the church offers a way for the social and political world 
to orient itself to the new creation; not to take on the church’s judgment against certain orders 
would be allow death and sin to flourish. In this way, Bonhoeffer is a theologian who shares 
an interest in orders that are reparable, contextual, and flexible, much like Althaus and 
Brunner. But for Bonhoeffer, the concrete practice is one of ‘venture and decision’, a 
judgment for or against particular social and political phenomena in the church’s 
proclamation of repentance to the world. It is, in a way, a passive reparation, because through 
its proclamation, the church offers an opportunity for the world to repent and change its ways 
for the sake of the gospel and human life; or alternately, choose not to repent and thus to 
allow sin and death to flourish. It is a judgment passed, and a solution offered, but not 
necessarily one taken up. This is not yet the reparative role that Bonhoeffer will see the 
church playing through practices like friendship, where freedom is restored to a world of 
obedience through the church’s social practice. But it is a strategy of reparation, where the 
church takes part in offering a way for the social and political world to choose life and human 
thriving, rather than death and sin, through an orientation of social and political orders to the 
gospel and the new creation of Christ. 
We also see, in Bonhoeffer’s theology of the orders of preservation, an interest in the 
integration and wholeness of various spheres of life, similar to the concern for wholeness seen 
in the Marburg faculty’s single order of creation. But Bonhoeffer’s treatment of wholeness is 
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much more sophisticated. Communities, as orders unto themselves, remain distinct while 
assuming that they are part of a larger order or social phenomenon; that is, social phenomena 
can have their own wholeness, integrity, and distinguishability while they are part of a larger 
whole. This idea that a sphere of social and political life can have an integrity of that is not 
threatened by being a part of a larger whole with its own integrity is something that we will 
see expressed in Bonhoeffer’s concept of a Spielraum that both exists as a distinctive Raum, 
but one that also comprehends other spheres of social and political life within it; this will be 
important in seeing friendship as a social phenomenon that both belongs to the church, and 
yet has a place within the whole of the social and political world. 
But the Spielraum, for Bonhoeffer, does not only refer back to concerns about 
wholeness and reparation as they are found in his theology of the orders of creation; the 
Spielraum is der Spielraum der Freiheit. And the freedom of the Spielraum is something best 
seen in life at Finkenwalde; and so it is to this period of Bonhoeffer’s life that we turn to next.  
 
4.2 FREEDOM AND OBEDIENCE 
 
Part of Bonhoeffer’s analysis of his social and political world, as he saw it from Tegel, 
was that ‘[I]t is indeed not easy to classify friendship sociologically’, because friendship 
belongs ‘not in the sphere of obedience but rather in the sphere of freedom, which 
encompasses all three spheres of the divine mandates’.409 But for Bonhoeffer, his ‘Prussian 
world is so strongly defined by the four mandates that the whole sphere of freedom has been 
pushed into the background’, and he wonders if ‘it is only from the concept of the church that 
we can regain the understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education, friendship, play)’.410 
So for Bonhoeffer, friendship—along with art, education, and play—belong to the sphere of 
freedom; and because Prussian obedience had come to the fore, this sphere of freedom has 
been relegated to the background. 
There are a number of issues already arising in this passage, not least the numbering of 
the mandates, and how the sphere of freedom is related to the ‘three mandates’ and the 
‘concept of the church’; I will address those issues more directly in the next section on 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of the mandates.  
But before Bonhoeffer returned to a more straightforward discussion of the reparation 
and wholeness of social and political spheres in his theology of the mandates, he took up his 
post as head of the Finkenwalde preacher’s seminary where Bonhoeffer met Bethge. My 
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proposal for this section is to look to Finkenwalde primarily, but also to Hegel and 
Bonhoeffer’s thought on freedom more generally, in order to investigate the particular 
problem of the relation of freedom to friendship and the Spielraum. Looking retrospectively 
to Finkenwalde, in the context of Bonhoeffer’s thought and through the lens of Hegel’s 
understanding of freedom, offers the best way to understand what Bonhoeffer was getting at 
when he wrote about the Spielraum and friendship within it. Finkenwalde, for Bonhoeffer, 
was where freedom was evident in practice, one of those practices being friendship; and 
friendship, as a practice of freedom, was for Bonhoeffer a way that freedom could be restored 
to a world where it has been pushed into the background, thus bringing freedom into social 
correlation with obedience. 
 
4.2.1 Hegel 
 
Before we get to Finkenwalde, however, we begin with the correlation of freedom and 
restraint in Hegel. Hegel’s correlation of freedom and restraint is found primarily in his 
introduction to Elements of the Philosophy of Right where he begins with three moments in 
the understanding of freedom.411 In the first ‘moment’, freedom is understood as the ‘pure 
indeterminacy’ of the self, free from restriction.412 This is, for Hegel, a ‘negative freedom’. 
But because freedom also means the ability to take part in particular communities which have 
their own necessary commitments and restraints, this leads Hegel to his second ‘moment’: the 
ability to engage in particular activities with their concomitant commitments and restraints. 
                                                            
411 The following section is based on a number of secondary authorities on Hegel’s 
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This second moment does not necessarily mean setting negative freedom aside, however; a 
commitment to a particular activity can preserve negative freedom by accounting for the 
possibility of withdrawal from the commitment made, and thus, the second moment preserves 
both negative freedom and the freedom to make commitments.  
But Hegel is critical of this second moment of as well. Freedom, as a freedom from 
restriction and the freedom to make particular commitments from which one might withdraw, 
relies on certain conditions. The choices upon which this kind of freedom rests are determined 
by given factors such as circumstance, or chance, or nature; further, these choices are made or 
rejected according to desire rather than the rational will. So for Hegel, the freedom to choose 
is not real freedom, because choices, and their commitments, are limited by what is given; 
and, on account of the choices being made according to desire, this kind of freedom is not 
derived from the reasoning will and not determined by that will, and thus freedom is 
dependent on an ‘inwardly or externally given content and material’.413 
Hegel’s solution to this problem is for the will to no longer be dependent on that 
which is given, but rather for the will itself to be a determining factor. When the will wills its 
own freedom, it is truly freedom because it is not dependent upon or limited by that which is 
already given. But even this will is not free from commitment or restraint, because in order to 
preserve the freedom of the will, the freedom of unlimited choice is itself given up in order to 
allow the freedom of the will to determine the character of that freedom, a freedom that is 
committed to that which commands the recognition of any free will. For Hegel, this leads to 
necessary commitments to rights and laws, and a ‘new valuation of the particular’.414 Thus, 
for Hegel, freedom is not, in the end, Kantian and Fichtian rational autonomy. Freedom, for 
Hegel, leads to participation in the ‘specific practices and institutions’415 of community, 
including the family, civil society, and the state. Further, these necessary commitments to 
others means that Hegel’s idea of freedom is not a speculative freedom remote from 
experience; instead, for Hegel, we have access to it in ‘friendship and love’.416  
For our purposes, then, Hegel’s understanding of freedom does not mean freedom 
from limits that might be placed by others through participation in institutions that make up 
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modern life. Instead, for Hegel, freedom itself, properly understood, leads to necessary 
commitments. In this way, to be subject to the rules and norms of communities and 
institutions—through commitment to those communities and institutions—is the result of 
freedom rather than an erosion of freedom. Freedom, then, is not the absence of forms of 
obedience, nor does obedience mean a lack of freedom. Freedom and obedience are not 
mutually exclusive and can exist side-by-side in social life; and, friendship is part of Hegel’s 
understanding of freedom’s practice. 
 
4.2.2 Freedom and Commitment in Bonhoeffer’s Pre-Finkenwalde Thought 
 
While friendship would not become part of Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s discourse on 
freedom until the prison correspondence, the correlation of freedom with forms of 
commitment and restraint has a place in Bonhoeffer’s pre-Finkenwalde thinking, and is seen 
in varying forms in Sanctorum Communio, Act and Being and Creation and Fall: 
Sanctorum Communio. In his first thesis, Bonhoeffer wrote about freedom in relation 
to matters of theological discipline. For Bonhoeffer, once the church has spoken on a matter 
of doctrine, the theologian owes obedience to the church with respect to the matter in 
question, pointing out that this kind of ecclesiastical obedience is relative, and implies a 
relative freedom, because relative freedom is only checked by obedience to the word. So for 
Bonhoeffer, ‘the relative freedom becomes absolute’ and the ‘relative obligation to the church 
can be broken […] if it stands in the way of [an] absolute commitment to the word’.417 Thus, 
in the case of conflict between word and ecclesiastical pronouncement, a person is absolutely 
bound to the word and free from that particular ecclesiastical pronouncement and the 
authority of the church. There is continuity here with Hegel; freedom, for Bonhoeffer, can 
exist alongside commitment to a community that demands forms of obedience. There is one 
difference, however, worth noting here because it will become increasingly important to 
Bonhoeffer’s conception of freedom: freedom is not a matter of the will, but something given 
in the external word. Further, this freedom is seen in certain practices such as the breaking of 
an obligation to the church.  
 Act and Being. In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer writes again of human freedom in terms 
of freedom’s correlation to obedience. For Bonhoeffer—making use of Luther—the heart is 
turned inward to itself, and thus reason is corrupted by the fall, which makes any appeal to 
reason, as a way to make an argument for human freedom, suspect.418 For Bonhoeffer, it is 
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revelation that makes a person free, because it is something that comes from the outside and 
independent from human reason. Bonhoeffer has Hegel in his sights here; for Bonhoeffer, 
Hegel’s understanding of the reasoning ‘I’ is an example of human reason that is not free, but 
necessarily in bondage to itself on account of the fall. 
But this freedom of the human person, in their ‘placement’ in revelation, is only one 
of the ways Bonhoeffer speaks of freedom in Act and Being: in a less critical Hegelian mode, 
Bonhoeffer wrote of human freedom as a kind of freedom that leads to necessary 
commitments to others. Bonhoeffer begins this discussion of human freedom with some 
remarks on the freedom of God, making a correlation between God’s freedom and his binding 
of himself to others in revelation:  
 
In revelation it is not so much a question of the freedom of God–eternally remaining 
within the divine self, aseity–on the other side of revelation, as it is of God’s coming 
out of God’s self in revelation. It is a matter of God’s given Word, the covenant in 
which God is bound by God’s own action. It is a question of the freedom of God, 
which finds its strongest evidence precisely in that God freely chose to be bound to 
historical human beings and to be placed at the disposal of human beings. God is not 
free from human beings but for them.419  
 
This freedom of God, for Bonhoeffer, has anthropological and ecclesiological consequences. 
God is free, as Anne Nickson puts it, in a freedom that ‘“finds its strongest evidence precisely 
in that God freely chose to be bound to historical human beings.” Only one who is truly free 
can freely give of him or her self’.420  
For God, this is not a freedom from the human beings he has created; the word is 
given, and as such, God freely chooses to be bound to human beings, and by doing this, God 
is free for human beings, relationally.421 The anthropological-ecclesial consequence of God 
binding himself to human persons is that God also binds humanity together in the Christ who 
exists as community: ‘the person of Christ draws together in itself all whom Christ has won, 
building and committing Christ to them and them to one another […] which manifests what 
God’s freedom is: that God binds God’s self to human beings’.422 So the freedom that God 
offers in Christ is more than a freedom from bondage to the cor curvum in se, it is a freedom 
for others where human persons are bound to one another in the community of the church. In 
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this way, we again see the correlation of freedom with social commitment and ‘binding’; so 
again, freedom can include obligation to others.  
Creation and Fall. In Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer continues to develop the idea of 
freedom in terms of the human creature, but now from the standpoint of creation. Human 
beings are made in the image of God, and thus enjoy the kind of freedom that God enjoys: 
freedom for others. But in what way is God free? Again, God’s freedom is freedom for his 
creatures; ‘God creates in complete freedom’ and ‘binds [creation] to God’.423 And because 
humankind is made in ‘the very image of God’, it means that human beings are also free, 
bound to God in freedom for God.424 But this freedom is more than a freedom for God, it is 
also a relational freedom where ‘one human being is free for another human being’.425 Again, 
in Hegelian mode, Bonhoeffer ties freedom specifically to obedience, writing that ‘[h]uman 
beings have life […] in their obedience, in their innocence, in their ignorance; that is, they 
possess it in their freedom. The life that human beings have happens in an obedience that 
issues from freedom’.426  
So what we see, in Act and Being and Creation and Fall, is a conception of freedom in 
which a ‘binding’ to others is a consequence of freedom, not an erosion of freedom. In this 
way, freedom is not at odds with social commitments to others, including commitments that 
lead to forms of obedience. Thus, for Bonhoeffer, freedom and commitment to others can be 
correlated; and in both Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, Bonhoeffer thinks that this 
correlation takes place in the theological and social life of the church. 
 
4.2.3  Freedom and Obedience at Finkenwalde 
 
The correlation of freedom and forms of obedience becomes important to 
understanding life at Finkenwalde, and this investigation begins with a look to the way church 
and education come together with regard to this correlation; this begins, for us, in April 1936, 
when Bonhoeffer gave the address where he infamously deployed Cyprian’s phrase extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus.  
The address, when it was published, drew a great deal of well-deserved attention for 
its implication about the relationship between the Confessing Church and the Reichskirche. 
Bonhoeffer began this line of thought by saying that proclamation presents the world with a 
decision about where the boundary of the church lies; the boundary of the church, for 
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Bonhoeffer, is not marked by a decision by the church ‘to identify [its] members by name, to 
count them, and to distinguish them from those who did not belong to the church or who 
merely pretended to belong’.427 ‘Such was the Reformation message concerning the church’, 
wrote Bonhoeffer; ‘[h]ere is the true church. Might it also be found elsewhere? That is not the 
question. It is here that God has granted it to us as a gift’.428 The question of boundaries was 
one that came from the outside, from a world—and specifically a Reichskirche—that excludes 
itself from the church by ‘not hearing and not believing’.429  
But Bonhoeffer also had a great deal to say about what extra ecclesiam nulla salus 
meant, and did not mean, for confessional difference within the Confessing Church, and 
contextually to theological education at Finkenwalde; what was happening at Finkenwalde, 
and in the Confessing Church more generally, was that Lutheran and Reformed churches and 
congregations were sharing the same space. This was, of course, already true in Germany. 
Lutheran and Reformed churches was already sharing ecclesiastical space together, as 
Gollwitzer points out in his response to Bonhoeffer’s lecture.430 But for Bonhoeffer, the 
reason that the churches were sharing this same space was different from what it once was. 
Lutheran and Reformed churches were sharing the same space, including at Finkenwalde, 
because the world had made that boundary by not hearing the divine commandment. As 
Bonhoeffer puts it, since Barmen, ‘the Lutheran and Reformed churches are quite 
significantly coming even closer together’, making synodical declarations together, and 
‘[w]hat were formerly schismatic creedal antitheses now no longer make it impossible to 
conduct Confessing synods’.431 Historical German ecclesiastical practice was not equipped to 
fully address the problem of the Reichskirche, the problem that the confessing church found 
itself needing to negotiate at synods such as Barmen and Dahlem. At the same time, 
confessional difference, on the ground at these synods, was not preventing rapprochement. 
What Bonhoeffer does, as a way to negotiate the relative importance of confessional 
difference, is to treat confessional difference as something that does not necessarily lead to 
schism or division. This way of negotiating confessional difference reaches back to 
Bonhoeffer’s comments on relative and absolute theological freedom in Sanctorum 
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Communio. The idea that the word disciplines the theologian and the church is hardly new to 
Bonhoeffer; but what I am drawing attention to here is that Bonhoeffer is writing on the 
church as a sphere of freedom. But it is also a sphere that is disciplined and obedient because 
it is under the relative authority of the church’s pronouncement and the absolute authority of 
the word; in this way, freedom and obedience exist side-by-side within the church. Despite 
this sphere being fenced by relative and absolute obedience, freedom in its relative sense is 
nevertheless present in the church as sphere of theological manoeuvrability that is not in 
conflict with the disciplinary aspect of canonical documents, or the word that sits in judgment 
over the relative pronouncements of the church. Thus, in the context of ecumenical 
theological education at Finkenwalde, the authority of historical confessional documents is 
relativised, because these competing historical confessional statements—as historically 
troublesome a problem as that might be—are not necessarily where the world is doing battle 
with the church, a battle represented in Barmen and Dahlem. Bonhoeffer is not unconcerned, 
but not overly concerned either, that Barmen was in conflict with the Augsburg confession 
and could not stand up to the letter of it; one can reject the Confessing synod from the 
perspective of the Augsburg Confession, according to Bonhoeffer, but because the Barmen 
synod was under the word, he would rather accept Barmen’s articles ‘with astonishment and 
humility and leave it to God to make of them what he will’.432 
Gollwitzer was a respondent to Bonhoeffer’s lecture, which provoked a counter-
response by Bonhoeffer that underlines the point I am trying to make here. Gollwitzer 
claimed that confession is ‘the testimony of the church to God’s word’; but Bonhoeffer, 
recalling Sanctorum Communio, replies that synods do have relative authority, but that they 
remain ‘under the word’.433 What this effectively means is that the Confessing Church is 
tasked to revise the judgments of Lutheran confessions, even Augsburg. The authority, even 
of Augsburg, is relative, and Bonhoeffer argues that the synods and confessional documents 
can be revisited—even the Augsburg Confession—because the confessions are already under 
the authority of that word. Scripture is the ‘sole rule and norm’ for the confessions 
themselves, and synods and confession cannot be elevated over the word.434 But Barmen, in 
this case, is elevated to ‘the testimony of God, demanding obedience […] a true confession to 
the Lord Jesus effected by the Holy Spirit’; because synods like Barmen speak truly, they are 
much like the concrete commandment, carrying the authority of the word but for a new 
historical moment. 
                                                            
432 DBW/E 14:2/19, 671/670. 
433 DBW/E 14:2/19, 696/694. 
434 DBW/E 14:2/19, 697/694-95. 
  115 
What Bonhoeffer is doing here, in underlining the relative freedom the church has 
with regard to documents like the Augsburg Confession because the church is under the 
absolute authority of the word, is best illustrated in a programmatic statement found in an 
early draft of Bonhoeffer and Hildebrandt’s 1936 Pentecost Statement. There, in an unusually 
direct reference to freedom in the Finkenwalde writings that pre-date Life Together—and in 
continuity with the way Bonhoeffer had written of the word, freedom, and the binding 
together of community—they write again of a word of freedom: ‘Do not allow your speech 
and actions to be bound by any alien law; instead entrust yourselves to the word of truth that 
is at work in the church alone and that makes us free’.435 To understand this statement in the 
context of Bonhoeffer’s preceding thought on freedom, is to say that the freedom of the 
church, under the word, is a freedom that binds people to one another in the church, a 
commitment that results in forms of obedience, and that the freedom of the church is not at 
odds with forms of obedience. As such, in the ‘concept of the church’, as Bonhoeffer would 
say later in prison, the ‘understanding of freedom’ is regained, a freedom regained 
specifically in Finkenwalde’s theological education through a visible practice of latitude in 
ecumenical theological reasoning in the face of an unbelieving world. 
In prison, the freedom of the Spielraum was described by Bonhoeffer, in conversation 
with Bethge, as something found in art, education, friendship, and play. De Gruchy 
specifically links the Spielraum letter to Finkenwalde: 
 
[Bonhoeffer] must have thought back to such times at Finkenwalde, and perhaps 
especially of his friend Bethge, when [music, literature, and games] had been such a 
rich part of their shared experience. In the midst of the church struggle and the 
political upheavals, which included arrests, conscription, and death, the 
Finkenwaldians experienced life together as a sphere of freedom in which they could 
enjoy the polyphony of life without losing their core commitment to discipleship and 
witness.436 
 
De Gruchy does not say more than this, but it is worth taking the time to flesh out what he 
says here. I have already, above, written at length about freedom and education, specifically 
theological education. Theological education at Finkenwalde is our first case, because 
theological education at Finkenwalde is already well-developed by Bonhoeffer; and as that 
investigation proceeded, we saw a pattern that 1. Included freedom as something that is 
correlated to binding and obedience, and 2. That this correlation comes with accompanying 
and visible forms of freedom. But it is only one of a set that includes, for Bonhoeffer, art, 
play, and friendship. As de Gruchy points out in capsule form, all of these constituent 
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practices of the Spielraum were present at Finkenwalde. But I will say a bit more, based on 
the pattern of education at Finkenwalde: the constituent practices of art, play, and friendship 
also correspond to modes of obedience, following the pattern established by Bonhoeffer in his 
understanding of ecclesially-grounded theological education. 
Singing and art in the form of music: In Life Together—a book based on what he 
learned from life at Finkenwalde—Bonhoeffer gave strict rules to follow when it comes to 
singing: 
 
Because it is completely bound to the Word, the singing of the congregation in its 
worship service, especially the singing of the house church, is essentially singing in 
unison. Here words and music combine in a unique way. The freely soaring tone of 
unison singing finds its sole and essential inner support in the words that are sung. It 
does not need, therefore, the musical support of other parts. […] The essence of 
congregational singing on this earth is the purity of unison singing—untouched by the 
unrelated motives of musical excess—the clarity unclouded by the dark desire to lend 
musicality an autonomy of its own apart from the words; it is the simplicity of 
unpretentiousness, the humanness and warmth, of this style of singing. […] Whether 
or not a community achieves proper unison singing is a question of spiritual 
discernment. This is singing from the heart, singing to the Lord, singing the Word; this 
is singing in unity.437 
 
Bonhoeffer specifically counsels against ‘improvised’ parts that ‘kill both the words and the 
sound’.438 
Bonhoeffer’s counsel on singing is part of the ordered life of Finkenwalde; the 
brothers were to sing like this as part of their shared life, and is part of what it meant to make 
a commitment to this kind of community. But the musical life of Finkenwalde was richer than 
what Life Together might suggest. If improvisation was banned from the singing of hymns, it 
was not banned from Bonhoeffer’s gramophone player on which spirituals and jazz were 
played; instead, Bonhoeffer’s ‘collection of gramophone records […] was at everyone’s 
disposal; the rooms often rang with then little-known Negro spirituals such as “Swing Low, 
Sweet Chariot.”’439 And, according to Bethge, there were ‘[t]wo Bechstein grand pianos [that] 
found a place in the music room and were in constant use’.440 There was, in this way, freedom 
to pursue music in ways that were not strictly ordered according to the brothers’ commitment 
to their common life; music was also something freely played, including music of which 
improvisation was a vital part. The freedom of the spiritual and the improvised continuo was 
something that could exist alongside the unison singing of worship at Finkenwalde. 
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Work and play: In Life Together, Bonhoeffer writes that ‘[a]fter the first morning 
hour, the Christian’s day until evening belongs to work’.441 Bonhoeffer’s main concern here is 
that prayer and work are not in competition with one another; but the result of a day of prayer 
and work is that ‘[t]he whole day now acquires an order and a discipline gained by the 
winning of the day. This order and discipline must be sought and found in the morning 
prayer. It will stand the test of work’, and this work ‘comes from the knowledge of God and 
God’s command’.442 While Life Together describes a day of ‘work’ for its more general 
audience, this work, at Finkenwalde, took the form of lectures and study.443 
This regimen of daily work and study, however, was something that was liable to be 
interrupted or cancelled. Bonhoeffer set the example: even in difficult circumstances, he 
‘never gave up his leisure time’444 and though a hard worker, had an ability ‘to interrupt work 
for play’.445 Bethge reports that ‘[s]ometimes in fine weather [Bonhoeffer] might suddenly 
cancel a class and go with his students to the woods or the coast. On Sundays he didn’t permit 
any class work to be done, but organized all kinds of games.’446 Schlingensiepen reports 
something similar: 
 
On warm afternoons [Bonhoeffer] was known to call off work altogether in favour of 
a swim in the sea and community sports. The more ambitious sportsmen among the 
ordinands were not too happy to discover that their director could run faster than they 
could and was almost unbeatable at table tennis.447  
 
Part of this play was musical as well, with Bonhoeffer once cancelling instruction to ‘conduct 
a choral piece for four voices by Josquin des Prez’.448 So the commitment made by ordinands 
to work and study was not exclusive of play, including chamber music; both could exist side-
by-side, with Bonhoeffer occasionally feeling free to have play take priority over work and 
instruction.  
Brotherhood and Friendship: The relational term that Bonhoeffer uses in the context 
of ordered ecclesiastical life—and throughout Life Together—is brotherhood.449 This relation 
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between ordered ecclesial life and ‘brotherhood’ is especially clear in the Bruderhaus and the 
‘new kind of monasticism’450 shared by a small number of the Finkenwalde seminarians. 
According to Bethge, ‘[t]he communal life envisaged in the proposal was to take the form of a 
daily order of prayer, mutual exhortation, free personal confession, common theological 
work, and a very simple communal life.’451 And for Bonhoeffer, this was part of learning 
‘how to live in a communal setting with strict daily obedience to the will of Jesus Christ’.452 
This ordered life of brotherhood was part of daily life beyond the Bruderhaus, and of all 
Finkenwalde ordinands. Bethge wrote: 
  
[Bonhoeffer] asked the ordinands to observe only one rule—never to speak about 
another ordinand in that person’s absence or to tell that person about it afterward when 
such a thing did happen. […] Bonhoeffer was able to impose this discipline on the 
seminary because he also left sufficient room for pleasure and outspoken 
discussions.453 
 
For Bethge to say that there was ‘only one rule’ is odd; Bonhoeffer also kept Finkenwalde in 
a strict routine of beginning and ending the day with ‘long services’; the morning service was 
followed by ‘a half-hour meditation’.454 So the Finkenwalde students were bound together as 
a brotherhood in which their day included a pattern for all to share; some of this daily pattern 
included worship, and some of it had to do with the way one would speak of another. But it 
adds up to one shared ‘rule’ of daily, regimented, and shared patterns of life to which all the 
ordinands, as brothers, were expected to participate in and be committed to.  
Hegel saw friendship as one of the ways freedom takes concrete form; and 
Finkenwalde is where Bonhoeffer’s most significant friendship, with Eberhard Bethge, began, 
the friendship that will eventually be called necessarily free in the Spielraum letter.455 In 
retrospect from prison Bonhoeffer can see, as de Gruchy points out above, friendship as a 
practice of freedom. De Gruchy links the music that Bonhoeffer and Bethge played together 
to their friendship, writing that it ‘undoubtedly helped to cement their friendship’.456 In 
addition to playing music together, Bethge’s theological capabilities were also part of this 
emerging friendship at Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer quickly recognising Bethge’s exegetical 
skills and that Bethge would not simply be the student of Bonhoeffer’s after ‘Bonhoeffer 
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quickly sensed that Bethge had much to offer him’;457 and Bethge’s critical engagement with 
Bonhoeffer would become a shared practice of theological reflection where Bonhoeffer would 
test ideas with Bethge, and where Bethge’s influence on Bonhoeffer’s theology began. In this 
way, the friendship with Bethge was one that integrated elements of free theological 
discourse, and play together in the form of music. 
So it is not difficult see the connection between Finkenwalde and der Spielraum der 
Freiheit, Finkenwalde being a time deeply concerned with order, discipline, and obedience in 
singing, work, and relationships, while simultaneously being a place of freedom in theological 
education, art, play, and friendship. And if the necessity of evidence of freedom is not clear in 
Hegel’s own correlation of freedom and obedience, Bonhoeffer pushes this conception in a 
practical way; Hegel mentions friendship, but Bonhoeffer sees art, education, and play 
alongside friendship as freedom instantiated in a concrete social form.  
 
*** 
 
We can see, here in the Finkenwalde literature, Bonhoeffer return to the question of 
both the wholeness and the reparation of social and political spheres. For Bonhoeffer, the 
political and social world is already a unity, because the boundaries between the church and 
the world outside the church is not recognised as a boundary by the church; practically, 
however, the world does mark a boundary through its inability to hear the divine command. 
But something else comes to light in looking to the relation between the church and the world 
outside it as Bonhoeffer understood it at Finkenwalde: we find some insight into the 
Spielraum’s potentially reparative role in Bonhoeffer’s ‘Prussian world’. Freedom, for Hegel, 
leads to the limitations imposed by the commitments one makes as a result of that freedom, a 
freedom seen in ‘love and friendship’. One of the ways to bring freedom out from the 
background is through those sorts of practices that are free, without usurping obedience or 
discipline; instead, concrete instantiations of freedom, for Bonhoeffer, can take part in 
restoring freedom to a world that had become characterised, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, by 
obedience alone. In this way, friendship—as a constituent practice of the Spielraum—is a 
reparative social relation, in that it takes part in the Spielraum’s reparation of a world marked 
by obedience. While it is important to note, here, that Bonhoeffer was looking back to 
Finkenwalde and his friendship with Bethge when he was formulating the concept of the 
Spielraum, there was a development in Bonhoeffer’s social and political thought that took 
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place between Finkenwalde and the prison correspondence; and it is to this period of 
reflection to which we turn next. 
 
4.3 REPARATION AND WHOLENESS IN BONHOEFFER’S MANDATES 
 
Despite the abandonment of his theology of the orders of preservation by 1933, it was 
not the end of Bonhoeffer’s theological work on the ordering of political and social life. 
While his concern with social and political life were at work in the background of his thinking 
at Finkenwalde, they come more clearly to the fore in the Ethics manuscripts; but the Ethics 
are also where Bonhoeffer sets up two problems for himself in the way he describes the 
sociality of the mandates. One problem is the way he understands the wholeness of social and 
political life at this juncture, as it relates to the sociality of the mandates. Before we do turn to 
that problem, and its solution in the concept of friendship and the Spielraum, however, we 
turn to the first problem Bonhoeffer causes for himself: the relation between reparation and 
sociality in the mandates, and the way Bonhoeffer thinks of this sociality in terms of hierarchy 
and non-reciprocity. 
 
4.3.1 Reparation in the Ethics 
 
In the Ethics, Bonhoeffer’s interest in political and social reparation continues, though 
he does move away from reparative judgment; instead, in the Ethics, reparation takes place in 
Stellvertretung as a hierarchical and non-reciprocal social practice. In the ‘Concrete 
Commandment and the Divine Mandates’ Ethics manuscript, for example, the commandment 
‘seeks to encounter human beings with an earthly relationship of authority’ in the mandate, 
leading to a description of Stellvertretung in terms of social hierarchy, where ‘above and 
below […] belong together in an inseparable and mutually delimiting relationship […] [but] 
refer not to a relation between concepts and things, but between persons’.458 For Bonhoeffer, 
‘[t]he bearer of the mandate acts as a vicarious representative’,459 and these bearers ‘are in a 
strict and unalterable sense God’s commissioners, vicarious representatives, and stand-ins’.460 
This hierarchical form of mandate-oriented Stellvertretung is also clear in the second ‘History 
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and Good’ manuscript, where Bonhoeffer thinks of the Stellvertreter ‘as a father, as a 
statesman, or as the instructor of an apprentice’.461 The non-reciprocal way of thinking of 
Stellvertretung is most evident in Bonhoeffer’s paradigmatic ‘father’ who ‘acts on behalf of 
his children’.462  
In addition to being hierarchical and non-reciprocal, Stellvertretung is also theological, 
in Sanctorum Communio’s use of ‘theological’; Stellvertretung, as it is found in these 
relations, depends on Christ the Stellvertreter who ‘bears the selves of all human beings[.] 
[…] All that human beings were supposed to live, do, and suffer was fulfilled in him’; and 
since ‘he is life, all of life through him is destined to be vicarious representative action’.463 In 
this sense, the Stellvertretung of the Ethics manuscripts now has a less stringent ecclesial 
association in that it takes place within the mandates of family, state, and work; but it is 
nevertheless theological, in that the Stellvertretung that takes place in all life—the family, 
state, and work—also takes place through ‘Jesus […] the Son of God who became human’,464 
and where the Stellvertreter stands in as Christ for others. 
Bonhoeffer has been under significant criticism for the hierarchical nature of his 
theology of the mandates, beginning as early as the betrothal letters shared between him and 
Maria von Wedemeyer. Bonhoeffer did not think of wives and husbands as equals, something 
clear in his wedding sermon for Renate and Eberhard Bethge’s wedding;465 this became 
evident again when Von Wedemeyer suggested that husbands and wives could be friends,466 
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provoking Bonhoeffer to dismiss the idea in favour of a ‘pure and divine’ order.467 Von 
Wedemeyer’s response to Bonhoeffer’s letter is critical of the necessity for differentiation and 
hierarchy in family relations, and told Bonhoeffer that her only real friend had been her 
father.468 Barth was critical of Bonhoeffer’s hierarchical ordering as well, and would detect 
‘not just a suggestion of North German patriarchalism’ in Bonhoeffer’s structures of authority 
in his mandates, wondering: ‘[w]ould it not be advisable then [not to rush] on to the rigid 
assertion of human relationships arranged in a definite order, and the hasty assertion of their 
imperative character?’469 West’s accusation is similar, calling Bonhoeffer ‘the ultimate 
aristocrat’ in this regard.470 And as Ziegler points out, in the context of the mandates, 
Bonhoeffer did think that obedience to Christ was the proper way to understand the task of 
government.471 
The accusation rings true because Stellvertretung, in the context of Bonhoeffer’s 
mandates, is clearly hierarchical and concerned with authority. But Stellvertretung’s 
hierarchical shape is understood, by Bonhoeffer, as a kind of care for the weak; and while this 
does not save it from all its less-than-fashionable assumptions about marriage and family, it 
does orientate Stellvertretung to God’s rule of care. Thus Stellvertretung is not identical with 
earthly power relations for Bonhoeffer: 
 
Under no circumstances may the more powerful simply invoke the divine mandate in 
their dealings with the weaker. It is, on the contrary, part of the nature of the divine 
mandate to correct and order the earthly power relations in its own way.472  
 
More will be said in Chapter 5 about the practice of Stellvertretung in the friendship between 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge. This will call into question whether hierarchy, and the closely related 
non-reciprocity implied by Bonhoeffer’s understanding of hierarchy, is necessary to 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of Stellvertretung, and whether Barth and West’s assessments are 
entirely fair if we were to look beyond the Ethics manuscripts. Important at this juncture, 
however, is that this social practice was reparative in Bonhoeffer’s mind, in that it ‘correct[s] 
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and order[s] the earthly power relations in its own way’.473 If earthly relations were ordered 
according to the advantage of the powerful, Bonhoeffer’s application of Stellvertretung to 
social ordering undermines that advantage; instead, if one were to apply Stellvertretung 
appropriately to the sociality of the mandates, they would be reoriented away from advantage 
and toward God’s care of others. Thus, to take Bonhoeffer’s counsel seriously on 
Stellvertretung, in a world of power and advantage, would mean the reparation of what, for 
Bonhoeffer, was a broken social order. 
 
4.3.2 Unity and Wholeness in the Ethics 
 
Unity and wholeness, rather than reparation, are much larger concerns in the Ethics 
manuscripts, concerns that take form in the way the mandates are understood in relation to 
one another through Christ and their eschatological orientation.  
In the ‘Christ, Reality, and Good’ manuscript, for example, Bonhoeffer sees all of 
reality, ‘the reality of God and the reality of the world’, as reconciled ‘in Christ, that is, in 
ultimate reality.’474 But this reconciled reality takes form in political and social life, and is 
significant for ethics; according to Bonhoeffer, ethical thought had wrongly been determined 
by the assumption in Lutheran two-realms thinking that the ‘autonomy of the orders of this 
world is proclaimed against the law of Christ’.475 Instead, for Bonhoeffer, there ‘are not two 
realities, but only one reality, and that is God’s reality revealed in Christ in the reality of the 
world’.476  
The unity of reality, however, ‘does not remove the difference between church-
community and world’.477 Bonhoeffer’s critique of two-realms thinking does not mean he 
thinks there is an undifferentiated unity in social and political life; instead, Bonhoeffer says 
that, in addition to the problematised differentiation between church and world, there are four 
differentiated spheres, the ‘mandates of God’ called ‘work, marriage, government, and 
church’,478 mandates that are distinct, but ones that nevertheless have their unity in their 
‘origin, existence, and goal in Jesus Christ’.479 So for Bonhoeffer, there are spheres of social 
and political life, ones that find their unity in an overarching Christological reality.480 
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Ziegler describes the autonomy of the mandates as a ‘relative autonomy’481 on account 
of this grounding in Christ, a unity that is eschatological. The mandates, for Ziegler, anticipate 
their unity in the ‘one heavenly city’: 
 
To set the state within the one “Christ-reality” is to relate it and its calling decisively 
towards Christ’s reign and its fulfillment, not only as a technique of preservation but 
perhaps also as anticipation. In other terms, under pressure (rightly!) from his 
eschatological affirmation of the present lordship of Christ, he is led to imagine that 
the state even now suffers the effect of its final cause, and Christians can expect it to 
be en route toward fulfilment of its telos, which as Bonhoeffer says forthrightly, is 
assumption together with the church into the one heavenly city.482 
 
Though Ziegler writes specifically on the state, Bonhoeffer thinks this way about all the 
mandates; the unity of mandates is found in their ‘origin, existence, and goal in Jesus 
Christ’.483 The logic of the communities in Sanctorum Communio,484 and of the orders of he 
describes in the 1930s, is repeated here through their dual reference to creation and the 
eschaton, but now as spheres that are clearly brought into unity through their relation to Christ 
and Christ’s Lordship. This eschatological grounding leads to forms of life in the present 
informed by the mandates’ end in Christ, his new creation, and as an anticipated whole. 
The subject of Christological unity has also been investigated by DeJonge, in 
Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, but from a different perspective than Ziegler’s 
eschatological reading of the Ethics. DeJonge looks to Bonhoeffer’s earliest theological 
influences, and in particular to Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran Christology in comparison to Barth’s 
Reformed Christology; it leads him to find the unity of the mandates in Bonhoeffer’s 
Lutheran, incarnational, and person-centred Christology. In this respect, DeJonge asserts that 
for Barth, God’s reconciliation is something ‘on the other side of eternity which merely 
manifests itself in history’, but for Bonhoeffer, this reconciliation ‘is in history in the person 
of Christ. Bonhoeffer’s understanding of revelation and incarnation in terms of person 
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emphasises the already accomplished reconciliation of God and humanity’.485 This leads 
DeJonge to say that this emphasis on the accomplished reconciliation of God and humanity in 
Christ is hermeneutical, a term which, for DeJonge, does not describe theories of 
interpretation in this case, but the ‘understanding of parts and wholes that stands behind such 
theories’.486 
DeJonge points out that Christ’s personal unity also presses Bonhoeffer’s ethics 
towards its own kind of unity. Oppositional ethical positions are unsatisfactory, for 
Bonhoeffer, because they rest on abstract distinctions that separate what belongs together in 
the reality of Christ; for DeJonge, Bonhoeffer argues this way because Christ’s person is the 
unifying ground of irreconcilable opposites.487 This rests, for DeJonge, on Bonhoeffer’s 
definition of reality, as a reconciled Christ-reality; but DeJonge emphasises the ‘person-
structure’ of this reality, and where reality is the ‘unity of opposites in history’.488 DeJonge 
traces this description of reality back to Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures of 1933:  
 
Just as Bonhoeffer appeals in “Christology” to the person of Christ to foreclose 
references to God or humanity apart from their unity in Christ, so Bonhoeffer appeals 
in Ethics to the Christological, person-structure of reality to foreclose references to 
God or the world independent of Christ-reality. With language that reaches back to his 
“Christology” lectures, Bonhoeffer writes, “From now on we cannot speak rightly of 
either God or the world without speaking of Jesus Christ”.489  
 
For Dejonge, this unity of the world in Christ moves Bonhoeffer’s ethics in a concrete 
direction. According to DeJonge, this Christological unity is part of Bonhoeffer’s challenge to 
the ‘pseudo-Lutheran’ understanding of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine and the reason for 
Bonhoeffer’s continual interest in the wholeness and unity of ethical life.490 This concrete 
ethic ‘takes into account this reconciled Christ-reality[.] […] On the practical level, ethical 
action, or what Bonhoeffer’ calls “responsible action,” is action in accordance with reality. 
Bonhoeffer’s project of concrete ethics is the attempt to think and act from the reality of the 
reconciliation of God and the world in Christ’.491 One of the consequences of ethics becoming 
concrete also leads DeJonge to speak of Bonhoeffer’s ethics as existential, much like 
Couenhoven writes of the ‘split in the lives of the individual believers’: ‘[o]n an existential 
level’, writes DeJonge, ‘the oppositional structure produces conflict by fuelling a tragic 
                                                            
485 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 9. Emphasis in original. 
486 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 9. 
487 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, pp. 136-7. 
488 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 137. 
489 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 137. 
490 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 139. 
491 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 137. 
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existence in which warring principles rend apart ethical being and acting’.492 So, without a 
strategy for speaking of the integration of social and political life, multiple mandates—like 
Luther’s division of spheres mentioned by Couenhoven—would lead to a kind of social and 
personal disintegration. But, if one were to consider the social and the political whole as 
integrated, acting ethically with the governing assumption that the social and political world is 
a unity would be a bulwark against the disintegrative tendency of sphere-thinking; it would be 
reparative by uniting ethical acting and ethical being, and therefore overcoming the ‘tragic 
existence’ that warring principles create. 
DeJonge’s analysis is important and penetrating, bringing some clarity to 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the relation of wholes to parts, but it neglects two important 
things. First, his distinction between Barth’s Reformed Christology and Bonhoeffer’s 
Lutheran Christology leads him to an unhelpful distinction between ‘eternity’ and ‘history’. 
Bonhoeffer’s consistent concern in his political and social theology was not, in the reading I 
am presenting here, one in which Bonhoeffer favours ‘history’ rather than ‘eternity’. The 
consistent concern for Bonhoeffer—in his understanding of Gemeinschaft, and in his 
understanding of the orders of preservation—is eschatology. Ziegler presents a better reading 
of Bonhoeffer on this point, where he sees the trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s eschatological 
concern continue in the Ethics, and where the eschatological unity of all spheres of life in 
Christ is what informs Bonhoeffer’s thinking on the unity of social and political spheres in the 
present. 
Secondly, DeJonge does not take into account the fact that Bonhoeffer’s own first 
expression of political, social, and ecclesiastical unity, as a good, is found in his description of 
Muslim North Africa. As a result, if we were to write a genealogy of the concept of unity in 
Bonhoeffer’s thought, there is precedence in his positive valuation of integrated Muslim life 
well before the Christology lectures. This early regard for political and social wholeness 
points to that unity being part of Bonhoeffer’s hope for lived reality that DeJonge can only 
take into account in an abstract way. DeJonge points to the existential cost of the division of 
spheres, but neglects to explain just how an abstracted unity of those spheres might impact a 
person’s lived social reality; by following Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, DeJonge is at the mercy of 
Bonhoeffer’s own limitation to social realities that remain segregated within the mandates 
themselves. 
 
  
                                                            
492 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation, p. 139. 
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4.3.3 The Spielraum and the Unity of the Mandates  
 
This limitation to the Ethics is costly for DeJonge because for the Bonhoeffer of the 
Ethics, the social practice of Stellvertretung is confined to family, political, and work 
hierarchies; DeJonge is caught in a problem that Bonhoeffer has created for himself by 
segregating the mandates from one another according to the internal social relations of those 
mandates. But if we were to look to the prison letters, we would find that the hermeneutical 
strategy that privileges unity is in play when Bonhoeffer writes of the Spielraum, and that this 
hermeneutical strategy is more than a way of understanding the unity of the world and its 
spheres. The Spielraum qualifies the social theology of the mandates of the Ethics in a way 
that takes into account the possibility of a social and lived unity of the spheres of the 
mandates, because the Spielraum is a sphere that is comprehensive and ‘encompasses all three 
spheres of the divine mandates’.493  
But before looking to the Spielraum as a strategy of bringing a lived and social unity 
to the social and political world, there is one problem that needs addressing: Bonhoeffer’s 
seemingly inconsistent numbering of the mandates, because the numbering of the mandates 
affects which mandates Bonhoeffer is referring to as part of the comprehensive Spielraum. 
For example, Bonhoeffer writes: 
 
Marriage, work, state, and church each have their concrete divine mandates, but what 
about culture and education? I don’t think they can simply be classified under work, as 
tempting as that would be in many ways. They belong not in the sphere of obedience 
but rather in the sphere of freedom [Spielraum], which encompasses all three spheres 
of the divine mandates.494  
 
So the context of Bonhoeffer’s comment on the encompassing nature of the Spielraum is a list 
of four mandates—’[m]arriage, work, state, and church’—but the Spielraum seemingly only 
encompasses three. 
Both Bethge and Pangritz have attempted solutions to this numbering problem. Bethge 
thinks Bonhoeffer is in a ‘flexible’ state of mind, and that this is seen in the ‘number of 
mandates, three or four (or even five?)’495 Pangritz, too, suggests that Bonhoeffer’s 
                                                            
493 DBW/E 8:2/102, 290-91/267-68. 
494 DBW/E 8:2/102, 290-91/267-68. 
495 Bethge, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Theology of Friendship’, p. 92. Later in his essay, Bethge 
will add ‘(or four)’ when he quotes Bonhoeffer’s own text, which originally read that the 
Spielraum ‘encompasses all three spheres of the divine mandates’; DBW/E 8:2/110, 291/268. 
This interpolation serves Bethge’s argument, but is not exactly faithful to Bonhoeffer’s own 
text. Bethge will also call the Spielraum a ‘mandate’; see Bethge, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Theology of 
Friendship’, p. 94. But this does not allow the Spielraum to maintain its comprehensive 
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inconsistency on the number of mandates here is because Bonhoeffer is in an experimental 
state of mind as he writes this letter.496 For Pangritz, the concept of culture had broken open 
the theology of the mandates, and the Spielraum emerges beyond the individual mandates 
themselves.497 But Pangritz does suggest another possibility in addition to Bonhoeffer’s 
flexible and experimental state of mind: for Pangritz, there is also the possibility that 
Bonhoeffer lists three mandates instead of four because of an association between the church 
and the Spielraum, though in the end Pangritz thinks this is unlikely because the church 
should rather be associated with obedience rather than freedom.498  
But as I argue in Chapter 3, the church is not simply a sphere of obedience, it is a 
sphere of freedom as well. So Pangritz is wrong to say that the Spielraum should not be 
identified with the church on account of the church being a sphere of obedience; rather, the 
church can be identified with the Spielraum because the church is where one might find the 
practices of freedom found at Finkenwalde. 
Further, if we look to what Bonhoeffer says about the church, there is a logic to 
Bonhoeffer’s listing of three mandates as part of the Spielraum. The church, for Bonhoeffer—
as I argue above from Finkenwalde literature—is itself a comprehensive realm in its claim, if 
not in the eyes of the world; there is a similar structural understanding of the church in the 
Ethics manuscripts. While Bonhoeffer, in ‘The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Topic’ 
manuscript, wrote that the ‘church, family, work, and government mutually limit one 
another,499 he also, in the manuscript titled ‘On the Possibility of the Church’s Message to the 
World’, wrote that the ‘church community’ is in ‘a relationship of responsibility for the 
world’.500 On the whole, then, the church is both part of the mutually limiting system of 
mandates while it remains responsible to the whole world. Similarly, in the ‘Christ, Reality, 
and Good’ manuscript, Bonhoeffer wrote that in the church’s ‘witness to the foundation of all 
reality in Jesus Christ[,] […] [t]he church is the place where it is proclaimed and taken 
seriously that God has reconciled the world to himself in Christ’.501 Bonhoeffer goes on to say 
that though the mandates are in a kind of mutual delimitation, the church does not act as 
though this delimitation affects its witness: 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
nature. Bonhoeffer himself, while calling it a Raum, does not refer to it as the more strictly 
defined ‘mandate’. 
496 Pangritz, ‘“Spielraum der Freiheit” und “Heilige Ordnung”’, p. 219. 
497 Pangritz, ‘“Spielraum der Freiheit” und “Heilige Ordnung”’, p. 218. 
498 Pangritz, ‘“Spielraum der Freiheit” und “Heilige Ordnung”’, p. 219. 
499 DBW/E 6, 384/380. Bonhoeffer, in the ‘Concrete Commandment and the Divine 
Mandates’ manuscript, described this mutual delimitation with the terms Miteinander, 
Füreinander, and Gegeneinander; see DBW/E 6: 397/393. 
500 DBW/E 6, 359/357. Emphasis in original. 
501 DBW/E 6, 50/64. 
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[O]ne must be aware that this space has already been broken through, abolished, and 
overcome in every moment by the witness of the church to Jesus Christ. Thus all false 
thinking in terms of realms is ruled out as endangering the understanding of the 
church.502  
 
So the church—even as it inhabits its own space with regard to the other mandates—does not 
recognise, in its responsibility and witness, boundaries that are already broken on account of 
the proleptic eschatological unity of all things in Christ. And this is the best way to 
understand the listing of three mandates—work, family, and state—as mandates that are 
encompassed by the mandate of the church. 
The encompassing nature of the church begins to make more sense of what 
Bonhoeffer wrote, for example, about the church in relation to the other mandates in the 
prison letters:  
 
I wonder whether–it almost seems so today–it is only from the concept of the church 
that we can regain the understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education, 
friendship, play). This means that ‘aesthetic existence’ (Kierkegaard) is not to be 
banished from the church’s sphere; rather, it is precisely within the church that it 
would be found anew. [...] Who in our time could, for example, lightheartedly make 
music, nurture friendship, play, and be happy? Certainly not the ‘ethical’ person, but 
only the Christian.503 
 
The church, here, is a distinct mandate, but one in which the practices of the Spielraum are 
found, the Spielraum that ‘encompasses all three spheres of the divine mandates’. The church 
finds itself dispersed across the social and political world through ‘aesthetic’ practices like 
friendship, and where those practices become one of the ways that the church lives out its 
vocation of living in a world where the boundary between it and the world is one erected from 
the outside through the mutual delimitation of the mandates in the present, but a boundary 
and delimitation that is not recognised by the church’s proleptic witness to the eschatological 
unity of Christ. In this sense, the Spielraum is identified with the church, and is an 
‘encompassing’ sphere through its relation to a church that encompasses the other three 
mandates. 
This also makes sense if we were to integrate Bonhoeffer’s concept of Christ existing 
as church-community from Sanctorum Communio with what I have said here. Christ, for 
Bonhoeffer, integrates all of reality, and this results in an integrating hermeneutical strategy. 
And if Christ integrates reality, including social and political life, it makes sense that the 
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Christ who exists as church-community will also press the relationship between church and 
the world in a reconciling direction. Thus Christ’s existence as church-community, and the 
desire to see the political, social, and ecclesiastical spheres as part of a whole, each come 
together in the Spielraum through social practices like friendship, because friendship is not 
isolated to a specific mandate. Rather, through friendship’s placement in the comprehensive 
Spielraum, friendship is a social relation unbounded to the division of the mandates as the 
social relations of father, statesman, or instructor are bounded to family, state, and work. 
 
*** 
 
The Spielraum, then, is well within the trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s political and social 
thought. In the concept of the Spielraum Bonhoeffer extends his interest in the wholeness of 
the political and social world that begins in North Africa, continues with his theology of the 
orders, is in the background if his Finkenwalde ecclesiology, and is expressed again in the 
Ethics manuscripts in his Lutheran Christological logic and the proleptic orientation of the 
mandates to their eschatological unity. Further, we see his concern with reparation taking 
place through judgment in his theology of the orders, a concern which takes a more granular 
relational turn in his theology of the mandates in the Ethics manuscripts. Bonhoeffer sees 
Stellvertretung, in the Ethics, as the way in which sociality is most appropriately ordered and 
performing a reparative function of correction by reordering earthly power relations. But this 
reparative strategy of listing relations as they exist within the spheres of the mandates does 
not contribute to the social wholeness of the mandates as they relate one to another, because 
the relations, as described in the Ethics manuscripts, are ones that take place within the 
mandate rather than between or among the mandates.  
But with the Spielraum, we see a development in Bonhoeffer’s thinking about social 
reparation, relating this reparation to the unity of the mandates by solving the existential 
problem identified by both Couenhoven and DeJonge. The mandates are all related to one 
another, but even though persons inhabit more than one at a time, there is no sociality 
described in the Ethics manuscripts that would cross the boundary between them and offer a 
kind of social relation that unites them. In other words, Bonhoeffer’s strategy for 
Stellvertretung as social reparation in the Ethics exacerbates the problem of the lack of unity 
of the mandates through the location of those relations like father or spouse, master, or 
statesman, within the mandates of family, work, and state. In the prison letters, however, we 
see Bonhoeffer add a social relation that can cross those boundaries between the mandates, 
and bring them into a kind of lived social unity possible in a relationship—friendship—
  131 
which, as a practice of freedom, is part of a Spielraum that is ecclesially grounded and yet 
socially and politically and comprehensive: friendship finds itself planted in the world of the 
other mandates and alongside the intra-mandate social relations described in the Ethics. 
Bonhoeffer does not relate friendship and Stellvertretung, so we cannot yet say that friendship 
is reparative in the way he claims the hierarchical intra-mandate Stellvertretung is. What can 
be said, here, however, is that through the concept of the Spielraum, the problem of social 
unity is solved through the living practice of a kind of relationship that transcends the internal 
social ordering of the mandate itself, and a type of relationship that concretely brings to the 
mandates a reparative unity that is already present hermeneutically in Christ and proleptically 
in the heavenly city. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship, we saw one way in which Bonhoeffer treated 
friendship as a relation which was necessarily caught up in the social and political world in 
which it was found. But it was a friendship that could only provide a pointer to the fact 
Bonhoeffer acted as though friendship was caught up in his political and social world, and on 
its own does not provide much conceptual sophistication.  
But in Bonhoeffer’s concept of the Spielraum, and friendship within it, we find a 
sophistication that has precedent in Bonhoeffer’s thought. To summarise: friendship is 
reparative in two ways. First, in the way that, as a practice of freedom, it offers evidence of 
freedom to a world in which freedom has been pushed in the background; and secondly, as a 
lived practice that crosses the boundaries of different spheres of life as they are represented in 
the mandates, it instantiates and gives witness to the comprehensive eschatological unity of all 
these spheres in Christ. 
The larger point, however, is not simply that friendship is reparative, or that the 
Spielraum is consistent with Bonhoeffer’s larger concerns with freedom and obedience and 
the unity of the social and political world. What friendship’s place in the Spielraum tells us is 
that friendship is not a private or personal relation whose goods are limited to the friendship 
itself; rather, it is reparative to the social and political world in which it finds itself, and brings 
a measure of lived unity to that social and political world. We can now say with confidence 
that Bonhoeffer both acted and thought of friendship as something caught up in a greater 
good. This is not to say that friendship is public; though it is to say that it can be political. 
Thus friendship, for Bonhoeffer, through its reparative and unitive significance to the social 
and political world in which it finds itself, is not simply for itself; friendship is also for others. 
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Throughout this chapter, however, more things have come to light than friendship’s 
political possibilities. First, Bethge’s role in the development of Bonhoeffer’s thinking is 
beginning to emerge. Although we do not have any correspondence from Finkenwalde that 
offers textual evidence of Bethge’s influence on Bonhoeffer’s thought on obedience, 
friendship, and freedom as practice, there are connections that I would point out: the idea of 
der Spielraum der Freiheit had its conceptual roots at Finkenwalde where Bonhoeffer first 
met Bethge, and where their friendship first developed. The possibility that I would offer 
now, to be considered in more detail in the next chapter, is that though the conversation with 
Bethge at Tegel was the immediate context of Bonhoeffer’s development of the idea of der 
Spielraum der Freiheit, it was the friendship with Bethge—a friendship that began at 
Finkenwalde—that inspired the concept of the Spielraum; and that this friendship is one of 
the primary ways that Bethge influenced Bonhoeffer’s own theological development. 
Secondly, in friendship—as a political form of sociality—we can further trace 
Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on eschatology and utility. Again, much like we saw in the Rößler 
chapter, for a friendship to be of utility in the present does not exclude an openness to God’s 
ultimate purposes; and similarly, for a friendship to be oriented to God’s ultimate purposes—
in this case, the unity of social and political life—does not mean that it is without utility in the 
present. Instead, its present utility is possible because it is oriented to God’s ultimate 
purposes. And, as we will see in the next chapter, Bonhoeffer will return to eschatology as he 
describes his friendship with Bethge. 
Thirdly, Bonhoeffer revisits the question of the boundaries between the church and the 
world, a line of inquiry that began Chapter 2 and continued in Chapter 3. In Sanctorum 
Communio, Bonhoeffer wrote of the way that intercession crosses the boundary of the church, 
and leaves self-offering open to this possibility as well. And in Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on 
Gandhi—as a person who hears the commandment and acts accordingly, making a call to 
peace—we had a person with whom some of the conditions of friendship were being fulfilled, 
making inter-faith friendship a speculative possibility on the basis of shared conviction. 
But there is an additional way in which we are beginning to see friendship as a relation 
that is of the church, but not necessarily bound to the church, though it will take putting three 
things side-by-side. 1. In Chapter 2, I argued that theological Stellvertretung, on account of 
the way Bonhoeffer describes it as mutual and particular, is especially appropriate to 
friendship. 2. In Chapter 3, I pointed out that Gandhi’s repentance for others—his 
Stellvertretung—was exemplary, yet took place outside the church; and now, in the Ethics 
manuscripts, Bonhoeffer detaches Stellvertretung from the church, though importantly, he 
does not detach it from Christ nor does he use the theological/ethical distinction he used 
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Sanctorum Communio. Instead, Stellvertretung is extra-ecclesial and takes part in God’s own 
care for others through a Stellvertretung in which a person stands in as Christ for others. 3. In 
this chapter, I point out that friendship, in the Spielraum, is part of a social practice that 
belongs in the world outside the church as part of the encompassing Spielraum. Together, this 
means that theological Stellvertretung, as it takes place in friendship, can take place in the 
social and political world as a whole.  
The possibility of Stellvertretung in friendship, and its political and social 
significance, however, is not something that Bonhoeffer explores directly in Sanctorum 
Communio, Ethics, or his prison correspondence. Further, Stellvertretung, in the Ethics, is 
described in hierarchical terms, but friendship is reciprocal and mutual; it would seem, then, 
that Stellvertretung and friendship are incompatible with one another. But if we were to look 
to Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s practice of friendship—as we did with the Bonhoeffer-Rößler 
friendship—we would find a way forward with the problematic association of mutual and 
reciprocal friendship to the ‘above and below’ Stellvertretung Bonhoeffer describes in the 
Ethics manuscripts. In the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, we find 1. The practices of 
Stellvertretung as they are described in Sanctorum Communio, making the friendship 
redemptive and lasting; and 2. evidence of mutuality, especially in theological dialogue; and 
3. evidence of goods that extend beyond the church, and beyond the friendship itself, making 
it political and a friendship for others.  
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5 INTERPRETING THE BONHOEFFER-BETHGE FRIENDSHIP 
 
I know from experience that your prayer for me is real power. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Eberhard Bethge, 1 February 1941504  
 
To whom did [Bonhoeffer] write? […] Bonhoeffer did not send the letters and the 
outline of his manuscript to the world at large, nor even to his Church; he shared his 
thoughts with a theological friend in the Confessing Church […] what we have was 
addressed to a very limited circle of people who understood his intentions.505  
 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge met in 1935, at Finkenwalde.506 Theirs would become a friendship 
that included conflict and the need to resolve conflict; it would also become a friendship of 
shared political ends and of theological dialogue. As such, it was a friendship that took into 
account the redemptive possibilities of Sanctorum Communio and the political and dialogical 
aspects of the Rößler friendship, and was the friendship that inspired the concept of the 
Spielraum. In this way, the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship best—though imperfectly—
exemplifies a friendship that was lasting, redemptive, dialogical, and for others. 
One would think that Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s theological biographers, being 
interested in both theology and the friendships that populate the pages of a biography, would 
have more to say on the connections between the acts of love and repentance that Bonhoeffer 
describes in Sanctorum Communio and the friendship that Bonhoeffer and Bethge shared. But 
this connection is overlooked in Bethge’s biography, who underemphasises the significance 
the personal aspects of his relationship with Bonhoeffer.507 Schlingensiepen makes no 
mention at all of the connection between the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship and Sanctorum 
Communio’s acts of love and repentance, even at Finkenwalde.508 Marsh, too, despite his 
theological acuity, makes little mention the significance of acts of love and repentance to the 
friendship, focussing more on the what he sees as Bonhoeffer’s affections for Bethge;509 I will 
                                                            
504 DBW/E 16:1/68, 125/136. 
505 Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer: Exile and Martyr (London: Collins, 1975), p. 140. 
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Bonhoeffer: A Biography, pp. 465-56. 
508 Schlingensiepen, Bonhoeffer, pp. 177-83. 
509 Marsh, Strange Glory, pp. 231-41. 
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return to Marsh in more detail below. De Gruchy’s biography of Bethge tells us that Bethge 
knew of Bonhoeffer’s bouts of depression on account of hearing his confession,510 but de 
Gruchy’s account of the friendship is more concerned with their mutual dependence, and the 
effect of Bonhoeffer’s engagement and Bethge’s marriage on the friendship.511 Bethge and 
Bonhoeffer had a ‘spiritual commitment’ according to de Gruchy, and mentions their mutual 
prayer and Bethge’s continued role as Bonhoeffer’s confessor, but he does not explore its 
theological significance or its connection to Stellvertretung.512 The only sustained 
investigation into the relation between Stellvertretung and friendship is by Bobert-Stützel, 
who makes a strong distinction between brotherhood and friendship; her arguments are 
substantive enough that I will return to them below.513  
If we were to look to the correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Bethge, however, 
the relation between Stellvertretung and the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship is clear at two 
junctures in particular: first while they were apart from one another, with Bonhoeffer at Ettal 
and Bethge at the Gossner Mission in Berlin; the second while they were apart from one 
another on account of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment. In these letters, the subject of friendship 
and the practices of Stellvertretung are intertwined on the page. Further, as this investigation 
into friendship and Stellvertretung proceeds, Bethge’s unique voice will emerge through the 
dialogical aspects of their mutual influence upon one another, and the political possibilities of 
this friendship—including Bethge’s work after Bonhoeffer’s death—will come to light as 
well. 
  
5.1 STELLVERTRETUNG, MEDIATION, AND FRIENDSHIP IN DISCIPLESHIP AND 
LIFE TOGETHER 
 
As it turns out, not long after Bonhoeffer and Bethge met at Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer 
was thinking again about the church, Stellvertretung, and friendship. So before turning to the 
Bonhoeffer-Bethge correspondence itself, this material needs some attention. What we will 
see is that in Discipleship, Bonhoeffer still thinks of Stellvertretung in terms of Christ’s 
Stellvertretung as both extra nos and in Christo. When Bonhoeffer turns to the subject of 
Stellvertretung in Life Together, however, he does two things of interest: Christ’s 
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(Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, 1994), pp. 89-109. 
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Stellvertretung is understood as the foundation that makes Christ’s mediation of community 
possible, and this mediation is identified with freedom. Things get more complicated when 
Bonhoeffer turns to friendship in Life Together because Bonhoeffer describes friendship as a 
‘self-centred’ community, raising the question as to whether Bonhoeffer’s theology, as it 
develops in Finkenwalde, is as sympathetic to friendship as a redemptive social relation as it 
was in Sanctorum Communio.  
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology in the Finkenwalde period, with regard to redemption, is 
easily recognisable from the pages of Sanctorum Communio. Redemption, in Discipleship, is 
extra nos, something accomplished for humanity by God: Christ is sent to ‘shoulder and carry 
all of humanity’;514 this Christ is ‘for us’ and ‘stands bodily before God in the place that 
should be ours’.515 But this promeity of Christ is also ecclesial for Bonhoeffer, and is seen in 
the church’s preaching and sacramental practice: the ‘body of Jesus is “for us” in the strictest 
sense of the word’, he writes, ‘on the cross, in the word, in baptism, and in the Lord’s Supper. 
All bodily community with Jesus Christ rests on this fact’.516 This body, in which Christ acts 
for us, is identified with Gemeinde: ‘[t]he body of Jesus Christ is identical with the new 
humanity which he has assumed. The body of Christ is his church-community 
[Gemeinde]’.517 And this ecclesial body of Christ is identified as Christ’s ongoing presence in 
the world: ‘[t]o be in Christ is to be in this Gemeinde, and to be in Gemeinde is to be ‘truly 
and bodily in Jesus Christ’;518 and the ‘life of believers in the church-community is truly the 
life of Christ in them’, and as members of his body, members ‘take part in Christ’s suffering 
and glory’ and in ‘daily dying’.519 Though he is not specific about particular ‘acts of love’, 
Bonhoeffer does speak again of a Christ who acts for others, extra nos and in the church, and 
an ecclesial life of Christ that takes place in the world in an ongoing way through its 
suffering, glory, and ‘daily dying’. 
Bonhoeffer describes this ecclesial participation in Christ’s Stellvertretung as a human 
mode of action and experience that may redeem others: 
 
Even though Jesus Christ has already accomplished all the vicarious suffering 
necessary for our redemption, his suffering in this world is not finished yet. In his 
grace, he has left something unfinished […] in his suffering, which his church-
community is to complete in this last period before his second coming[.] […] Whether 
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this suffering of Christians also has the power to atone for sin […] is an open 
question.520  
 
This Stellvertretung is ongoing, and is Christ’s own, completed in church-community. So 
Bonhoeffer himself confirms the possibility—the ‘open question’—of Christ’s own 
atonement taking place by way of the members of the church, as an ongoing suffering 
atonement in the body of Christ as Gemeinde. This, then, is more than a promeity identified 
with Christ’s headship, and a Christ who ‘comes upon me from the outside’, as Ziegler puts 
it.521 It is also a cautious affirmation that church-community may be continuing the 
redemptive work of Christ. 
I argued in Chapter 4 that freedom can be assumed when Bonhoeffer speaks of 
obedience at Finkenwalde; but in Life Together, Bonhoeffer became more explicit about 
freedom, speaking about interpersonal relations in terms of Christ’s Stellvertretung and a 
person’s freedom. For Bonhoeffer, ‘[b]ecause Christ has long since acted decisively for other 
Christians, before I begin to act, I must allow them the freedom to be Christ’s’.522 So because 
Christ has already acted for another, that person is free, and this freedom in Christ is taken 
into account through the ‘release [of] others from all my attempts to control, coerce, and 
dominate them with my love’.523 
The result of another’s belonging to Christ, and their resulting freedom, is that 
encounter takes place by way of a mediating presence. Mediation was not a new subject for 
Bonhoeffer; he had written about it a number of ways in Sanctorum Communio,524 even 
relating it to friendship, writing that ‘objective spirit […] appears as independent and 
anonymous to the third person, who desires admission into a bond of friendship; the objective 
spirit also thrusts itself as a third entity right between the two who are bound together’.525 But 
in the Finkenwalde literature, Bonhoeffer no longer calls this mediating presence ‘objective 
spirit’. The mediator is Christ, and ‘we can encounter others only through the mediation of 
Christ’.526 
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For Green, imagining a Christ that mediates leads to an ability to see others, and 
yourself, the way Christ does;527 Fergus sees effects on community as well, but in concrete 
terms in the healing of relationships.528 But both of these outcomes are reliant on Christ 
having acted first. Without Christ’s accomplished Stellvertretung, both renewed perception 
and healed relationships would be evacuated of what makes either a possibility: Christ’s own 
ongoing work in the community and in another person. Thus Feil, rightly, sees mediation in 
Life Together as a concept that arises from Stellvertretung529 because for Bonhoeffer, Christ 
has ‘long since acted decisively for other Christians’, therefore ‘they should encounter me 
only as the persons that they already are for Christ.’ For Bonhoeffer, Christ having acted for 
others ‘is the meaning of the claim that we can encounter others only through the mediation of 
Christ’.530 Christ’s Stellvertretung, then, results in his ongoing work; Bonhoeffer calls this 
ongoing work Christ’s mediation; this mediation is a way of understanding others as already 
‘for Christ’. Though Bonhoeffer does not use the word Stellvertretung or Stellvertreter here, 
the function of being ‘for Christ’ is the same because to be Stellvertreter is to act for others; 
here, similarly, another person—through mediation—acts ‘for Christ’. So, in this way, 
mediation is reliant on both Christ’s accomplished Stellvertretung and his ongoing work for 
others, in the human person, in the present. This point will become clearer when I turn to 
Beichte below. 
This mediation, where Christ continues to stand between ‘me and others’,531 leads to a 
prohibition: ‘I must not long for unmediated community with that person.’532 The reason for 
this prohibition of unmediated community is that for Bonhoeffer, unmediated community is 
self-centred and results in ‘human enslavement, bondage, rigidity’ rather than ‘the freedom of 
Christians under the Word’.533 Bonhoeffer calls it ‘seelischer Gemeinschaft’, ‘emotional 
community’,534 community that seeks immediate interpersonal relationships, a ‘complete 
intimate fusion’ between people.535  
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Unmediated, self-centred, and emotional community does exist despite this 
prohibition, and Bonhoeffer assumes that unmediated community will exist side-by-side with 
the spiritual community within the church; this brings us to Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on 
friendship in Life Together. Bonhoeffer begins with a description of an ‘undiscerning 
observer’ of communities that include such things as friendships:  
 
The undiscerning observer may think that this mixture of ideal and real, self-centred 
and spiritual, would be most obvious where there are a number of layers in the 
structure of a community, as in a marriage, the family, friendship–where the element 
of self-centeredness as such already assumes a central importance in the community’s 
coming into being at all, and where the spiritual is only something added to 
humanity’s physical-emotional [leiblich-seelischen] nature. According to this view, it 
is only in these multi-faceted communities that there is a danger of confusing and 
mixing the two spheres, whereas such a danger could hardly arise in a community of a 
purely spiritual nature.536 
 
Bonhoeffer is not entirely clear as to whether he means that 1. Friendships are ‘mixed’ or 
‘multi-faceted’ in and of themselves, apart from being part of a larger ‘spiritual’ community; 
that 2. friendships are ‘self-centred’ and ‘emotional’ in and of themselves, and ‘spiritual’ on 
account of being embedded in larger communities that are shaped by additional relationships 
apart from the affections of friendship; or that 3. friendships are ‘multi-faceted’ in and of 
themselves, on account of the friendship itself being shaped by both its ‘self-centredness’ and 
as part of a larger ‘spiritual’ community.  
There is good reason to think that friendships are ‘multi-faceted’ in and of themselves, 
and that they are shaped by both the affections of friendship and through being part of a larger 
community. Bonhoeffer reflects here on life in Finkenwalde, a community that was not 
founded by family or friendship; the intention was ‘the formation of a community based on 
the Sermon on the Mount’537 that was ‘part of the one, holy, universal Christian church’.538 
This community, however, did include brothers and cousins,539 and is where Bonhoeffer’s 
friendship with Bethge began; it was a community in the terms of Sanctorum Communio, 
where families and friendships take their place within the larger church-community. 
Bonhoeffer, then, is thinking of friendship as both ‘self-centred’/’physical-emotional’, but 
                                                            
536 DBW/E 5, 33/46. 
537 Geffrey B. Kelly, ‘Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition’, in Life Together 
and Prayerbook of the Bible, ed. by Geffrey B. Kelly (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), pp. 3-23 
(p. 13). 
538 DBW/E 5, 32/45. 
539 Bethge and Vibrans were cousins, and both began at Finkenwalde in 1935; Gerhard 
and Winfried Krause were brothers, both part of Finkenwalde’s 1937 session. See biographies 
and class lists in DBW/E 14, 1050/1022, 1053/1025, and the biographies in DBWE 14, 1186, 
1155. 
  140 
because they are part of larger ‘spiritual’ community, the ‘spiritual is something added’ to the 
friendship itself through its participation in the larger church-community.  
As Bonhoeffer continues to describe this ‘mixed’ form of community, he says that the 
observer, who thinks that in a ‘mixed’ community there is a danger of confusing the sphere of 
the ‘spiritual’ with the sphere of the ‘physical-emotional’ and ‘self-centred’, is mistaken: 
 
Such ideas [of confusing the two spheres in mixed communities] are a grand delusion. 
On the basis of all our experience–and as can be easily seen from the very nature of 
things–the truth is just the opposite. A marriage, a family, a friendship knows exactly 
the limitations of its community-building power. Such relationships know very well, if 
they are sound, where the self-centred element ends and the spiritual begins. They are 
aware of the difference between physical-emotional and spiritual community.540 
 
Sound friendships, marriages, and families—if they know the limits of their power to build 
community—are precisely where the discernment of ‘spheres’ takes place. The real danger is 
in communities that consider themselves entirely ‘spiritual’: 
 
On the other hand, whenever a community of a purely spiritual nature comes together, 
the danger is uncannily near that everything pertaining to self-centeredness will be 
brought into and intermixed with this community. Purely spiritual life in community 
[Lebensgemeinschaft] is not only dangerous but also not normal. Whenever physical-
familial community, the community formed among those engaged in serious work, or 
everyday life with all its demands on working people is not introduced into the 
spiritual community, extraordinary vigilance and clear thinking are called for.541 
 
For Bonhoeffer, healthy communities are not made through the rejection of family or 
friendship as self-centred, but through the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘self-centred’ living side-by-side, 
and within, relationships like friendships. The conscious and intentional inclusion of the 
forms of life that are self-centred and emotional, for Bonhoeffer, acts as an aid to 
discernment. 
So for Bonhoeffer here, there are relationships like friendships and families that are 
‘physical-emotional’ and ‘self-centred’; they know their limits; and they take part in 
communities that are ‘spiritual’. But ‘spiritual’ communities—without friendships or families 
that know their limitations and can integrate the ‘spiritual’ into them—are susceptible to their 
own self-centredness but without the ability to recognise it. Friendship and family, as ‘multi-
faceted’, make communities that are tempted to be ‘spiritual’ aware of the reality of self-
centredness. In this sense, friendships are of utility to the community of which the friendships 
are a part. 
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So Bonhoeffer’s understanding of friendship at Finkenwalde—despite the fact that he 
speaks in different terms—is in continuity with what he has already said. Gemeinschaft in 
Sanctorum Communio—including marriage, family, friendship—is open to God’s purposes, 
and is an intermediary collective person in the collective person of Gemeinde. Here, too, 
friendship is a distinct kind of social relation within the church-community, and one that is 
open to God’s purposes through its service of discernment. 
Friendship, then, continues to be a theological and ecclesial topic for Bonhoeffer at 
Finkenwalde, and though he speaks of it as ‘self-centred’ and ‘physical-spiritual’, friendship 
appears in the Finkenwalde literature as a constructive part of community life. Bonhoeffer is 
interested in friendship here as human, and in its ability to be ‘multi-faceted’ and to preserve 
a community from the fantasy of being entirely ‘spiritual’. He may be interested in the ends of 
community as a whole; but friendship, here, is part of that the community that Bonhoeffer is 
describing. Friendship is said to have its particular and legitimate demands, and the work that 
takes place in friendship is ‘serious’ and is part of community life. And though it is a serious 
charge to call these kind of relationships ‘self-centred’, they are considered valuable for their 
ability to offer the church clarity in its discernment between the spiritual and the self-
centred,542 and as a place where ‘spiritual’ community, mediated by Christ and reliant on his 
having acted for the friend, can find a place. 
We also see, in Discipleship and Life Together, an affirmation of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology of Stellvertretung from Sanctorum Communio. This is not the extra-ecclesial 
Stellvertretung of the Ethics. Though Christ has acted for others and on their behalf, an idea 
preserved in the Ethics, Bonhoeffer is in an ecclesial mode here, where the church lives 
Christ’s life in the world in an ongoing, redemptive way, and where members of that body 
‘take part in Christ’s suffering and glory’ and in ‘daily dying’.543 It also marks two 
developments from Sanctorum Communio: the Stellvertretung of Christ extra nos is 
foundational to, and makes possible, his ongoing work of mediation between persons in the 
present; and, in a development that will help make sense of the connection between 
Sanctorum Communio’s Stellvertretung, as acts of love, and the reparative sociality of the 
Spielraum, this mediation is one of the ways persons are understood to be free.  
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The final difference between the language of Sanctorum Communio and that of Life 
Together is less substantive than it first appears. In Sanctorum Communio, a person acts as 
Christ for others; in Life Together, Christ is found at work between a person and others. This 
does not result in a substantive difference for us, because first, both kinds of vicarious action 
are dependent on Christ’s Stellvertretung extra nos, and this is the founding condition of the 
redemptive co-operation between Christ and the human person in the present. Secondly, it 
would be an error to categorically separate acting as Christ for others from Christ’s mediation, 
as both are forms of Christ’s ongoing, ecclesial, and redeeming work in which a human 
person acts. Christ comes ‘between’ one person and another in acts of love and repentance, in 
that the person is not effaced on account of Christ’s Stellvertretung; equally, Christ’s 
mediation is not an absolute differentiation between Christ and the person, in that Christ’s 
work nevertheless takes place in the other. This correspondence of Stellvertretung and 
mediation means that when we turn to the Bonhoeffer-Bethge correspondence, we can do so 
with combined terms: Stellvertretung as ecclesially-grounded acts of love and repentance, in 
friendship, acts which are characterised by suffering, glory, and daily dying. 
 
5.2 FRIENDSHIP AND STELLVERTRETUNG IN THE BONHOEFFER-BETHGE 
CORRESPONDENCE 
  
Though the evidence of theological Stellvertretung—as acts of love and repentance—
are clear in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, recent attention to the friendship has centred on 
Charles Marsh’s claims in his biography of Bonhoeffer, Strange Glory, where he makes some 
strong inferences and conclusions about Bonhoeffer’s sexual orientation and the nature of 
Bonhoeffer’s love and affection for Bethge.544 So before I get to Stellvertretung, and the 
different kind love that I will be referring to here, Marsh’s claims will need attention. 
There is an historical question that arises with Marsh’s claim. Is the claim about 
Bonhoeffer’s love and affection towards Bethge historically plausible? Marsh is not the first 
to ask a question about the nature of Bonhoeffer’s affection for Bethge; the earliest reference I 
can find dates from June 1946, when Gerhard Vibrans compared the loneliness that would be 
caused by the departure of Bethge from Bonhoeffer’s life to Vibrans’s own unmarried 
existence.545 And even though he denied this possibility when asked,546 Bethge did not always 
tell the entire truth about other things, particularly when the truth might affect the lives of 
                                                            
544 Marsh, Strange Glory, pp. 236, 253, 308. 
545 DBW/E 14:1/87, 174/195. 
546 Edwin Robertson, The Prison Poems of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A New Translation 
with Commentary (Guildford, Surrey: Eagle, 1998), p. 78. 
  143 
others. I referred to Paul von Hase, in Chapter 2, as someone about whom Bethge said very 
little about the Nationalist Socialist company kept by von Hase in the interest of discretion for 
the sake of the family;547 Bethge treats Rößler similarly by not delving too deeply into 
Rößler’s political past. So it makes sense for Bethge not to call into question Bonhoeffer’s 
sexual orientation, because it would have led to even more unwanted attention paid to Maria 
von Wedemeyer,548 Bonhoeffer’s one-time fiancée, attention that Bethge tried to avoid in 
other circumstances.  
On the historical question, Marsh does not make an argument about how the 
Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship may fit within Berlin’s culture of same-sex affectionate and 
sexually active relationships, though he could have. Brian Joseph Martin, in his book 
Napoleonic Friendship, makes the case for erotic relationships among French soldiers 
between 1789 and 1916, a slightly different world from the one Bonhoeffer and Bethge 
inhabited in Weimar Germany. But if we were to see the Bonhoeffer family as one whose 
values were Wilhelmian and Prussian,549 and having strong military commitments—including 
two of the Bonhoeffer brothers fighting in World War I550—the Bonhoeffer’s themselves 
were not that far from the nineteenth-century military culture that Martin describes. Further to 
this, as we look to the shape of the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, there are other similarities 
to what Martin describes in his work. Bonhoeffer and Bethge shared a common purse, as did 
some of the men in the relationships described by Martin; and, much like the friendships 
described by Martin, Bonhoeffer too thought of his friendship with Bethge as a life-long 
commitment.551 Finally, if we were to look to the sexual culture of Weimar Germany, one of 
the homosexual associations was called Freundschaft,552 one of the reviews written by and for 
the gay community was called Die Freundschaft (which was itself an amalgamation of two 
circulars, one called Freundschaft und Freiheit).553 Cognates of Freund are found in the 
names of other gay newspapers and associations.554 This suggests some continuity between 
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the use of the Freundschaft to describe both sexually intimate and non-intimate same-sex 
relationships.  
If we were to ask this question from the texts we have at hand, however, the 
possibility that Bonhoeffer held some kind of unrequited and unrecognised sexual desire 
toward Bethge, and hoped that their friendship could be more like either Martin’s military 
friendships or Weimar’s gay friendships, can only remain a tentative conclusion based on 
inference rather than material evidence. Marsh himself does not make his claim through either 
historically contextualising the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, or from material evidence, but 
from impressions gleaned from the letters Bonhoeffer and Bethge shared.555  
Hauerwas sees this kind of assumption of a sexual relationship an ‘impoverished 
understanding of friendship’;556 and a look to the letters, and an investigation into how 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge themselves thought about and practiced their friendship, bears 
Hauerwas out. In reading the letters, the theological interests that I am investigating become 
much more clear. Though Bonhoeffer’s attachment to Bethge was real and sometimes 
overbearing, what becomes clear as we will see in the letters themselves is that Bonhoeffer 
did long for Bethge’s presence, but it was a presence for which he longed because it 
facilitated confession and intercession—not sexualised bodily intimacy—making 
Stellvertretung a much more obvious departing point, beginning with the Ettal/Gossner 
letters.  
 
5.2.1 Stellvertretung in the Ettal/Gossner Correspondence 
 
In February 1941, after returning from a short-lived opportunity for a safe life in New 
York, Bonhoeffer retreated to a monastery in Ettal to work on his Ethics manuscripts. Bethge, 
meanwhile, was in Berlin working in the Gossner Mission.557 With this, they were apart from 
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one another for the first time on Bonhoeffer’s birthday,558 which both Bonhoeffer and Bethge 
turned into an opportunity to write to one another about their friendship.  
The first letter in this birthday exchange is from Bethge, written on 1 February 1941, 
beginning the conversation by wishing Bonhoeffer well, writing: ‘I […] wish you a good and 
fruitful use of your powers, […] and good coffee and tea in your new year’.559 Bethge also 
wished, for himself, ‘frequent opportunities for us to get together’.560 Bethge is also thankful, 
writing: ‘I offer you a summary of thanks—perhaps I can do this in writing—for your care 
and faithfulness, your kind work for me, availability in all personal and professional needs, 
[…] [and the] sharing of neckties and shoes, imagination and encouragement’.561  
On that same day, Bonhoeffer wrote his own letter to Bethge; Bonhoeffer, too, was 
reflecting on the friendship, and the fact that the friendship between them was, at times, 
difficult. Bonhoeffer writes:  
 
You have also patiently withstood the severe tests of such a friendship, particularly 
with regard to my violent temper (which I abhor in myself and of which you have 
fortunately repeatedly and openly reminded me), and have not allowed yourself to be 
made bitter by it. For this I must be particularly grateful to you.562 
 
Bonhoeffer, like Bethge, is thankful; but this thankfulness is for Bethge’s forbearance as he 
recognises how difficult a friend he was. Bonhoeffer was penitent, in this sense, sharing his 
faults with Bethge.  
The most fitting example of the ‘severe tests of such a friendship’ to which 
Bonhoeffer refers took place not long after Bonhoeffer and Bethge had met. While Bethge 
and Bonhoeffer were planning a trip to Switzerland in 1936, Bethge invited his cousin and 
fellow seminarian, Gerhard Vibrans, to join them, but Bonhoeffer was uninterested in another 
companion:  
 
[A]s far as the Swiss trip is concerned […] it would not be at all so simple for three 
people. I could borrow some money from a friend, but it would not suffice for three 
people. If Gerhard can get accommodations elsewhere, that would be another matter 
entirely.563  
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Bonhoeffer does say that ‘the three of us making the trip would be wonderful’.564 But after 
this brief moment of generosity, he returns to his overriding concern about the disadvantages 
of three people: ‘every decision, every change of plans, etc., can cause more friction among 
three people than between two[,] […] in Switzerland Gerhard must have a place to stay[.] 
[…] Moreover, we really cannot do much for Gerhard financially for the trip’.565 When the 
possibility of a fourth person was suggested, Bonhoeffer became concerned about the strain 
on the rear axle of the car because of the extra weight: ‘[t]hen the car itself. The axle already 
has to strain with three people in the car, and it certainly will with four. What can be done? 
And then in the mountains’.566 Bonhoeffer concludes: ‘In a word, it is difficult to make a 
decision here. I would like to make it as nice as possible for you and the other two and don’t 
want to be selfish. But it’s just that things could get complicated with four of us’.567  
Bonhoeffer did not get his way in the end, and Vibrans came on the trip. But it was a 
trying episode for all involved. Bethge approached Bonhoeffer about his behaviour on the 
trip, and as a result, Bonhoeffer wrote to Vibrans: ‘[l]et me say first of all that I now 
understand that I disturbed both of you while you were together and that I made things 
difficult for you, and that I am very sorry now’.568 But Bonhoeffer’s request for pardon came 
with some insouciance. ‘Hence I want to ask both of you to pardon me’, writes Bonhoeffer to 
Vibrans, ‘just as I already did when we parted’.569 And he makes excuses as well, writing: ‘[I 
was] really at the end of my strength[,] [I] slept very poorly indeed and then only briefly, and 
I was just worn out’.570 He then blames Bethge: ‘Eberhard […] was from the beginning 
irritated that I spoke with you about the conditions of our trip together’.571 He blames 
Vibrans, too: ‘It irritated me that you always referred to yourself as the third wheel on the cart 
and in so doing pushed us into a position none of us wanted’.572 Bonhoeffer recognises that 
his actions might have been seen in a negative light, but that his actions, ‘[r]ather than being a 
sign of unfriendliness, it was perhaps more the opposite, namely, an attempt to avoid potential 
problems’.573 He does, in the end, show regret: ‘[n]ow I have the feeling it was 
misunderstood. I am very sorry about that’;574 and he hopes that the episode can be put behind 
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them all: ‘I discussed it all with Eberhard, and we are done with it. I am now asking you to 
join with me and with us again on this matter. I could not bear it if anything serious came 
between us and were not addressed. Write me just a single word—nothing more is 
necessary—that you feel similarly. I beg you’.575 
Referring to this episode, de Gruchy is cautious and understated, calling Bonhoeffer a 
‘demanding friend’.576 He was that, and more: it was a severe test of friendship. Bonhoeffer 
does make some gestures toward reconciliation, but he began with an attempt to keep Vibrans 
from joining the trip; went on to make what appear to be absurd excuses about the strength of 
a car axle; acts unfriendly toward Vibrans on the trip itself; thus when Bethge asked him to 
reconcile with Vibrans, Bonhoeffer follows through with petulance, making a number of 
excuses for his behaviour while blaming others. 
But in the Ettal letter, Bonhoeffer recognised how he tested Bethge. De Gruchy states, 
concerning this letter, that ‘[s]uch a friendship did not need theological justification; it was 
simply understood as a gift to be received, shared, and expressed’.577 While the friendship 
may have not needed theological justification, it was a friendship, at this point, that was also 
theologically informed by Bonhoeffer’s theology of Stellvertretung and the practices that 
were able to mitigate how difficult Bonhoeffer made the friendship. So the realisation that his 
temper was destructive, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, was connected to Bethge’s prayer for him; and 
Bonhoeffer turned, immediately after his confession about his testing of the friendship, by 
writing: ‘I know from experience that your prayer for me is real power.’578  
Since Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer and Bethge had regularly taken time together for 
personal and mutual intercession.579 Bonhoeffer recalls this practice again in a letter 
responding to Bethge three days later, referring to Bethge’s ‘personal intercession’580 over the 
years; but away from Bethge, at Ettal, Bonhoeffer was without Bethge’s intercession and the 
daily devotions they shared. Epistolary correspondence may capture some of their shared life 
of prayer and repentance, but without Bethge’s immediate presence he calls his day ‘without 
meaning and substance’, writing that other ‘signs of love need to appear in this light [of 
shared devotion and intercession], or they lose their splendor’.581 This kind of splendour, for 
Bonhoeffer, is not easy to produce when one is alone because that splendour is found in a 
particular friend, and for Bonhoeffer, particularly in Bethge:  
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Among other things, you wish me good stimulating friends. One can well wish such a 
thing for oneself, and it is a great gift today. And yet the human heart is created in 
such a way that we seek not the many but the one particular other and rest there. That 
is the challenge, the limit, and the treasure of authentic human relationship insofar as it 
touches the realm of individuality and is at the same time grounded fundamentally in 
faithfulness. There are individual relationships without faithfulness, and there is 
faithfulness without individual relationship. Each of these can be found among the 
many. But to find both (and this happens seldom enough!) one seeks the particular 
other, and blessed is the one ‘possessing that noble prize’.582  
 
Bonhoeffer’s use of ‘faithfulness’ is not simply in reference to Bethge’s forbearance; there is 
more to the letter’s subject matter than forbearance. Their faithfulness takes the shape of 
intercession for one another, and Bonhoeffer’s opportunity to continue to confess his faults to 
Bethge. For Bonhoeffer, this faithfulness is found not in a general way for many others. It is 
the faithfulness of a particular other who hears his confession and intercedes for him; it is the 
‘noble prize’ of a friend in whom particularity and faithfulness meet.  
 
5.2.2 Stellvertretung in the Prison Letters Part I: Repentance, Intercession, and Forgiveness 
 
By 1943, Bonhoeffer and Bethge were separated once again, this time on account of 
Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment; and, much like we see in the Ettal/Gossner letters, Bonhoeffer 
took their absence from one another as an opportunity to speak about their friendship. We find 
this most clearly in the letters of 18 and 20 November 1943, where Bonhoeffer covered 
friendship in his own recently written fiction,583 the conflict between marriage and 
friendship,584 and the complexity of friendship as a person gains friends after childhood.585  
Because the correspondence was smuggled and was circumventing the prison’s 
censor,586 Bonhoeffer was also able to be more candid than he had been in earlier letters from 
prison. As a result, alongside friendship as a subject, Bonhoeffer turned to the more personal 
aspects of his practice of friendship with Bethge, writing to make sure that their intercessions 
were ongoing and mutual, and returning to the value he places on Bethge’s prayer for him: 
‘[you] can pray for me like no one else. I want to ask you for this, and I also do the same for 
you every day’.587 Upon asking Bethge for prayer, and as a way to give content to Bethge’s 
intercessions, Bonhoeffer offers some details to his state of life and mind, of ‘some of the 
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things that you should know about me’.588 Bonhoeffer refers, in this request, to his ‘“acedia”-
“tristitia” with its ominous consequences that have often haunted me’; his wonder as to 
‘whether it is really the cause of Christ for whose sake I have inflicted such distress on all of 
you’; and to his self-reproach ‘for not having finished the Ethics’.589  
Bonhoeffer’s eschatology surfaces again in this letter, now in relation to intercession. 
At this point, Bonhoeffer was considering the possibility that he and Bethge would not see 
one another again; this leads Bonhoeffer to speak of their friendship as lasting: 
 
Let us promise each other to remain faithful in intercession for each other[.] […] And 
if it should be determined that we never see each other again, then let us think of each 
other to the end with gratitude and forgiveness, and may God grant to us then that we 
one day stand praying for each other and praising and giving thanks with each other 
before God’s throne.590  
 
Ziegler, in an article on the eschatology of the prison letters, points out that William 
Hamilton, Larrry Rasmussen, James Woelfel, and Ernst Feil find little or no evidence for 
eschatology in these letters.591 Ziegler contests this reading, finding Bonhoeffer’s 
eschatological thinking in his understanding of secularity.592 Here we have another example 
of Bonhoeffer’s eschatological thinking in the same letters, in this instance about prayer in the 
context of his friendship with Bethge. Like the eschatology of Sanctorum Communio, where 
communities in the present are informed by their sanctified form, Bethge’s prayer in the 
present is understood, by Bonhoeffer, in terms of its eschatological end. 
Ziegler sees Bonhoeffer’s eschatology taking form in ‘elements of evangelical faith 
[that] provide proto- or antitypes which can and ought to direct the vocation of the mandates 
in the world’;593 and this is similar, though it’s not clear that Bonhoeffer is looking to the 
gospel, precisely, for a prototype of the vocation of friendship in the present. But similarly, 
the community of friendship does more than endure, for Bonhoeffer; it also looks, in the 
present, to an eschatological type, where the present shape of the friendship is informed by its 
eschatological end. The hope, in the face of their possible separation, that God will grant their 
eternal intercession for one another before God’s throne is related to their gratitude and 
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forgiveness in the present. To hope for what will be, in Bonhoeffer’s eschatological 
imagination, means acting upon that hope now, in gratitude and forgiveness. 
Bonhoeffer felt strongly that he did need forgiveness in the present; and as 
Bonhoeffer’s request for intercession became more personal, he turns back to how difficult a 
friend he was: 
 
I had wanted to express to you there how grateful I was that with so much patience 
and forbearance you bore my tyrannical and self-serving manner, which often made 
you suffer, and everything with which I sometimes made your life difficult.594 
 
Much like Bonhoeffer’s penitent words in the Ettal/Gossner correspondence, Bonhoeffer 
speaks of his friendship with Bethge as the opportunity for him to be a difficult and 
demanding friend, and treats their friendship as an opportunity to find some resolution to his 
actions through the prayer of the very friend—and in a point I will return to below, not to a 
Christian who stood apart from the sin—who had himself suffered his difficult and self-
serving manner. 
At the end of Bonhoeffer’s renewed penitence over the ways he made Bethge’s life 
difficult, and following his request for prayer, Bonhoeffer makes a clear connection between 
intercession, confession, and absolution. Immediately after reminding Bethge that he ‘made 
[Bethge’s] life difficult’, he writes: 
 
 I ask you for forgiveness for this and yet know that—even if not physically—we were 
granted participation spiritualiter in the gift of confession [Beichte], absolution, and 
communion, and may be very happy and at peace in this.595 
 
What Bonhoeffer did in the Ettal/Gossner correspondence—entering in a mode of confession 
and repentance as he asked for Bethge’s prayers, though not saying clearly that it was 
confession—he does now by identifying this clearly as confession and absolution. Bethge’s 
prayers of intercession followed his confession, and were part of the forgiveness of sins that 
comes through Bethge taking Christ’s place, for Bonhoeffer, in both intercession and 
absolution.  
This was, in epistolary form, Beichte, the private form of the forgiveness of sins that 
had been expected of the members of the Finkenwalde community. Even Bonhoeffer, as head 
of the seminary, was expected to take part in this practice; Bonhoeffer privately confessed his 
sin to Bethge.596 Bonhoeffer described this private confession, in Life Together, as God’s 
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work through another: according to Bonhoeffer, ‘[t]hose who confess their sins in the 
presence of another Christian know that they are no longer alone with themselves; they 
experience the presence of God in the reality of the other’;597 like the confession of sins that 
Bonhoeffer describes in Sanctorum Communio, Beichte was a meeting of God in another 
person. This kind of confession, then, through the person acting as God, is one of the ecclesial 
forms of Stellvertretung—the mutual forgiveness of sins—but in personal and private form. 
Wilkes confirms this reading of Beichte, describing it in terms of Bonhoeffer’s vision of 
Stellvertretung:  
 
[T]he confessor represents the church community and stands in the place of Christ, 
and as Christ, to the one who confesses and as such bears the sin and speaks words of 
absolution. […] Members of the Christian community must bear one another if they 
are together to act as a Stellvertreter (vicarious representative) to the world. Indeed, 
Bonhoeffer commented: “Confession of sin is founded on the reality of the vicarious 
representative action of Christ.” Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on “being for” others was 
manifest first of all, on his account, in the willingness to take on the burden of 
another’s sin.598  
 
Christ’s Stellvertretung is the founding condition for the church’s ongoing ecclesial practice; 
here, that ongoing practice is the personal form of the confession of sin in which the member 
of the church community acts as Christ for another, bearing that sin and offering absolution as 
Christ. Christ’s work carries on in the practices of the church, carried out by individual 
persons for other individual persons; and in this case, carried out for a friend by a friend.  
This connection between friendship and confession is also present in Bonhoeffer’s 
poem ‘The Friend’. Bonhoeffer wrote the poem to Bethge—the ‘daring, trusting, spirit’—to 
whom Bonhoeffer discloses his sin: 
 
The spirit longs to cleanse itself 
from all hypocrisy 
and trust itself to the other spirit 
totally open, 
bound to that spirit, 
freely and in truth. 
Then, ungrudgingly, he will respond, 
will praise, 
will give thanks, 
will find joy and strength 
in the other spirit.599 
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So for Bonhoeffer, the friend—specifically Bethge—is the one to whom he can speak openly, 
freely, and truthfully: that is, the friend is one to whom things can be disclosed. 
This connection between friendship, disclosure, and confession marks a particularity 
that Bobert-Stützel cannot account for in her allocation of Beichte to the ecclesial relation of 
‘Bruderschaft’ rather than ‘Freundschaft’.600 Bobert-Stützel turns to Bonhoeffer’s comment in 
NL B 11,5 (2)—Hans-Werner Jensen’s unpublished student notes from a lecture by 
Bonhoeffer on pastoral care from 1938-39—where Bonhoeffer says that one goes to God for 
forgiveness, not to a friend.601 Apart from the unreliable provenance of the quotation, even if 
it were genuine, this quote can just as easily be read as a confirmation of the idea that as 
Stellvertreter, a friend acts as God. This would be consistent with seeing this reference in the 
context of Life Together where friendship is ‘multi-faceted’; if one were to simply go to a 
friend instead of a friend acting as God, this would be an ‘unmediated’ relationship, not 
‘spiritual’, and in Bonhoeffer’s mind, inappropriate. 
More importantly, in both the Ettal/Gossner and the prison correspondence—and in 
response to Bobert-Stützel’s argument as a whole—friendship cannot be extricated from 
Bonhoeffer’s confession and allocated to ‘Bruderschaft’ rather than ‘Freundschaft’. Even if 
Bonhoeffer claimed something similar in a lecture, in practice Bonhoeffer is making this 
confession in a letter that is about friendship; friendship, and confession, are intertwined on 
the page. Further, as in both the Ettal/Gossner letters and the prison correspondence, the 
friendship itself intertwined with the trespass, the confession, and its resolution. Bonhoeffer 
could have gone to any other Christian to hear his confession about his tyranny toward 
Bethge; that would be a brother seeking out a brother and a more strictly ecclesiastical and 
‘spiritual’ relationship, and rather than the ‘multi-faceted’ friendship. But as Bonhoeffer puts 
it in Life Together, Beichte is part of finding ‘the presence of God in the reality of the 
other’,602 not a finding of the presence of God despite the reality of the other; Christ’s 
mediation is not the effacement of the one who acts as or with Christ. Bonhoeffer goes to a 
friend to confess how inconsiderate he was to the friend hearing the confession. In this sense, 
the friendship with Bethge was the opportunity for the expression of Bonhoeffer’s tyranny 
and inconsiderateness, and also where this could be addressed. Bethge, as the Christ who 
bears Bonhoeffer’s sin against Bethge himself, does not bear Bonhoeffer’s sin as distant 
bystander. He bears them personally as the friend, and redemptively as a friend forgiving as 
Christ. If the friendship is so closely intertwined with the trespass, the confession, and the 
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absolution, there is no way for Bethge to lay aside his friendship in order to only be a brother 
in Christ. 
And here, Fergus—who sees the mediation of Christ as something that results in the 
healing of relationships—makes better sense than does Green, who sees mediation as a way 
of seeing others. This is not a matter of seeing someone through the eyes of Christ, except 
perhaps as a secondary effect. It is Stellvertretung, Christ acting in or in-between oneself and 
another, where another forgives sin as Christ, with real reconciliation between God and 
human persons taking place because Christ himself is at work in this moment of redemption. 
Nor would Green’s suggestion that Christ was not the mediator in a dispute603 have been 
much consolation to Bethge. They did have disputes, at least in the sense here that Bonhoeffer 
was—in his own words—’tyrannical’ and ‘self-serving’. It was Bonhoeffer’s own sin against 
Bethge that Bonhoeffer brought to confession, and the sin for which he asked forgiveness and 
absolution. ‘Seeing’ Bonhoeffer through the eyes of Christ might be a help, but to act as 
Christ, forgiving and bearing sin in a prayer and absolution as the Christ who forgives and 
bears sin, would be ‘real power’ and a way to reconcile the friend with God and the friend 
with the friend. This was a matter of forgiving concrete sins against the person hearing the 
confession, which may impact one’s vision of another, but renewed vision is not the same as 
Christ’s forgiveness. 
So in both the Ettal/Gossner correspondence and the prison letters, we find evidence 
of Stellvertretung in practice between friends—where the particularity of the friend cannot be 
extricated from the act of Stellvertretung itself—and where Bonhoeffer confesses, and Bethge 
intercedes and forgives; and though Bonhoeffer is in greater need than Bethge for prayer and 
forgiveness, Bonhoeffer saw it as a Stellvertretung that was mutual, expecting Bethge to pray 
for him as he did for Bethge. 
 
5.2.3 Stellvertretung in the Prison Letters Part II: Self-Offering 
 
Alongside the acts of Stellvertretung in friendship seen above, Bonhoeffer also wrote 
to Bethge of his own self-offering. There are a number of ways to understand this more 
general and non-specific ‘act of love’ that Bonhoeffer calls ‘self-renouncing’; in Sanctorum 
Communio Bonhoeffer listed advocacy,604 so we could add, in this category of Stellvertretung 
in friendship, Bonhoeffer’s work in getting, and trying to keep, Bethge’s UK status, the 
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classification that kept Bethge from being conscripted.605 Bonhoeffer also included financial 
offering in that list;606 in addition to shoes and neckties, Bonhoeffer and Bethge shared 
finances, and held goods in common.607 Self-offering was also part of the way Bonhoeffer 
described his reason to return to Germany in 1941. Bethge, however, referring to a letter to 
Reinhold Niebuhr,608 wrote that Bonhoeffer had returned for Germany and his people: ‘[w]hat 
had really caused him […] to return to Germany […] was simply his readiness to recognize 
that he was and would have to remain a German, fully accepting guilt and responsibility’.609 
But Bonhoeffer also gave an additional reason for his return, one that Bethge overlooks. In a 
letter to American ecumenist Henry Smith Leiper, Bonhoeffer wrote that he needed to go 
back for the sake of his friend Bethge, to ‘stand by him and to act with him, or to get him out 
and to share my living with him’.610 So Bonhoeffer’s self-offering, in this case, had a dual 
dimension to it: it was both for Germany, and for Bethge. 
Self-offering is seen again in the friendship letter of 18 November 1943, where 
Bonhoeffer asked for intercession for his ‘tristitia’, and brings us to a more difficult aspect of 
self-renouncing in Bonhoeffer. This ‘tristitia’ is in reference to Bonhoeffer’s thoughts of 
suicide, a subject that Bonhoeffer covered in the Ethics manuscripts.611 There, Bonhoeffer had 
said that suicide is often done out of ‘personal self-interest’.612 But nevertheless, Bonhoeffer 
writes (in a prescient passage): 
 
[If] a prisoner takes his life because he fears that under torture he would betray his 
people, his family, or his friend […] [and] can spare them serious damage by freely 
taking his own life, the self-inflicted death is so strongly subordinate to the motive of 
sacrifice that condemnation of the deed becomes impossible.613  
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In the case, for Bonhoeffer, that killing oneself is a sacrifice for others, it is like the soldier 
who jumps in front of a bullet for another soldier, and judgment should be suspended, even 
though the difference between the use and misuse of this freedom is difficult to perceive and 
‘often barely perceived by the human eye’.614 
Bonhoeffer had clearly thought of suicide in prison, and he admits this to Bethge in 
his letter of 18 November 1944.615 There was a real possibility that to say too much to his 
interrogators would put his brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi, at risk, in prison himself and 
also under interrogation, a risk that would be mitigated if Bonhoeffer were to commit suicide. 
Though Dohnanyi himself had asked Bonhoeffer to ‘plead ignorance and assign all 
responsibility to him’, Bonhoeffer later had to be careful to keep his story on ‘Operation 7’ 
consistent with Dohnanyi’s testimony, and, with regard to a letter found by the Gestapo about 
Dohnanyi’s help in Bonhoeffer avoiding military service, had to avoid giving his interrogators 
evidence that would lead to Dohnanyi’s death sentence for ‘undermining Germany’s 
defences’.616 To say the wrong thing could also put Bethge’s freedom at risk, as Bethge was 
also under suspicion for ties with the Bonhoeffers, and had been imprisoned just a few weeks 
before, and interrogated a few weeks later.617 Similarly, Bethge had put himself at risk for 
Bonhoeffer during the interrogations when he falsely claimed that he did not recognise 
Bonhoeffer’s signature on an incriminating document.618 And Bonhoeffer himself, in his 
poem ‘The Friend’, called friendship something that could, ‘if needs be’, lead a friend to 
‘sacrifice their life’s blood’.619 So the thought of dying at his own hand in order to save 
others, as he faced interrogation himself, was not a distant one.  
Though Bonhoeffer did decide that he was not in the position to sacrifice himself in 
this way,620 he was thinking of it in similar terms to his return to Germany. In both cases, self-
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offering was not reducible to a personal good. There is personal good and benefit, in that a 
friend benefits from the sacrificial offering of the friend; but here, self-sacrifice as an act of 
love is implicated in the world which the friendship inhabits. To return to Germany was both 
‘for Germany’ and ‘for Bethge’, which led to a situation in which Bonhoeffer was 
contemplating suicide, a suicide that would save the friend with whom he was politically 
implicated. To kill himself, then, would have been, again, for Bethge and for the Germany he 
was, through conspiracy, hoping to preserve from the ills of National Socialism under Hitler. 
 
*** 
 
In the evidence from the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, as seen in the Ettal/Gossner 
and prison correspondence, we see Bonhoeffer causing Bethge suffering; we see friendship 
understood in terms of God’s glory, where friendship endures eschatologically before the 
throne of God, an eschatological glory that shapes the practice of friendship in the present. 
We also see evidence of repentance, intercession, forgiveness, and self-offering. This 
correspondence, then, describes both the acts of love and repentance that are described in 
Sanctorum Communio and the ongoing redemptive work of Gemeinde as it’s found in 
Discipleship, making this friendship one of the ways God had acted redemptively in the 
world.  
This evidence also leads to four conclusions. First, Stellvertretung can be mutual and 
reciprocal. I pointed out in Chapter 4 that Stellvertretung in the Ethics is where it was 
described by Bonhoeffer in terms of ‘above and below’ and as non-reciprocal; but Bonhoeffer 
thinks about acts of love and repentance, in his friendship with Bethge, in terms of mutuality. 
Bonhoeffer’s request for prayer—as a way to be repentant, and to seek intercession and 
forgiveness—was something he expected Bethge to do for him as well. Even if we were to 
look at Bethge’s intercession for Bonhoeffer, Bethge is implicated through his own need to 
intercede for the sake of the well-being of the friendship of which he is a part.621 In this sense, 
it is not a symmetrical reciprocity, but there is an offering on both sides: a request for the 
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healing of the friendship through repentance, and an offering of forgiveness that is healing; 
the intercession, in this way, is of benefit to both.  
Secondly, there is an irreducible particularity in play in these examples of 
Stellvertretung in practice: each of them takes place in the particular context of a friendship. 
Stellvertretung—as intercession, absolution, repentance, and self-offering—was not, here, to 
act for a stranger at a distance, nor does the friend and the friendship become spectral in order 
that Christ can become real. The friendship was the opportunity for Bonhoeffer’s temper to 
rise, and where Bonhoeffer’s behaviour tested Bethge’s forbearance; it was where Bonhoeffer 
showed his repentance; it was the context of the prayer that Bonhoeffer associates with his 
repentance. Bonhoeffer does not go to someone removed from what Bonhoeffer needed to 
confess, or ask for intercession from someone removed from what needs prayer. Bonhoeffer 
goes to his friend, Bethge, a person who is party to the confession, and to the prayer that 
comes as a result, and the sin Bonhoeffer confessed. Bethge’s faithfulness and suffering, and 
Bonhoeffer’s temper and disclosure, are each part of the resolution of that anger through 
Bethge’s prayer, and each known in the context of friendship. Their self-offering was made or 
contemplated for the sake of another known in particular ways; Bonhoeffer returned to 
Germany and sought out Bethge’s UK status so their friendship could flourish; as a result, 
Bethge was drawn more deeply into the conspiracy, a conspiracy that meant they put 
themselves at risk—or in Bonhoeffer’s case, contemplated suicide—for the sake of a friend 
with whom that conspiracy was shared. Thus, as Bethge intercedes and forgives, and as 
Bonhoeffer repents and offers himself, they do so as a friend who is acting to preserve the 
friendship to which they belong, or in order to save the friend with whom he is politically 
involved, and where God is found in the reality of the friend.  
Thirdly, the friendship was political, in that it was significant for the social and 
political world in which it was situated. Bonhoeffer returned from New York both ‘for 
Bethge’ and ‘for Germany’, and Bonhoeffer considered suicide for his friend and for the sake 
of the Germany he sought to save from Hitler and National Socialism. Friendship, understood 
through these kinds of self-sacrificial love, is something that cannot be simply personal 
because the act for the friend and the act for others beyond the friendship cannot be extricated 
one from the other. To act for the friend, in this instance, was to act for others beyond the 
friendship; and to act for others beyond the friendship was to act for the friend. 
But eschatology, mutuality, particularity and politics are not the only ways to 
understand friendship in Bonhoeffer’s life and practice. Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship 
with Rößler included a shared intellectual life; this is something we can also see in 
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Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge in a shared counsel that will again be understood as 
freedom. 
 
5.3 BONHOEFFER AND BETHGE’S FRIENDSHIP AS DIALOGICAL 
 
In Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘The Friend’, the stanza about the longing for cleansing and 
trust—a cleansing and trust that took place, in part, in Bonhoeffer’s confession and Bethge’s 
absolution—is immediately followed by a stanza about ‘counsel’: 
 
Even under severe pressure 
and strong rebuke 
he willingly submits. 
Not by command, nor by alien laws and doctrines, 
but by good and earnest counsel, 
which liberates, 
the mature man seeks  
from the true friend. 
Far or near 
in success and in failure,  
the one recognizes in the other 
the true helper 
towards freedom 
and humanity.622 
 
‘Counsel’ is the first way to describe Bethge’s influence upon Bonhoeffer, a counsel that 
influences through Bethge’s ability to clarify Bonhoeffer’s thinking. De Gruchy calls Bethge 
Bonhoeffer’s sounding board and clarifier;623 Schlingensiepen writes that ‘Bethge had a 
capacity to enter into Bonhoeffer’s thinking, and to draw him out by means of questions, 
which Bonhoeffer found extraordinarily stimulating and which had a generally positive effect 
on the studies at Finkenwalde’.624 Bethge, too, while making his own independent 
contributions, would find his theological conversations with Bonhoeffer enriching his own 
theological thinking. But there is more going on here than counsel and dialogue: Bonhoeffer, 
in the poem, also makes connections between friendship, counsel, and freedom.  
The importance of shared counsel to the Bethge-Bonhoeffer friendship appears in the 
same Ettal/Gossner birthday exchange where we found evidence of Stellvertretung. In that 
correspondence, Bethge wished Bonhoeffer ‘success in articulating your new insights’625 and 
                                                            
622 Robertson’s translation as found in Hauerwas, ‘“The Friend”’, p. 97. 
623 De Gruchy, ‘Interpreter Extraordinaire’, pp. 352-53. 
624 Schlingensiepen, Bonhoeffer, pp. 179-80. 
625 DBW/E 16:1/67, 123/134. 
  159 
thanks him for his ‘intellectual and spiritual generosity and partnership’.626 This counsel, for 
Bethge, is summative of his good wishes and thanks: Bethge asked, ‘[h]ow shall I 
summarize? [With the] secure feeling of knowing someone with whom counsel and solutions 
are to be found in all circumstances.’627 Even as he thanked Bonhoeffer for counsel, Bethge 
anticipated that his sentiments would encourage a response from Bonhoeffer: ‘Of course, you 
will think this is formulated much too broadly’.628 So for Bethge, an important part of his 
friendship with Bonhoeffer included hope for Bonhoeffer’s own continued theological 
development, an appreciation of Bonhoeffer’s own counsel, and the expectation that even this 
hope and appreciation would take part in their ongoing exchange. 
In the letter Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge on that same day, Bonhoeffer reflected 
Bethge’s sentiments. Bonhoeffer wrote that Bethge knew him ‘both objectively and 
personally’, that the connection between them, in ‘work and in friendship’, was ‘a rather 
extraordinary joy for a human life’, and a connection that took form in Bethge being 
Bonhoeffer’s ‘faithful helper and advisor’.629 Bonhoeffer wrote: ‘in countless questions you 
have decisively helped me by your greater clarity and simplicity of thought and judgment’.630 
For Bonhoeffer, the friendship came with Bethge’s counsel and Bethge’s ability to help 
clarify his thinking. So for both of them, the friendship was one of shared counsel and critical 
conversation. 
In the prison correspondence, the dialogical aspects of the friendship between 
Bonhoeffer and Bethge are made clearer. Their shared intellectual life included Bethge’s 
truthfulness with Bonhoeffer; we can see this in the way Bonhoeffer relied on Bethge for 
practical counsel about the way his future vocation might be affected by his connection to the 
Military Intelligence Office. Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge:  
 
You are absolutely the only person with whom I can discuss this question for the time 
being, and if permission to visit is ever granted, perhaps we can talk about it. Give this 
some thought and please tell me the truth.631 
 
This telling of the truth was described by Bonhoeffer through the analogy of a water-
purifying plant. According to Bonhoeffer, by telling the truth, Bethge clarified his thinking: 
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If you had been here, Eberhard, you would have been the only one who would have 
done your duty as a friend and told me the truth. Tomorrow or the day after, so I am 
told, I will be able to talk to you. For the first time in nine months, I will be allowed to 
speak and hear the complete truth. […] Aren’t there such things as purification plants 
near lakes?—you are aware of my ignorance of technical matters—but such things do 
exist, and this is what you are for me.632 
 
Bethge was happy to play this role, writing to Bonhoeffer: as he put it, ‘I would have liked so 
much to be your “spiritual clarification plant”’.633 
This truthfulness in counsel was something that Bonhoeffer associated with their 
friendship. Bonhoeffer, for example, called their ‘spiritual companionship’ one of 
‘intellectual-spiritual kinship’;634 and in ‘The Friend’, the stanzas on disclosure and counsel 
were preceded by one that makes a connection between counsel and friendship clear: 
 
Then when the spirit moves a man 
to great, serene, audacious thoughts 
of heart and mind, 
he may look the world in the face 
with clear eyes and open countenance; 
then, if action is joined to the spirit 
—by which alone it stands or falls— 
from this action,  
sound and strong, 
the work grows, 
giving content to thought and meaning 
to the life of the man; 
then the active, lonely man 
longs for 
the befriending, understanding spirit of another. 
Like a clear, fresh flow of water, 
in which the spirit cleanses itself from the dust of the day, 
cooled from the burning heat, 
strengthened in the hour of tiredness— 
like a fortress, to which after the dangers of battle 
the spirit retires 
to find safety, comfort and strength— 
such is the friend to the friend.635 
 
‘Cleansing’, above, was related to disclosure and trust; here, the cleansing takes place through 
the Bethge, who ‘[l]ike a clear fresh flow of water’, gives ‘content’ to the ‘thought and 
meaning’ of Bonhoeffer’s own ‘great, serene, and audacious thoughts’. So ‘counsel’ was a 
kind of conversation that clarified his ideas.  
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Counsel, in this sense, is more than offering guidance in practical life decisions, it is 
related to theological clarity, and the degree to which Bonhoeffer was a theologian who relied 
on friendship in order to carry out his own theological work. For a time, Hildebrandt had done 
some of this work for Bonhoeffer, as had Rößler, in his own way, until 1935; but by the time 
of Bonhoeffer’s imprisonment, Bethge had become Bonhoeffer’s primary theological 
interlocutor.636 Bonhoeffer, in a letter exploring some of his thoughts on the ‘world come of 
age’, ended with a hope that Bethge could fulfill this role in the future: 
 
Forgive me, this is all still put terribly clumsily and badly; I’m very aware of this. But 
perhaps you are just the one to help me again to clarify and simplify it, if only by my 
being able to tell you about it, and to hear you, as it were, keep asking and answering 
me!637  
 
Bonhoeffer would echo this statement about Bethge’s ability to clarify his thinking in his 
outline for a book he was preparing: there were problems that arose, for Bonhoeffer—related 
to being a ‘“modern” theologian who has nevertheless inherited the legacy of liberal 
theology’—to which only Bethge could provide ‘clarifying conversation’.638 For Bethge, too, 
Bonhoeffer’s letters were stimulating, and part of his own way of seeing things anew: ‘[a]ny 
letter from you is an event and gives rise to a host of questions, brings me to new stimuli and 
new ways of seeing things’.639 So this part of their intellectual life was mutual, and their 
theological conversation was one of reciprocal enrichment and influence. 
The dialogical nature of their friendship, and the way that this contributed to 
Bonhoeffer’s own theological work, is especially evident in the epistolary conversation 
between them about the Spielraum. In Chapter 4, the concept of the Spielraum—and 
friendship’s place in it—formed part of a trajectory in Bonhoeffer’s political and social 
thought; but the idea itself came out of a conversation with Bethge about friendship that 
began with a discussion about necessity, and Bethge’s visit to Bonhoeffer in prison on 23 
December 1943. After the visit, Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge: 
 
There is a spiritual hunger for discussion that is much more tormenting than physical 
hunger, and I can speak in that way and about certain things with no one else but you. 
Entire complexes of questions are opened and clarified in a few words and hints. Our 
attunement, our familiarity with each other, achieved by years of not always 
frictionless practice, is something we must never lose. It is an unbelievable advantage 
and an extraordinary help.640 
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The visit was needed because Bonhoeffer relied so much on Bethge’s conversational practice 
in order to clarify his own thinking. But when Bethge does what Bonhoeffer hopes he will 
do—and asks a question that clarifies what necessitas means—the conversation turns to the 
difference between marriage and friendship. Marriage, not friendship, writes Bethge, ‘gets the 
outward consideration and recognition. Everyone, in this case the whole family, must take it 
into account and thinks it right that much has to be done, and should be done, on behalf of a 
married couple’.641  
Bethge is drawing on his experience of the Bonhoeffer family, who did not feel 
compelled to share Bonhoeffer’s letters with him, though they did share the letters with 
Bonhoeffer’s fiancée and brother. ‘It’s taken for granted’, wrote Bethge, ‘that your letters are 
passed to Maria, and almost as much that they go to Karl-Friedrich, but it takes an extra 
struggle for me to get them as well’.642 Bonhoeffer may claim that his friendship with Bethge 
was necessary for his own well-being, but his family did not agree. ‘Friendship, even when 
it’s so exclusive and includes all of each other’s goods, as it is with us, doesn’t have any 
“necessitas”’,643 counters Bethge.  
This lack of recognition of friendship’s necessitas outside the friendship itself led 
Bethge to say: 
 
Friendship is completely determined and sustained by its own inner content, and only 
this keeps it in existence. Marriage doesn’t have to be any more than just that; it is 
sustained by the formal recognition it enjoys […] But even this [separation from 
Renate Schleicher, Bethge’s fiancée, on account of military service] still has the effect 
that the family thinks about things for the sake of the marriage, while no one has yet 
given any serious thought to how it might be made possible for you and me to do our 
service together.644 
 
Friendship, in the direction that Bethge developed it, has its own inner content. For Bethge, it 
is also private good governed by its own internal quality rather than regulated or supported by 
norms exterior to the friendship itself. 
Bethge’s claim, in turn, prompted a response from Bonhoeffer, who was not content to 
leave the discussion there; Bethge may think of friendship as a private good; but for 
Bonhoeffer, friendship has a place in the larger social and political world. First, Bonhoeffer 
differentiates friendship from other relationships as a way to discover in which social sphere 
friendship might belong: 
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In relation to this, I find that what you say about friendship–that unlike marriage and 
family relationships, it doesn’t enjoy any generally recognized rights but depends 
entirely on its own inherent quality–is a very good observation. It is indeed not easy to 
classify friendship sociologically. It probably must be understood as a concept 
subsumed within culture and education, whereas brotherhood falls within the concept 
of church and comradeship within the concepts of work and politics.645 
 
In response to Bethge, Bonhoeffer accounts for friendship ‘as a concept subsumed within 
culture and education’ and governed by a necessitas that is not accountable to external 
ordering in the same way that the divine mandates are, as something that belongs in a social 
sphere that transcends its own inner quality; and at this point, we come to der Spielraum der 
Freiheit:  
 
Marriage, work, state, and church each have their concrete divine mandates, but what 
about culture and education? I don’t think they can simply be classified under work, as 
tempting as that would be in many ways. They belong not in the sphere of obedience 
but rather in the sphere of freedom [Spielraum], which encompasses all three spheres 
of the divine mandates.646  
 
Where Bonhoeffer lands, at the end of the conversation with Bethge on friendship, is 
friendship as a political and social phenomenon that is part of a sphere of freedom, the 
Spielraum that, in the previous chapter, I showed to be a solution to longstanding concerns in 
Bonhoeffer’s political and social theology. My point, here, is that it was Bethge’s independent 
interjections that led to Bonhoeffer clarifying his ideas, and his most mature thoughts on 
friendship as a reparative social and political phenomenon. 
In addition to what was said in Chapter 4 about the Spielraum’s theological content, 
the Spielraum conversation also reveals one of the forms of Bonhoeffer’s theological 
development. The Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship was one that included theological counsel 
and clarification, and where friendship was integral to Bethge’s influence on the development 
of Bonhoeffer’s theological ideas; similarly, Bethge’s own thinking is enriched by 
Bonhoeffer’s responses. They both thought of friendship as the place where they could speak 
truthfully to one another, and to seek the other’s counsel in the form of theological 
interjections and clarifications; thus, the friendship was one of mutual influence. Further, the 
content of the Spielraum conversation reflects its form: the friend’s theological counsel and 
clarification—a counsel that, in the poem ‘The Friend’, Bonhoeffer describes as another way 
in which the friend is a helper towards freedom—led to Bonhoeffer’s concept of a sphere of 
freedom in which friendship was its representative form of sociality. 
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Not long after this conversation and the writing of the friendship poem, Bonhoeffer 
was moved out of Tegel prison and subsequently executed at Flossenbürg. While this would 
inevitably mark the end of the theological conversation between Bonhoeffer and Bethge, it 
did not signal the end Bethge’s role as Bonhoeffer’s clarifier, a role that Bethge would 
associate with his friendship with Bonhoeffer, becoming for us another way to speak of their 
mutual influence upon one another.  
 
5.4  BETHGE AFTER BONHOEFFER 
 
During the struggle to end Apartheid, Bethge visited South Africa in order to give 
public lectures and seminars on Bonhoeffer’s life and thought. De Gruchy recounts Bethge’s 
visit in the following way:  
 
As we listened to Bethge’s lectures on Bonhoeffer during his visit […] in 1973, it 
became increasingly obvious how relevant Bonhoeffer’s life and thought is for our 
situation today. Some laymen who attended a seminar on Bonhoeffer, but who had no 
previous knowledge of him, innocently required: ‘When did Bonhoeffer visit South 
Africa? He knows our situation from the inside!’647 
 
For de Gruchy, this was, in part, a moment when South African Christians came to see the 
importance of Bonhoeffer for South Africa: ‘there is a sense in which he has visited us and 
spoken to our situation’, he writes of Bonhoeffer, ‘through his own writings and witness’.648 
De Gruchy describes this as a necessary recontextualisation of Bonhoeffer’s thought, because 
being true to Bonhoeffer’s legacy would mean allowing Bonhoeffer to speak to such things as 
Apartheid in South Africa, post-war theological dialogues on the Holocaust, and questions of 
racism.649 As de Gruchy puts it, to be true to Bonhoeffer’s legacy meant ‘engaging in the 
ongoing church and political struggles that followed the end of the war’;650 and de Gruchy’s 
essay on Bethge’s visit catalogues the numerous ways that Bonhoeffer’s legacy spoke to 
South Africa and its struggle with Apartheid.651 
This recontextualisation, however, needed an interpreter. Bethge had already been 
doing something similar during Bonhoeffer’s life, through the way his interjections and 
interlocutions helped Bonhoeffer clarify his thinking. While Bonhoeffer’s letters showed an 
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appreciation of Bethge’s friendship as a relation in which acts of love and repentance can take 
place, Bethge had placed more of an emphasis on friendship’s association with theological 
dialogue; as I point out above, while Bonhoeffer wrote his letter of confession from Ettal, 
Bethge was writing a letter to wish Bonhoeffer ‘success in articulating […] new insights’652 
and thanking him for his ‘intellectual and spiritual generosity and partnership’.653 It was this 
role that Bethge continued, doing so by speaking for Bonhoeffer and to his theology after 
Bonhoeffer’s death. 
Initially, Bethge was more willing to downplay his part in understanding and knowing 
Bonhoeffer’s theological thoughts and directions. Others, like de Gruchy at the time of the 
South Africa lectures, made a connection that Bethge was initially unwilling to make; for de 
Gruchy, learning about Bonhoeffer and his potential contribution to South Africa’s struggle 
with Apartheid was a moment which could not be neatly distinguished from Bethge’s 
contribution. De Gruchy’s Bonhoeffer was one introduced to South Africa ‘through his close 
friend and interpreter, Eberhard Bethge’.654 But while Bethge did rely on his personal 
knowledge and time with Bonhoeffer for much of the biography, he was initially more 
comfortable in treating the Bonhoeffer-Barth friendship as paradigmatic, describing it in the 
biography according to the stages of Bonhoeffer and Barth’s theological conversations, 
disagreements, and disputes.655 So for Bethge the biographer, theological friendship included 
rigorous theological conversation; but the one he preferred to refer to in this light was not his 
own, but Barth’s. 
Not long after the biography, however, the stakes in who was able to best interpret 
Bonhoeffer were higher; as I point out in the thesis introduction, Bonhoeffer had been 
deployed in a number of theologies that Bethge thought were not appropriately representative 
of Bonhoeffer’s thought. Part of this had to do with Bonhoeffer’s place in the politics of pre-
war Germany; Bethge, in relation to this, took part in the increasingly important renegotiation 
of Jewish-Christian relations after the Shoah, working at re-interpreting Bonhoeffer in this 
light.656  
For de Gruchy, Bethge’s role as interpreter was in addition to his friendship with 
Bonhoeffer. For de Gruchy, ‘Bethge was far more than friend, and more than editor of 
Bonhoeffer’s works; he was also the major interpreter of his legacy, an interpreter 
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extraordinaire’.657 But for Bethge, in the lectures given in South Africa, he spoke not as 
though his role as interpreter was something in addition to being Bonhoeffer’s friend; Bethge 
thought of himself as someone best suited to interpret Bonhoeffer because of his friendship 
with Bonhoeffer. So, when the time came for Bethge to defend his interpretation of 
Bonhoeffer’s theological legacy in those lectures, he specifically referred to his friendship 
with Bonhoeffer as the reason for his own hermeneutical priority. Speaking on the contested 
meaning of the prison literature, Bethge asked:  
 
To whom did he write? […] Bonhoeffer did not send the letters and the outline of his 
manuscript to the world at large, nor even to his Church; he shared his thoughts with a 
theological friend in the Confessing Church […] what we have was addressed to a 
very limited circle of people who understood his intentions.658  
 
For Bethge, there are some who do understand Bonhoeffer and his intentions, and they are 
Bonhoeffer’s friends in the church, the ones who knew Bonhoeffer personally. And this 
friendship, according to Bethge, offers a unique insight into both the life and the theology of 
his subject. So Bethge’s interpretation of Bonhoeffer was part of being a friend to Bonhoeffer; 
rather than interpretation being something he did in addition to his friendship, friendship—
including the way Bethge critically evaluated and independently engaged with Bonhoeffer’s 
thinking—was integral and part of the interpretation itself. 
This claim about special knowledge of Bonhoeffer is a contentious one for Bethge to 
make. Bonhoeffer himself claimed the opposite about himself in his poem ‘Who Am I?’, 
where he asks, ‘[a]m I really what others say of me? Or am I only what I know of myself?’ 
These are unanswered questions for Bonhoeffer, but for one exception: ‘[w]hoever I am, thou 
knowest me; O God, I am thine!’ But Bethge’s claim is germane to the subject matter at hand. 
What Bethge claims, here, is that on account of his friendship with Bonhoeffer, in 
Bonhoeffer’s absence he can stand in for him as the person best able to interpret the work of a 
friend.  
So Bethge continued in the role of clarifier of Bonhoeffer’s thoughts, but in a new 
post-war context that Bonhoeffer would not know. Upon Bonhoeffer’s death, Bethge stood in 
Bonhoeffer’s place and re-interpreted his work according to a new time, a new context, and 
new theological need. But this ‘standing in’ for Bonhoeffer was not a repetition of 
Bonhoeffer’s thinking; it depended on Bethge’s ability to make his own critical judgments 
about Bonhoeffer’s work. While it would be a stretch to claim the same redemptive 
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possibilities for this work, Bethge, as Bonhoeffer’s friend, does act as Bonhoeffer’s 
Stellvertreter in this way as well, accomplishing something that Bonhoeffer could no longer 
do on his own.  
In the way Bethge stood in for Bonhoeffer, this kind of theological representation of a 
friend for a friend becomes a final way to speak of friendship for others. Bonhoeffer, in this 
sense, continues to enrich Bethge’s thinking, and Bonhoeffer’s thinking continues to be 
clarified; so despite Bonhoeffer’s death, both Bonhoeffer and Bethge continue to influence 
one another. Further to this ongoing mutuality—and by virtue of their friendship—Bethge 
also critically interprets and reinterprets Bonhoeffer for others; and Bethge did so for 
Christians renegotiating Christian antisemitism after the Shoah and for the anti-Apartheid 
movement in South Africa. In this way, through the theology that arose out of the friendship, 
the friendship was not simply for the sake of the friends, the friendship contributed to a 
political good beyond itself, making the friendship for others as well. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The friendship between Bonhoeffer and Bethge serves as the best example of 
friendship, in all its forms, that I have put forward so far: the friendship was lasting, 
dialogical, redemptive, and for others. 
This friendship was lasting in a number of ways. It was a friendship that was resilient, 
in part on account of Bethge’s patience. More important to my argument here, however, is 
that it was lasting and resilient on account of the practice of Stellvertretung. For Bonhoeffer to 
offer himself to Bethge by advocating for him meant that they could continue to be nearby to 
one another. And for Bonhoeffer to be repentant, and for Bethge to intercede and to forgive, 
meant that there were avenues of reparation available to them.  
As Stellvertretung, however, this was more than taking practical steps to remain near 
to one another and in good standing with each other. It was a friendship that survived 
Bonhoeffer’s death in the way Bethge continued in his role as Bonhoeffer’s ‘clarifier’, and as 
Bonhoeffer’s intellectual Stellvertreter, Bethge took Bonhoeffer’s place and represented 
Bonhoeffer theologically for others. Finally, the friendship lasted with reference to the 
eschaton. Stellvertretung meant acting for one another as Christ; it was a reparation that was 
part of Christ’s ministry of reconciliation. In Sanctorum Communio reconciliation was 
described as proleptic, in that Christ’s presence to another was a re-ordering of relationships 
in the present according to an eschatological future, where social phenomena like friendships 
experience everlasting life. So for Bonhoeffer to imagine himself with Bethge ‘before the 
  168 
throne of God’ makes sense; this was a vision of God’s eschatological future, in which he 
finds an image of a friendship enduring eschatologically. In this way, the condition that made 
the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship destructible—its lack of a shared orientation to Christ and 
his new creation—is present in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, both through 
Stellvertretung as a mode of Christ’s eschatological prolepsis, and through its orientation to 
its eschatological form. 
It was a friendship that was dialogical. Each of them found the friendship to be 
beneficial, and as such was one of the ways the friendship was mutual and reciprocal, and part 
of the way they influenced one another’s theology; the result of their theological dialogue was 
that Bethge could continue as the friend best able to critically evaluate and interpret 
Bonhoeffer, a role that depended on their established practice of critical conversation. It was, 
in a way, much like Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Rößler: Bonhoeffer was a theologian who 
was habitually honing and developing his theology through others, even—and perhaps 
especially—through disagreements, like the one with Rößler over political eschatology and 
the one with Bethge over the social and political significance of friendship. 
But in Bethge’s case, as opposed to Rößler’s, the friendship was lasting on account of 
Stellvertretung and its ability to make a friendship resilient. But the resiliency and enduring 
nature of the friendship was a result of a Stellvertretung that was redemptive. In 
Stellvertretung, Bethge was the friend who bore Bonhoeffer’s sin and forgave as Christ; 
similarly, Bonhoeffer was the friend who offered himself to his friend as Christ. The ministry 
taking place here, in Stellvertretung, was Christ’s ministry of reconciliation: of Bonhoeffer 
and Bethge to one another, and the both of them to God. 
To see this friendship in terms of Stellvertretung is also a way to speak of agency. As 
Bethge intercedes and forgives and as Bonhoeffer repents and offers himself, they do so in a 
way that takes into account the particularity of their situation. Bonhoeffer repented of specific 
sins against Bethge, and Bethge responded to those particular sins in counsel, intercession, 
and forgiveness; Bonhoeffer offered himself according to Bethge’s relative need and 
according to a particular ethical dilemma engendered by a particular political situation. Thus, 
ecclesial Stellvertretung is not a rote repetition, but demanded a contextual creativity that 
arose out their particular situations. Because these are acts of theological Stellvertretung, it is 
a mode of God’s work in the world; thus Stellvertretung offers one way to speak of divine and 
human agency interacting in non-competitive ways.  
The correspondence offers a word of caution, however, and the point about non-
competition could be pressed too far. Bonhoeffer, after all, decided that to kill himself would 
have been a selfish thing to do, rather than it being something he would do for others; and, as 
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he describes this kind of offering in the Ethics, he says that such cases of death could not be 
clearly seen as self-offering, because the nature of such acts are inscrutable, being an 
expression of both self-interest and sacrifice. Nevertheless, in both Sanctorum Communio and 
in Discipleship Bonhoeffer does not see the need to qualify Stellvertretung by saying that 
human agency is a contaminating factor in acting as Christ for another. If Christ does not 
mediate, the relation between human and divine agency becomes a much different question; 
but what Bonhoeffer’s reluctance to qualify Stellvertretung in Sanctorum Communio and 
Discipleship means is that under certain circumstances—in the church, for example—when 
one intercedes, forgives, and offers oneself for others, human agency is not a competitive or 
contaminating factor. 
The question of mixed motivation in acts of love brings us back to the question of 
inappropriate expressions of love in friendship. As I pointed out in the introduction and in the 
conclusion to Chapter 2, in Augustinian understandings of friendship-love such as 
Meilaender’s, creaturely love can be exercised in inappropriate ways. For Meilaender, 
friendship-love is inappropriate because it is a preferential love for a particular other rather 
than a universal love, or a love that is reciprocal and thus demanding a return. I have already 
pointed out that even if it is particular, it need not be lesser than a universal love; to love a 
particular other is simply the creaturely way of loving as Christ. And, to say that this kind of 
love is reciprocal, is not to say that love is demanded in return and a way to undermine the 
greater love of someone for their own sake. If it is Christ who is active in the act of love, it 
can only be reciprocal or mutual by way of trust, because God cannot be compelled. For 
Bonhoeffer, creaturely love is inappropriate not when it is particular or mutual, but when that 
love is unmediated by Christ. In this way, if the love is one in which a person is Christ for 
another—in theological Stellvertretung—it is appropriately creaturely and divine. And we see 
this in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship: a love of a particular other, marked by a complex 
reciprocity and mutuality, but one that is mediated by Christ in theological Stellvertretung. 
The friendship was also for others. Again, here, any strict differentiation between 
social forms that have utility in the present, and social forms that are ends in themselves and 
therefore open to God’s purposes, does not make sense of the evidence. We already saw that 
any strict differentiation between utility and eschatological ends was difficult to apply to the 
Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship: Bonhoeffer and Rößler did not share the same eschatological 
hope, which meant that the friendship could not share a degree of political utility, and come to 
common agreement about what ethical and political decisions were most appropriate for the 
present.  
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And, like the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship, the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship was 
implicated in the political tumult of the time. But in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship we find 
practices of Stellvertretung—specifically Bonhoeffer’s self-offering for Bethge—in which the 
friend, as he acts for the friend, is simultaneously acting for others. In this way, 
Stellvertretung itself has political and social dimensions to it. Thus Stellvertretung—as a 
friend acting as Christ for a friend sacrificially, and where that acting for the friend is at the 
same time acting for others—God, in Christ, is at work in the world, in the church, and in 
political life. Further, this offering of oneself to the friend, and others, as Christ—if it meets 
the conditions of theological Stellvertretung—is a way that God redeems the world, making 
friendship the kind of relation in which God, too, is acting for the friend, for others, and for 
the political and social world in which the friendship finds itself.  
The final point to make, in conclusion, has to do with the Spielraum: it is no wonder 
that Bonhoeffer’s concept of the Spielraum could arise out of a conversation with Bethge. 
First, the Spielraum was a sphere of freedom, and in Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge, he 
found freedom in two ways. Bonhoeffer and Bethge, together, were Stellvertreter to one 
another, and this Stellvertretung arose from Christ’s mediation, a mediation that sets a person 
free; and, this practice of Stellvertretung included offering truthful counsel, a counsel that was 
also freeing, for Bonhoeffer. Secondly, the Spielraum spoke of friendship as a reparative 
practice that brought a lived comprehensiveness to the social and political world more 
generally, and thus as a social phenomena that took part in a good that reaches beyond the 
friendship itself. Similarly, as Bonhoeffer acted for Bethge in self-offering, he was offering 
himself for a good that reached beyond the friendship, making this friendship, like friendship 
in the Spielraum, a friendship for others.
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The theological and biographical resources investigated here—beginning with Sanctorum 
Communio, moving to Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Rößler, then to Bonhoeffer’s final words 
on the mandates and their relation to friendship in the Spielraum, and ending with 
Bonhoeffer’s friendship with Bethge—offer the following summary conclusions, both of 
them breaking ground in Bonhoeffer studies, and with regard to the theological significance 
of the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship. 
First, Stellvertretung is appropriate to friendship, and a friend can be Stellvertreter for 
a friend. Sanctorum Communio offered the conceptual possibility that, in Bonhoeffer’s way of 
thinking, theological Stellvertretung can take place in an ecclesially grounded friendship. The 
best evidence of this possibility was that, in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, we see 
evidence of each of the acts of love and repentance that are listed in Sanctorum Communio. 
Further, the acts of love and friendship found in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship cannot be 
understood apart from the friendship itself for two reasons: 1. Because of the inextricable link 
between what took place in the friendship, the friends’ investment in the friendship, and the 
acts of love and repentance that brought healing and reconciliation to the friends; and 2. The 
acts of love and repentance were characterised by that which makes friendship a distinctive 
social relation, mutuality and particularity. 
Secondly, friendship can be for others. Friendship, as significant to the political and 
social world in which it is situated, first becomes clear in the way Bonhoeffer treated his 
friendship with Rößler as one in which some degree of shared conviction was necessary; and 
then, in the concept of the Spielraum, we find Bonhoeffer thinking of friendship as a relation 
that takes part in the reparation of the whole of the political and social world of the mandates. 
Finally, we see that friendship can be for others in the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship in two 
ways. 1. The friendship was one in which the practice of Stellvertretung, as self-offering, 
meant that as Bonhoeffer acted for Bethge, he was also acting for others as well; and 2. The 
friendship’s ecclesial location meant that they were able to share in the practices of 
Stellvertretung that made it lasting in a way that the Bonhoeffer-Rößler friendship was not: in 
addition to being lasting during their lives, and thus open to its eschatological enduring, the 
friendship lasted in the mid-term. After Bonhoeffer’s death, but before Bethge’s, and on 
account of their friendship, Bethge was able to represent and stand in for Bonhoeffer 
theologically for South Africa and for Christians and Jews after the Shoah. In this way, for 
Bethge to act for Bonhoeffer, in friendship, was to act for others as well. 
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These conclusions, as they relate to the material as a whole, also offer a number of 
future possibilities for Bonhoeffer studies, readings of Bethge’s theology, and for theology 
more generally. With regard to Bonhoeffer studies, as early as Sanctorum Communio, 
Bonhoeffer was developing a theology of friendship in Hegelian terms such as ‘objective 
spirit’; and late in his thought, Bonhoeffer spoke of friendship as a practice of freedom, which 
has pedigree in Hegel’s understanding of friendship as the ‘concrete concept of freedom’ in 
Philosophy and Right. Bonhoeffer also makes links between friendship and Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetics, and to Stifter’s fiction, in his prison letters. Friendship was a significant theme in 
Bonhoeffer’s fiction as well.659 This makes Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship part of a 
longer and larger history of philosophical and literary reception that would be of interest to 
both Bonhoeffer studies, and the topic of friendship as a philosophical, aesthetic and literary 
category.  
While this work has relied heavily on Bonhoeffer’s theological resources, it has also 
relied on Bethge’s own letters and theological work in order to more fully consider the 
manner of Bonhoeffer and Bethge’s mutual influence. There is much more that could be done 
on this account, however, especially regarding Bethge’s independent theological voice. Once 
Bethge’s personal correspondence is made more readily available for research, a deeper 
investigation into Bethge’s own theological development—both on his own and in relation to 
Bonhoeffer—would be more easily accomplished.  
As for theology beyond Bonhoeffer studies, particularity and mutuality, as they inform 
the practice of Stellvertretung, also open up certain possibilities for the doctrine of redemption 
that could be explored further. God’s redemption of the world in Christ is accomplished, for 
Bonhoeffer, in a way that human persons cannot do so on their own. In the way redemption is 
something offered to all, it is necessarily for more than a particular other; and in the way it is 
something that persons cannot do on their own, it is necessarily non-reciprocal. God does not 
only save some particular others, nor is salvation something we can offer to God. But 
redemption also takes place, for Bonhoeffer, in ongoing form in the church and in the world, 
and this makes for additional creaturely possibilities. Creaturely limit means that this kind of 
Stellvertretung will be limited to some particular others. And though parental relationships 
may repeat the pattern of ‘above and below’, Stellvertretung, as it takes place in a friendship, 
can become mutual and reciprocal without making the error of thinking of Christ’s originary 
Stellvertretung as something to which human persons contribute. In Stellvertretung—as it 
takes place in a relationship of mutuality and reciprocity and for particular others—one can 
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receive the gift of redemption in another acting for you, according to your own particularity, 
and you can, in turn, do the same for another. 
While the Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship is not transgressive of the boundary between 
the church and the world—at least in that both of them were ecclesially situated as 
Christians—Bonhoeffer’s thought, as I have presented it, also offers resources for a more 
complex and transgressive understanding of friendship. Bonhoeffer wrote of intercession and 
self-giving in terms of a possible transgression of that boundary; Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on 
Gandhi, as one for whom friendship would have been a speculative possibility, make possible 
a similar transgression. Further, in the Spielraum, the church already has forms of coextension 
with the political and social world as a whole. So there are theological resources present in 
Bonhoeffer’s thought that open the possibility of friendship that is ecclesially grounded, and 
yet open to others who are not ecclesially situated. With Bonhoeffer, we can imagine a 
political friendship in which a friend prays for another—that is, to think of it as theological 
Stellvertretung—without the necessity of mutuality in the case of prayer. Further, in the way 
that Bonhoeffer makes certain kinds of self-offering, in the Ethics, both extra-ecclesial and 
theological, we can imagine a mutuality in self-offering that is for the sake of the friend, and 
for the sake of others, but a friendship that crosses the boundary between the church and the 
world outside it. This kind of transgressive friendship would not be the same as the 
Bonhoeffer-Bethge friendship, in that it would not have access to the same kind of ecclesial 
practices that meant intercession and forgiveness could be mutual. But it would be a 
friendship nonetheless—and a theological one at that—and would fulfill the promise of a 
Spielraum in which friendship brings a level of social coherence and reparation to the political 
and social world as a whole.  
The question of human and divine agency, in Bonhoeffer, is both compelling and 
problematic. Bonhoeffer is silent about human agency as a problem with regard to divine 
agency in Sanctorum Communio and Discipleship, when he discusses ecclesial Stellvertretung 
in which human persons are actors; elsewhere, Bonhoeffer shows a very real concern about 
how one goes about doing God’s will.660 Speaking of Stellvertretung as a way of a human 
person acting as Christ for others could be explored through the ‘capacious as’ of John’s 
Gospel, a phrase David Ford develops in his Bampton lectures and relates to questions of 
agency;661 looking at agency through John’s Gospel would also be a way to turn the question 
of divine and human agency in a Trinitarian direction through John’s references to the Spirit’s 
                                                            
660 DBW/E 2, 51-53/57-59. 
661 David Ford, ‘Daring Spirit: John’s Gospel Now’, (unpublished manuscript, 2015). 
See lectures 1 and 3 especially; as Ford points out, John 5:26, 10:14-15, 13:34, 15:9, and 
15:12 each speak to shared agency in different ways. 
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place in this concept of shared agency. Tanner’s ‘double-rule’ in God and Creation in 
Christian Theology could be another avenue of investigation, specifically around her 
comments on Luther and soteriological agency,662 which allows for creaturely capacity to 
exist alongside divine sovereignty and unconditioned primacy in a way that would be 
compatible with the duality of theological Stellvertretung as both God acting for others in 
Christ, and human persons acting as Christ for others. 
In addition to Bonhoeffer’s ‘as’, the larger question of Bonhoeffer’s Johannine 
sensibility would be another good avenue of investigation. John 15:13—where Jesus speaks 
of the great love of laying down one’s life for one’s friends—has resonance in the way that 
for Bonhoeffer, to be a friend and Stellvertreter is to be Christ for another, and to offer 
oneself as Christ, but in an appropriately limited and creaturely way; following verses speak 
to freedom and servitude, explored in Chapter 4 in terms of freedom, commitment, and 
obedience; and knowledge, explored in Chapters 3 and 5. John 15’s words on friendship, in 
this way, may act as the kind of evangelical prototype that Ziegler sees operational elsewhere 
in Bonhoeffer’s eschatological understanding of the mandates. 
 These comments on Bonhoeffer studies, soteriology, political theology, agency, and 
the Johannine contours to Bonhoeffer’s thought, speak to the way my work offers some future 
avenues of investigation. But as a final word, in a thesis that argues for Stellvertretung in 
friendship, and for friendship as a relation for others, I would return to these two core 
concerns. If we were to say that it is extraordinary to imagine that Moses spoke to God as one 
speaks to a friend, as God does in Exodus, what I am saying here is even more extraordinary. 
If the friend can be Stellvertreter for a friend, we do more than speak to God as a friend: as 
we speak to a friend, we speak to God. But this is also about much more than speech. The 
friend acts as God for us, fashioning our own particular redemption as we do the same in 
return. And as the friend acts for us, and us for the friend, God may be fashioning a 
redemption not only for us or the friend, but for others as well. 
                                                            
662 Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2005), pp. 105, 111-12. 
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APPENDIX: Why Rößler? 
 
Among Bonhoeffer’s correspondents, there are a number of possible candidates for an 
investigation into Bonhoeffer’s practice of friendship. I chose Rößler for three reasons: 1. The 
letters are substantive, having clear points of connection with Bonhoeffer’s theology (in this 
case his political eschatology), allowing for some analysis of Bonhoeffer’s theological 
development in relation to a friendship; 2. In these letters, we see evidence of the fact that 
they thought of one another as friends; and 3. They engaged in reflection on the meaning of 
friendship and/or its limits. There are no other candidates that fulfill all three of these criteria.  
In his article of Bonhoeffer’s theology of friendship, Bethge lists Bonhoeffer’s 
‘friends in the singular’: Hans Christoph von Hase, Walter Dreß, Franz Hildebrandt, and 
himself;663 in his biography of Bonhoeffer, Bethge also calls Barth a friend of 
Bonhoeffer’s.664 But among these candidates, aside from Bethge himself (as seen in Chapter 
5), references to friendship were rare.  
In the letters shared between Bonhoeffer and von Hase, there is one to von Hase from 
Bonhoeffer (DBW/E 9:1/4, 13-14/23), and two to Bonhoeffer from von Hase (DBW/E 
10:1/139, 205/250; DBW/E 10:1/143, 208-11/253-56). Bonhoeffer and von Hase neither refer 
to one another as friends nor do they have a conversation about friendship. 
In the letters shared between Bonhoeffer and Dreß, there are two letters to Dreß from 
Bonhoeffer, both addressed to him and Susanne Dreß (DBW/E 14:1/15, 62-63/81; DBW/E 
15:1/32a, 123/76-77), and 25 to Bonhoeffer from Dreß (DBWE 9:1/89a, 144-45 and DBW 
17, 20; DBWE 9:1/89b, 145-46 and DBW 17, 21; DBWE 9:1/93a, 150 and DBW 17, 21-22; 
DBWE 9:1/93b, 150 and DBW 17, 22; DBWE 9:1/94a, 152 and DBW 17, 22-23; DBWE 
9:1/96b, 157-58 and DBW 17, 24; DBWE 9:1/97a, 161 and DBW 17, 24-25; DBWE 9:1/97b, 
161 and DBW 17, 25; DBWE 9:1/97e, 163 and DBW 17, 27; DBWE 9:1/97f, 164 and DBW 
17, 28; DBWE 9:1/99a, 166 and DBW 17, 28-29; DBWE 9:1/99b, 167 and DBW 17, 49-50; 
DBWE 9:1/99c, 168-69 and DBW 17, 50-51; DBWE 9:1/102a, 173 and DBW 17, 51; DBWE 
9:1/102b, 173-74 and DBW 17, 51-52; DBWE 9:1/105a, 177 and DBW 17, 52; DBWE 
10:1/14a, 76-77 and DBW 17, 70-72; DBWE 10:1/19b, 86-88 and DBW 17, 74-76; DBWE 
10:1/27a, 101-03 and DBW 17, 76-79; DBWE 10:1/44a, 136-38 and DBW 17, 81-84; DBWE 
10:1/45a, 139-40 and DBW 17, 84-85; DBWE 10:1/45b, 141 and DBW 17, 86; DBWE 
10:1/49a, 146 and DBW 17, 86-87; DBWE 10:1/60a, 157 and DBW 17, 87-88; DBWE 
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13:1/47a, 76-77 and DBW 17, 121). None of the letters shared between Dreß and Bonhoeffer 
speak of friendship, nor do they address one another as friends. 
In a letter to Erwin Sutz, Bonhoeffer calls Hildebrandt a ‘friend’ (DBW/E 11:1/38, 
96/63); in a letter to Karl Barth, he calls Hildebrandt his ‘closest friend’ (DBW/E 13:1/2, 
13/22); and in a letter to Heinrich Lebrecht, Bonhoeffer calls Hildebrandt ‘a close friend’ 
(DBWE 13:1/85a, 125). Bonhoeffer and Hildebrandt were certainly friends. But in the four 
letters from Hildebrandt to Bonhoeffer (DBW/E 10:1/138, 202-04/246-49; DBW/E 10:1/149, 
217-19/262-64; DBW/E 10:1/156, 229-31/273-75; DBW/E 13:1/66, 86-88/92-95) and the two 
letters from Bonhoeffer to Hildebrandt (DBW/E 14:1/151, 300/318 to both Hildebrandt and 
Julius Rieger; DBW/E 15:1/6, 22-23/28), they do not refer to one another as ‘friend’ or write 
about the friendship.  
In the correspondence between Bonhoeffer and Barth, neither calls the other ‘friend’ 
nor do they clearly think of their relationship as a friendship; though Bonhoeffer did share 
with Barth what he calls ‘personal matters’ (DBW/E 13:1/2, 15/24), it is a relationship 
between senior and junior colleagues, though one that was valued by both. Their shared value 
in the relationship is seen in the exchange concerning Bonhoeffer’s reasons for being in Basel 
in September 1941 which had caused some suspicion in Barth’s circle; on this, see the letter 
from Bonhoeffer to Barth (DBW/E 16:1/161, 267-69/277-79), the response from Charlotte 
von Kirschbaum (16:1/162, 269-72/279-81), and Bonhoeffer’s response to von Kirschbaum 
(16:1/163, 272/282); Barth had also sent greetings, and a cigar, to Bonhoeffer in prison 
(DBW/E 8:1/79, 299/199). In the nine letters from Bonhoeffer to Barth, Bonhoeffer addresses 
Barth respectfully as ‘Professor’ (DBW/E 12:1/21, 37-38/81-2; DBW/E 12:1/37, 56-57/99-
100; DBW/E 12:1/41, 62/105; DBW/E 12:1/96, 124-25/164-66; DBW/E 13:1/2, 11-15/21-24; 
DBW/E 14:1/119, 234-40/252-55; DBW/E 16:1/110, 182-83/190-91; DBW/E 16:1/160, 266-
67/276-77; DBW/E 16:1/161, 267-69/277-79); in all five letters from Barth to Bonhoeffer, 
Barth addresses Bonhoeffer as ‘Colleague’ (DBW/E 12:1/30, 48-49/92-93; DBW/E 12:1/39, 
60-61/103; DBW/E 12:1/97, 125-28/166-69; DBW/E 13:1/16, 31-34/39-41; DBW/E 
14:1/124, 249-53/265-69), with one in which Barth sends ‘cordial greetings to you and all our 
friends’ (DBW/E 12:1/39, 661/103) and one in which Barth sends ‘friendly sentiments’ 
(DBW/E 14:1/124, 253/269). It is a relationship of mutual respect, if not the closeness seen in 
the Bethge and Rößler correspondence. 
There are, however, possibilities beyond what Bethge suggests. Gottfried Beckmann 
and Gerhard Vibrans (along with Bethge) are referred to as potential friends in the Vibrans 
family guestbook (DBW/E 14:1/21, 73/93). The only surviving correspondence concerning 
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Beckmann is a letter to Beckmann’s parents in response to Beckmann’s imprisonment in 
Magdeburg (DBW/E 14:1/152, 301/319). 
Despite the promise of the Vibrans-Bonhoeffer friendship, there are only four letters 
from Bonhoeffer to Vibrans (DBW/E 14:1/82, 166/187; DBW/E 14:1/90, 180-82/200-02; 
DBW/E 14:1/96, 191-93/210-13; DBW/E 14:1/114, 227-29/244-46) and one letter from 
Vibrans to Bonhoeffer (DBW/E 14:1/87, 171-75/192/95). Again, aside from an apologetic 
letter from Bonhoeffer after the fateful trip to Switzerland with Bonhoeffer, Bethge, and 
Vibrans that I mention in Chapter 5, there are no references to their friendship or its practice 
to be found in this correspondence.  
De Graaff, in Politics and Friendship, describes Bonhoeffer’s relationship with 
George Bell as a friendship. But the correspondence itself—though there is a great deal of 
it—does not offer much guidance about what Bonhoeffer himself thought about friendship or 
its practice. Bell does ask Bonhoeffer to translate a letter he was writing to Hindenberg and 
Reich Bishop Müller into German, and was concerned ‘not to embarrass one’s friends’—
meaning Bonhoeffer—if Bonhoeffer were to do the translation (DBWE 13:1/61, 88-89). But 
in the 38 letters from Bonhoeffer to Bell (DBWE 13:1/12, 28-29; DBWE 13:1/15, 30; DBWE 
13:1/18, 35-35; DBWE 13:1/19, 43-44; DBWE 13:1/36, 64; DBWE 13:1/44, 67; DBWE 
13:1/60, 87-88; DBWE 13:1/62, 89; DBWE 13:1/76, 116; DBWE 13:1/79, 118-19; DBWE 
13:1/89, 128-30; DBWE 13:1/90, 130-131; DBWE 13:1/92, 132-33; DBWE 13:1/95, 137-38; 
DBWE 13:1/99, 140-41; DBWE 13:1/106 147-48; DBWE 13:1/117, 167-68; DBWE 
13:1/119, 169-72; DBWE 13:1/126, 181; DBWE 13:1/132, 188; DBWE 13:1/144 213-14; 
DBWE 13:1/155, 226-27; DBWE 13:1/169, 250; DBWE 13:1/175, 258; DBWE 13:1/188, 
279-80; DBWE 14:1/25, 100-01; DBWE 14:1/132, 287; DBWE 15:1/80, 153-54; DBWE 
15:1/82, 155-57; DBWE 15:1/85, 160; DBWE 15:1/106, 176-77; DBWE 15:1/147, 258-59; 
DBWE 16:1/92, 167; DBWE 16:1/113, 193; DBWE 16:1/132, 223-24; DBWE 16:1/166, 285-
86; DBWE 16:1/175, 311-12; DBWE 16:1/199, 354), and the 13 letters from Bell to 
Bonhoeffer (DBWE 13:1/13, 29/37; DBWE 13:1/46, 74-75; DBWE 13:1/61, 88-89; DBWE 
13:1/75, 115; DBWE 13:1/78, 117-18; DBWE 13:1/97, 139; DBWE 13:1/98, 139-40; DBWE 
13:1/107, 142; DBWE 13:1/118, 168-69; DBWE 13:1/171, 251; DBWE 13:1/189, 281-82; 
DBWE 15:1/105, 176; DBWE 15:1/156, 268), there is no discussion at all about friendship, 
or much sense—beyond Bell’s passing remark—that they thought of it as a ‘friendship’. 
De Gruchy mentions Paul Lehmann, Frank Fisher, Jean Lassere, and Elisabeth Zinn as 
friends of Bonhoeffer that acted as theological interlocutors.665 The four letters from 
Bonhoeffer to Lehmann (DBWE 15:1/97, 170-71; DBWE 15:1/125, 204-06; DBWE 
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15:1/131, 212; DBWE16:1/116a, 196-201), and the 15 letters to Lehmann from Bonhoeffer 
(DBWE 11:1/2a, 32 and DBW 17, 90-91; DBWE 11:1/8a, 41-44 and DBW 17, 91-94; 
DBWE 11:1/37a and DBW 17, 105-06; DBWE 11:1/59a, DBW 17, 106-08; DBWE 11:1/68a, 
131-33 and DBW 17, 109-11; DBWE 11:1/93a and DBW 17, 112-14; DBWE 12:1/10b, 70-
71 and DBW 17:10a, 115; DBW/E 15:1/40, 90-91/91-92; DBW/E 15:1/114, 191-92/191-92; 
DBWE 15:1/126, 206; DBW/E 15:1/128, 208-10/209-10; DBWE 15:1/133, 213-14; DBWE 
16:1/16a, 61-63 and DBW 17, 94-96; DBWE 16:1/92a, 168 and DBW 17, 128; DBWE 
16:1/126a, 219-20) have the same limitations as others. Bonhoeffer thanks Lehmann for a 
letter ‘so full of friendship’ (DBW/E 15:1/128, 208/209) and refers to their ‘friendship’ 
(DBWE 16:1/92a, 168 and DBW 17, 128) but neither are in a reflective mood about the 
nature of the friendship. As for Frank Fisher and Jean Lassere, there is not enough material to 
work with. There are no letters at all between Frank Fisher, though there is a reference, in 
Bonhoeffer’s awkward English, to being Fisher’s ‘boyfriend’ in a letter to Paul Lehmann 
(DBWE 11:1/37a, 95). There is one extant letter from Lassere (DBWE 15:1/149, 262) in 
which he calls Bonhoeffer ‘dear friend’; in a letter to Erwin Sutz Bonhoeffer also refers to 
Lassere as ‘our friend’ (DBW/E 15:1/29, 72/72). The single published Zinn letter (DBW/E 
14:1/47, 112-14/134-35) makes no reference to their relationship as a friendship. 
Another candidate— Erwin Sutz—despite a good number of letters to investigate, also 
does not provide much pertinent material. Bonhoeffer did write to Sutz, asking: ‘Please be 
warmly assured that our friendship will always be important to me’ (DBW/E 12:1/38, 
59/102); in another letter he would call himself Sutz’s ‘old friend’ in the closing (DBW/E 
13:1/93, 129/136); addresses Sutz as ‘Friend’ (DBW/E 14:1/59, 136/149); and calls Sutz a 
‘friend’ in a letter to Karl Barth (DBW/E 14:1/119, 235/252). They were clearly friends in 
Bonhoeffer’s eyes. But in the 21 letters from Bonhoeffer to Sutz (DBW/E 10:1/144, 211-
12/256-57; DBW/E 11:1/4, 16-17/34-35; DBW/E 11:1/5, 17-18/35-36; DBW/E 11:1/6, 18-
22/36-40; DBW/E 11:1/11, 27-29/49-51; DBW/E 11:1/27, 49-52/75-78; DBW/E 11:1/39, 63-
66/96-99; DBW/E 11:1/59, 87-91/119-123; DBW/E 11:1/66, 94-95/129; DBW/E 11:1/72, 99-
102/136-138; DBW/E 11:1/89, 117/18/155-56; DBW/E 12:1/38, 57-59/100-02; DBW/E 
12:1/67, 97-98/140-41; DBW/E 13:1/93, 128-29/134-36; DBW/E 13/147, 204-06/216-18; 
DBW/E 14:1/59, 136-37/149; DBW/E 14:1/113, 227/244; DBW/E 14:1/125, 254-57/270-73; 
DBW/E 15:1/29, 71-72/71-72; DBW/E 15:135, 215/215; DBW/E 16:1/127, 206/220-21) 
there is no discussion of friendship. (No letters from Sutz to Bonhoeffer have survived.)  
The letters shared with the Cromwell family make an interesting case. In Bonhoeffer’s 
letter to Philipp Cromwell, he addresses Philipp as ‘friend’ (DBWE 14:1/67a, 147); and then 
in his letter to Phillipp’s son, Ernst, Bonhoeffer writes of friendship and shared conviction 
  179 
(and is quoted as an epigraph to this chapter; DBWE 14:1/69a, 163). The other ten letters to 
Ernst Cromwell (DBW/E 13:1/208a, printed in DBWE 17, 55–57, original German 
unavailable in print; DBW/E 13:1/209a, printed in DBWE 17, 57–58, original German 
unavailable in print; DBW/E 13:1/209b, printed in DBWE 17, 58, original German 
unavailable in print; DBWE 14:1/4a, 58-60; DBWE 14:6a, 64-65; DBWE 14:15a, 82; DBWE 
14:20a, 92; DBWE 14:32a, 108-09; DBWE 14:40a, 122-23), one to the Cromwell family 
(DBWE 14:4b, 60-61), and one from Philipp Cromwell to Bonhoeffer (DBW/E 13:1/210a, 
printed in DBWE 17, 59, original German unavailable in print) do not offer any additional 
reflections on friendship. What Bonhoeffer does say, however, about shared convictions and 
friendship, offers corroborating evidence for my argument that for Bonhoeffer, friendship has 
political dimensions. 
Finally, Bonhoeffer calls Jürgen Winterhager ‘Friend’ in his salutation (DBW/E 
13:1/111, 147/153); Théodore de Félice calls Bonhoeffer ‘friend’ is his salutation four times; 
presumably ‘Ami’ in the original French (DBWE 13:1/121, 173; DBWE 13:1/138, 197-98; 
DBWE 13:1/150, 223; DBWE 13:1/153, 225). Bonhoeffer’s responses to de Félice do not 
reciprocate (DBWE 13:1/151, 223-24; DBWE 13:1/174, 257); Gandhi addresses Bonhoeffer 
as ‘friend’ in his English salutation (DBWE 13:1/158, 229) and Nils Karlström addresses 
Bonhoeffer as ‘friend’ (DBW/E 14:1/53, 118/139). But none of these references are part of 
any substantial body of correspondence.  
Many of these relationships—such as the one Bonhoeffer shared with von Hase, Dreß, 
Hildebrandt, Vibrans, Sutz, Lehmann, Lassere, Fisher and Philipp Cromwell—were certainly 
friendships, and understood as such. And it is likely that many of these friendships included 
theological conversation and discussions about friendship. But among them, the Rößler 
friendship stands apart because of the way the friendship was largely epistolary, and therefore 
open to textual investigation. In the Rößler correspondence, we have evidence that 
Bonhoeffer and Rößler engaged in theological conversation, considered their relationship a 
friendship, and engaged in conversation about the nature of that friendship and its limits. The 
only parallel epistolary relationship was with Bethge.
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